

# METHODIST REVIEW.

(BIMONTHLY.)

WILLIAM V. KELLEY, D.D., Editor.

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NEW YORK:  
HUNT & EATON.  
CINCINNATI:  
CRANSTON & CURTS.

Subscription Price, Postage Included, \$2.50.

[Entered at the Post Office, New York, N. Y., as second-class mail matter.]

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# METHODIST REVIEW.

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JANUARY, 1896.

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## ART. I.—EDGAR A. POE'S ADDENDA TO HIS "EU-REKA," WITH COMMENTS.\*

THESE extracts relate to, and constitute a part of, a letter written on February 29, 1848, by Edgar A. Poe to a correspondent still living in one of the States of our Union. Since Professor Stringham, of the California State University, has seen fit to publicly comment upon the matter embraced in these extracts, without having given a clear, comprehensive idea of the text of Poe's *Addenda* (refer to Mr. George E. Woodberry's Life of Poe), it seems but fair to all parties concerned, including such portion of the public as may have read the professor's strictures, that the lack be now supplied by a publication of the hitherto unpublished *Addenda*.

In the letter referred to Poe writes to his correspondent :

"I presume you have seen some newspaper notices of my late lecture upon the Universe. You could have gleaned, however, no idea of what the lecture was, from what the papers said it was. All praised it as far as I have yet seen, and all absurdly misrepresented it. . . . To eke out a chance of your understanding what I really *did* say, I add a loose summary of my propositions and results.

"By the by, lest you infer that my views, in detail, are the same with those advanced in the *Nebular Hypothesis*, I venture to offer a few addenda, the substance of which was

\*Being *Extracts from Siftings*, by Slevé. Copyrighted in 1889, but not hitherto published.

penned, though never printed, several years ago, under the head of

“ ‘A PREDICTION.’ ”

“As soon as the beginning of the next century, it will be entered in the books that the Sun was originally condensed at once (not gradually, according to the supposition of Laplace) to his smallest size; that, thus condensed, he rotated on an axis; that this axis of rotation was not the centre of his figure, so that he not only rotated, but revolved in an elliptical orbit (the rotation and revolution are one, but I separate them for convenience of illustration); that, thus formed, and thus revolving, he was on fire and sent into space his substance in vapor, this vapor reaching farthest on the side of the larger (equatorial) hemisphere, partly on account of the largeness, but principally because the force of the fire was greater here; that, in due time, this vapor, not necessarily carried then to the place now occupied by Neptune, condensed into that planet; that Neptune took, as a matter of course, the same figure which the Sun had, which figure made his rotation a revolution in an elliptical orbit; that, in consequence of such revolution—in consequence of his being *carried backward* at each of the daily revolutions—the velocity of his *annual* revolution is not so great as it would be if it depended solely upon the Sun's velocity of rotation (Kepler's third law); that his figure, by influencing his rotation—the heavier half, as it turns downward toward the Sun, gains an impetus sufficient to carry it past the direct line of attraction, and thus, to *throw outward* the centre of gravity—gave him power to save himself from falling to the Sun; that he received, through a series of ages, the Sun's heat, which penetrated to his centre, causing volcanoes eventually, and thus throwing off vapor, and which evaporated substances upon his surface, till finally his moons and his gaseous ring (if it is true that he has a ring) were produced; that these moons took elliptical forms, rotated and revolved, ‘both under one,’ were kept in their *monthly* orbits by the centrifugal force acquired in their *daily* orbits, and required a longer time to make their monthly revolutions, than they would have required, if they had had no daily revolutions.

“I have said enough, without referring to the other planets, to give you an inkling of my hypothesis, which is all I intended

to do. I did not design to offer any evidence of its reasonableness; since I have not, in fact, any collected, excepting as it is flitting, in the shape of a shadow, to and fro within my brain.

"You perceive that I hold to the idea that our moon must rotate upon her axis oftener than she revolves round her primary, the same being the case with the moons accompanying Jupiter, Saturn, and Uranus.

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"Since the penning, a closer analysis of the matter contained has led me to modify somewhat my opinion as to the origin of the satellites—that is, I hold now that these came, not from vapor sent off in volcanic eruptions and by simple diffusion under the solar rays, but from rings of it which were left in the inter-planetary spaces, after the precipitation of the primaries. There is no insuperable obstacle in the way of the conception that meteoric stones and 'shooting stars' have their source in matter which has gone off from volcanoes and by common evaporation; but it is hardly supposable that a sufficient quantity could be produced thus, to make a body so large as, by centrifugal force resulting from rotation, to withstand the absorptive power of its parent's rotation. The event implied may take place not until the planets have become flaming suns—from an accumulation of their own Sun's caloric, reaching from centre to surface, which shall in the lonesome latter days melt all the 'elements' and dissipate the solid foundations out as a scroll.

"The sun forms, in rotating, a vortex in the ether surrounding him. The planets have their orbits lying within this vortex at different distances from its centre; so that their liabilities to be absorbed by it are, other things being equal, inversely just according to those distances, since length, not surface, is the measure of the absorptive power along the lines marking the orbits. Each planet overcomes its liability—that is, keeps in its orbit—through a counter-vortex generated by its own rotation. The force of such counter-vortex is measured by multiplying together the producing planet's density and rotary velocity; which velocity depends, not upon the length of the planet's equatorial circumference, but upon the distance through which a given point of the equator is carried during a rotary period.

"Then, *if* Venus and Mercury, for example, have now the same orbits in which they commenced their revolutions—the



orbit of the former 68 million miles, and that of the latter 37 million miles from the centre of the Sun's vortex—; if the diameter of Venus is  $2\frac{2}{3}$  times the diameter, and her density is the same with the density of Mercury; and if the rotary velocity of the equator of Venus is 1,000 miles per hour; that of Mercury's equator is 1,900 miles per hour, making the diameter of his *orbit of rotation* 14,500 miles—nearly 5 times that of himself. But I pass this point, without farther examination. Whether there is or is not a difference in the relative conditions of the different planets sufficient to cause such diversity in the extents of their peripheries of rotation as is indicated, still each planet is to be considered to have, other things equal, a vortical resistance bearing the same proportion inversely to that of every other planet which its distance from the centre of the solar vortex bears to the distance of every other from the same; so that, if it be removed inward or outward from its position, it will increase or diminish that resistance accordingly, by adding to or subtracting from its speed of rotation.

"Then, Mercury, at the distance of Venus, would rotate in an orbit only  $\frac{3}{8}$  as broad as the one in which he does rotate; so his centrifugal force, in that position, would be only  $\frac{3}{8}$  as great as it is in his own position; so his capability, while there, of resisting the *forward pressure* of the Sun's vortex, which prevents him from passing his full (*circle*) distance behind his centre of rotation and thus adds to his velocity in his *annual orbit*, would be but  $\frac{3}{8}$  what it is in his own place. But that forward pressure is only  $\frac{3}{8}$  as great at the distance of Venus as it is at that of Mercury. Then Mercury, with his own rotary speed in the annual orbit of Venus, would move in this orbit but  $\frac{3}{8}$  as fast as Venus moves in it; while Venus, with her rotary speed in Mercury's annual orbit, would move  $\frac{8}{3}$  as fast as she moves in her own—that is,  $\frac{8}{3}$  of  $\frac{3}{8}$  as fast as Mercury would move in the same (annual orbit of Venus); it follows that the square root of  $\frac{8}{3}$  is the measure of the velocity of Mercury in his own annual orbit with his own rotary speed, compared with that of Venus in her annual orbit with her own rotary speed—in accordance with fact.

"Such is my explanation of Kepler's first and third laws, which laws *cannot* be explained on the principle of Newton's theory.

"Two planets gathered from portions of the Sun's vapor into one orbit would rotate through the same ellipse with velocities proportional to their densities—that is, the denser planet would rotate the more swiftly; since, in condensing, it would have descended further toward the Sun. For example, suppose the Earth and Jupiter to be the two planets in one orbit. The diameter of the former is (in round numbers) 8,000 miles; period of rotation, 24 hours. The diameter of the latter, 88,000 miles; period,  $9\frac{1}{2}$  hours. The ring of vapor out of which the Earth was formed was of a certain (perpendicular) width; that out of which Jupiter was formed was of a certain greater width. In condensing, the springs of ether lying among the particles (these springs having been latent before the condensation began) were let out, the number of them along any given radial line being the number of spaces among all the couples of the particles constituting the line. If the two condensations had gone on in simple diametric proportions, Jupiter would have put forth only 11 times as many springs as the Earth did, and his velocity would have been but 11 times her velocity. But the fact that the falling downward of her particles was completed when they had got so far that 24 hours were required for her equator to make its rotary circuit, while that of his particles continued till but about  $\frac{2}{3}$  of her period was occupied by his equator in effecting *its* revolution, shows that his springs were increased above hers in still another ratio of  $2\frac{1}{2}$ , making, in the case, his velocity and his vortical force ( $2\frac{1}{2} \times 11 =$ ) 27 times her velocity and force.

"Then the planets' densities are inversely as their rotary periods, and their rotary velocities and degrees of centrifugal force are, other things being equal, directly as their densities.

"Two planets, revolving in one orbit, in rotating would approach the Sun, therefore enlarge their rotary ellipsis, therefore accelerate their rotary velocities, therefore increase their powers of withstanding the influence of the solar vortex, inversely according to the products of their diameters into their densities—that is, the smaller and less dense planet, having to resist an amount of influence equal to that resisted by the other, would multiply the number of its resisting springs by the ratios of the other's diameter and density to the diameter and density of itself.

Thus the Earth, in Jupiter's orbit, would have to rotate in an ellipse 27 times as broad as herself, in order to make her power correspond with his.

"Then, the breadths, in a perpendicular direction, of the rotary ellipses of the planets in their several orbits are inversely as the products obtained by multiplying together the bodies' densities, diameters, and distances from the centre of the solar vortex. Thus, the product of Jupiter's density, diameter, and distance being ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  times 11 times  $5\frac{3}{4}$ ) = 140 times the product of the Earth's density, diameter, and distance, the breadth of the latter's ellipse is about 1,120,000 miles; this, upon the foundation, of course, that Jupiter's ellipse coincides precisely with his own equatorial diameter. It will be observed that that process, in its last analysis, presents the point that rotary speed (hence that vortical force) is in exact inverse proportion to distance. Then, since the movement in orbit is a part of the rotary movement—being the rate at which the *centre of the rotary ellipse* is carried along the line marking the orbit—and since that centre and the planet's centre are not identical, the former being the point around which the latter revolves, causing, by the act, a relative loss of time in the inverse ratio of the square root of distance as I have shown, back; the speed in orbit is inversely according to the square root of distance. Demonstration—The Earth's orbital period contains  $365\frac{1}{4}$  of her rotary periods. During these periods, her equator passes through a distance of ( $1,120,000 \times 2\frac{1}{2} \times 365\frac{1}{4}$ ) = about 1,286 million miles; and the centre of her rotary ellipse, through a distance of ( $95,000,000 \times 2 \times 2\frac{1}{2}$ ) = about 597 million miles. Jupiter's orbital period has ( $365\frac{1}{4} \times 2\frac{1}{2} \times 12$  years =) about 10,957 of his rotary periods, during which his equator courses ( $688,000 \times 2\frac{1}{2} \times 10,957$ ) = about 3,050 million miles; and the centre of his rotary ellipse, about the same number of miles ( $490,000,000 \times 2 \times 2\frac{1}{2}$ ). Dividing this distance by 12 ( $\frac{3050000000}{12}$ ) gives the length of Jupiter's *double* journey during one of the Earth's orbital periods = 254 million miles. Relative velocities in ellipse ( $\frac{1286}{597}$ ) 5 plus to 1, which is inversely as the distances; and relative velocities in orbit ( $\frac{597}{254}$ ) 2 plus to 1, inversely as the square roots of the distances.

"The Sun's period of rotation being 25 days, his density is only  $\frac{1}{25}$  of that of a planet having a period of 24 hours—that

of Mercury, for instance. Hence Mercury has, for the purpose now in view, virtually, a diameter equal to a little more than  $\frac{1}{12}$  of that of the Sun ( $\frac{888000}{25}=35,520$ ;  $\frac{35520}{3}=11,840$ ;  $\frac{888000}{11.840}$ )—say, 75,000 miles.

"Here we have a conception of the planet in the *mid-stage*, so to speak, of its condensation—after the breaking up of the vaporous ring which was to produce it, and just at the taking on of the globular form. But before the arrival at this stage, the figure was that of a truck the vertical diameter of which is identifiable in the periphery of the globe ( $75,000 \times 2\frac{2}{7} =$ ) 236 thousand miles. Halfway down this diameter the body settled into its (original) orbit—rather, would have settled, had it been the only one, besides its parent, in the Solar System—an orbit distant from the Sun's equator ( $\frac{236000}{2} =$ ) 118,000 miles; and from the centre of the solar vortex ( $118,000 + \frac{888000}{2} =$ ) 562 thousand miles. To this are to be added, successively, the lengths of the semidiameters of the truck of Venus, of the Earth, and so on outward.

"Then, the planets' *original* distances—rather, speaking strictly, the widths from the common centre to the outer limits of their rings of vapor—are pointed at. From them, as foundations, the present distances may be deduced. A simple outline of the process to the deduction is this: Neptune took his orbit first; then Uranus took his. The effect of the coming into closer conjunction of the two bodies was such as would be produced by bringing each so much nearer the centre of the solar vortex. Each enlarged its rotary ellipse and increased its rotary velocity in the ratio of the decrease of distance. A secondary result—the *final* consequence—of the enlargement and the increase was the propulsion of each outward, the square root of the relative decrease being the measure of the length through which each was sent. The *primary* result, of course, was the drawing of each inward; and it is fairly presumable that there were oscillations inward and outward, outward and inward, during several successive periods of rotation. It is probable—at any rate, not glaringly improbable—that, in the oscillations across the remnants of the rings of vapor (supposing that these were not *completely* gathered into the composition of the bodies), portions of the vapor were whirled into satellites, which followed in the last passage outward.

"Saturn's ring (I have no allusion to the rings now existing), as well as that of each of the other planets after him, while it was gradually being cast off from the Sun's equator, was carried along in the track of its next predecessor, the distance here being the full quotient (not the square root of the quotient) found in dividing by the breadth to its own periphery that to the periphery of the other. Thus, reckoning for Uranus a breadth of 17 million, and for Saturn one of 14 million, miles, the latter (still in his vaporous state) was conducted outward (through a sort of capillary attraction)  $\frac{1}{14}$  as far as the former (after condensation) was driven by means of the vortical influence of Neptune. The new body and the two older bodies *interchanged forces*, and another advance outward (of all three) was made. Combining all of the asteroids into one of the *Nine Great Powers*, there were eight stages of the general movement away from the centre; and, granting that we have, exact, the diameters and the rotary periods (i. e., the densities) of all the participants in the movement, the measurement of each stage, by itself, and of all the stages together, can be calculated exactly."

Having now given Poe's "Addenda" transcribed from the letter referred to, we in turn will venture to do a little proving upon those assumptions-for-criticisms of Professor Stringham, which we cite, substantially in full, as follows:

"Poe's purely scientific speculations are mainly contained in the unpublished 'Addenda' to a report of a lecture on 'The Universe,' sent to a correspondent. . . . They exhibit, once more, Poe's tenacity of mind—the sleuthhound persistence of intellectual pursuit; but, like his metaphysics, they represent a waste of power. They are, moreover, characterized by extraordinary errors. Some of the data are quite imaginative, it being impossible to determine what are the facts. Some of them are quite wrong. The density of Jupiter, for example, in a long and important calculation, is constantly reckoned as two and a half; whereas it is only something more than one fifth; and the densities of the planets are described as being inversely as their rotary periods; whereas in any table of the elements of the solar system some wide departures from this rule are observable.



"Again, it is stated that Kepler's first and third laws 'cannot be explained upon the principle of Newton's theory;' but in fact they follow by mathematical deduction from it. Poe's own explanation of them is merely a play upon figures.

"A striking instance of fundamental ignorance of astronomical science is his statement, at various places, that the planets rotate (on their own axes) in elliptical orbits, and the reference he frequently makes to the *breadth* of their orbits (the *breadth* of their paths through space), agreeably to this supposition. Such a theory is incompatible with the Newtonian law of gravitation, according to which any revolution in an elliptical orbit implies a source of attraction at the focus of the ellipse. . . . To make the proper rotations of the planets themselves take place about a focus, which would be merely a point moving in an elliptical orbit about the sun, would be to give them an arbitrary motion, with no force to produce it."

This complaint from Professor Stringham presents three distinct items, two of which can be met by plain, easy arithmetical ciphering; while the other horn of the dilemma may be knocked off through logical reasoning from presumably approved premises. Before commencing our surgery we will propound two or three direct questions at the professor. Is not the "table," to which you call attention, that *old one*, measuring compactness in precise accordance with Newton's rule for fixing gravitating tendency—that is, by finding the ratios of distances from the centers of gravity (the phrase being, here, convertible into centers of density!)? Did not the table record Mercury as the closest-grained; Venus, next; Earth, third; so on, outward? Have not you (judges in the case) already taken wide "departures" with respect to the three planets named? If you have discarded one part of the regulation, what feasible ground have you for holding to any other part?

The undisputed premises of which we spoke are, that the planets were originally diffused particles, and that these began to fall together—in other words, took a step toward a rotary movement. Every particle put forth a spring of velocity. The sum of the springs indicates the number of the pieces deposited within a given compass and the narrowing of the spaces among them. Condensation and speed of descent go abreast. Swift rotation necessarily *means* correspondingly near contact.

As to the mathematical deduction of Kepler's two laws from the Newtonian code, this code declares that gravity is multiplied in exact proportion to the square of decrease in distance; that the same drawing force is (was) the cause of the planetary revolutions about the source of itself. Then by inference which cannot truthfully be gainsaid these revolutions must be hastened in complete union with the application of the enlarged power—that is, orbital velocities *are obliged* to be accelerated *by square*; “whereas” Kepler *demonstrates* that the augmentation is gauged by the *square root*.

As to the breadths of elliptical rotary orbits, let the professor start the earth upon her course about the sun. Her center coincides with a point of the approximately even—*unswitched*—curve of her average orbit. He insists that such position is kept, *always*—that the height from that center to the equatorial periphery of her figure will be forever that from the pivot to the circle of rotation. Well, she advances along the orbit at the rate, say, of 67,000 miles per hour. Take notice that this is the measure of the center's progress. Of course, since the axial turning (also forward) continues, the circumference *has to go* a little faster. Surely the critic will need no farther guidance by us to enable him to *deduce mathematically* (by a “play upon figures”?) the inevitable fact that each rotation will be performed in fewer than twenty-three minutes, hence that there will be more than 23,000 “days” in a single “year” (reckoning radius of orbit 93,000,000 miles).

By consulting some of the recent issues of the London periodical entitled *Nature* Professor Stringham will discover that the selfsame ill-begotten *elliptical monster*, exorcised by him from the “Addenda,” has been offered in attempted elucidation of the *lifting of latitude*, discussions of which he no doubt has read. Our closing advice to him is that he construct a machine consisting of an unbalanced wheel upon an axle; that he ascend with it in a balloon; set it revolving, withdraw the axle, letting it down whirling. Will—can—it describe any other than elliptical figures? Furthermore, is it possible for him to even *imagine* (intelligently) the formation of a perfect sphere, such as his plan provides for, out of atoms hanging loose and huddling indiscriminately in space?

## ART. II. —AN INSPIRING CHAPTER IN METHODIST HISTORY.

SINCE the Primitive Methodist Connection, after a very successful existence of eighty-five years, seems likely soon to end its separate career the time is favorable to review its history. Negotiations for a union between it and the Bible Christians have so far progressed that the time cannot be distant when they will fully come together under some such name as the "Presbyterian Methodist Church" or the "Methodist Union Church," both of which have been proposed by the committee. Since the Primitives have, according to the latest returns, 196,324 members (besides some 5,000 probationers), together with 462,856 pupils in Sunday schools, and the Bible Christians have 34,047 members, with 56,222 in the Sunday schools, the combination would give certainly a body with more than 750,000 adherents, if not well toward a million. And this union will be, we trust, but the prelude to that larger amalgamation which shall blend the more than two millions of Wesleyan Methodists and the half million of smaller Methodist bodies into one grand consolidated Church, that will swing clear of all coquetry with the semi-Romanized Anglican Establishment and take its rightful place, in self-respectful dignity and aggressive power, at the head of the truly Protestant forces of the empire.

Exceptions have often been taken by Wesleyan Methodists to the name "Primitive Methodists," adopted by the new organization in 1812, as though it contained an unfair reflection on the older body. But we think history will justify the appellation. John Wesley said at Chester, in April, 1790, after exhorting the preachers to go into the streets and lanes of the city, as well as under the trees and hedges of the country, that all might be brought in, "This is the way the primitive Methodists did." And this was peculiarly and specifically the way adopted by those who followed Messrs. Bourne and Clowes in 1807 and after. Moreover, it was for doing this these leaders were cast out of the Wesleyan Methodist Connection. The camp meeting held on Mow Hill in Cheshire, Sunday, May 31, 1807, was the beginning of the offense; and the refusal of its promoters to cease these irregular operations, by

which great numbers were converted, sealed their fate. They felt that they must listen to what they regarded as the voice of God rather than the voice of man; and they deemed that they were genuine followers of that great innovator and open-air preacher, John Wesley, who was ready at any time to throw routine and regularity to the winds if he might only save more souls. So they went steadily on, perfectly satisfied that the work was of the Lord, and that good but mistaken men would not be permitted to overthrow it. The issue fully justified their opinion.

Great as are the wonders connected with the rise and growth of Wesleyan Methodism in the eighteenth century, they are more than paralleled by the facts brought out in a study of the beginnings of Primitive Methodism in the nineteenth century, which was an equally marvelous revival of true religion. The latter movement, while not headed by men of such ability and distinction as led the former, had nevertheless leaders who were in a very marked degree men of God, and it showed even a more rapid progress. Tyerman\* is authority for the statement that at Wesley's twenty-fourth Conference, in 1767, twenty-eight years after Methodism was founded, there were 41 circuits, 104 itinerant preachers, and 25,911 members, being an average gain of less than one thousand members a year. Whereas at the fourth Primitive Methodist Conference, in 1823, thirteen years after the formation of the first class, there were 45 circuits, 202 itinerant preachers, and 29,472 members, being an average annual gain of more than two thousand. Taking a longer period of comparison the result is the same. In 1781, which was forty-two years from 1739, the year in which Mr. Wesley's societies actually began, the number of members in the Wesleyan Connection was 44,461. The number in the Primitive Methodist Connection after forty-two years, that is, in 1852, the date of the founder's death, was 109,984. In 1799, sixty years after the beginning of Wesleyan Methodism, the number of members in the society was 107,752; in 1867, sixty years from 1807, the earliest beginnings of Primitive Methodism, the numbers in society were 155,247. Of course it may be urged that the population of the country was not so numerous in Wesley's day, that the principles of religious liberty were not so well understood, and that—what

\* *Life and Times of John Wesley*, vol. II, p. 606.

perhaps most of all kept down the numbers of his societies—Mr. Wesley was so strongly attached to the Church of England as to very seriously oppose the rise of a new denomination. But, on the other hand, it should also be said that the Primitive Methodist preachers had nowhere such audiences as attended the Wesleys and Whitefield, nor the help which the latter's learning, eloquence, and prestige afforded; nor had they by any means such a free field on which to operate, since they were obliged to follow another body of similar doctrines and principles that had already largely taken possession of the country; yet their members were not drawn from this other body, but from the wholly neglected, unevangelized masses. So, on the whole, the comparison cannot be accounted an unfair one. And it serves at least to awaken a desire to know by what means, under what circumstances, through what instrumentalities, these marvelous successes were achieved. The story is one of stirring incident and thrilling interest.

Messrs. Bourne and Clowes have been mentioned as founders and leaders. They were, indeed, a remarkable couple, neither of whom could well have been spared. It is not possible to enter here into the details of their lives, but a sketch must be given. Hugh Bourne, the chief impelling spirit of the movement, came into the world April 3, 1772, and left it October 11, 1852. He was a poor man, a carpenter, with very few natural advantages of any kind, and not converted till he was twenty-seven. But the sequel showed that he had within him a mind of no ordinary strength, as well as a heart that burned with zeal for the Master. Being led of the Lord, as he firmly believed, to inaugurate in England what had proved so useful in America, open-air, all-day religious services, or camp meetings, he was not one to draw back at opposition; and, although the establishment of a new denomination was at first the farthest possible from his thoughts, as he took step after step under providential guidance, he came at last to see that there was no other way. He was compelled after a little to give up his business, that he might devote his whole time to evangelistic labors and the general superintendency of the rising cause. No toil was too heavy, no service too menial, no journey too long, no expense too great for him, if only the Master's work could be promoted. His journeys were almost always on foot.



It is probable that no man ever walked so many miles in the prosecution of Christian enterprise. He kept this up to the last of his long life, chiefly, it would seem, because he was unwilling to spend money on his own comfort or convenience that might be, as he thought, more advantageously expended on other objects. It was owing mainly to his judicious counsels, his pious example, and his tireless industry that matters moved forward so well. He looked after everything. He was hard at it, early and late, now rectifying abuses, now reclaiming backsliders, now organizing schools or building chapels, now visiting families, now preaching with all his might. He struck out a set of rules for the government of the societies, he established a tract society, he prepared a hymn book, he was connectional editor up to the time of his superannuation, in 1842. His was the master mind appealed to on almost all occasions, his was the guiding hand that rarely failed to find the right channel for the ecclesiastical ship. He had great legislative talents. Without his sagacity, energy, and determination it is scarcely possible that the connection could have conquered its early difficulties. He chiefly constructed its polity, shaped its laws, and enforced the stringent measures that were necessary for the general good. For strong faith and prayerfulness, self-denial and generosity, energy and zeal, he has rarely been surpassed.

William Clowes was born March 12, 1780, and died March 2, 1851, just sixty years after the departure of Wesley. After a wild and reckless youth he was powerfully converted in his twenty-fifth year. He speedily became a tremendous exhorter, heartily united with Bourne in holding camp meetings, and soon developed into the chief preacher of the movement. His exertions were enormous. He was emphatically a shouter, and would labor till his strength failed night after night, after working hard all day from six to six at his temporal calling, which was pottery. When arrangements were made for him to give his whole time to evangelistic effort, extensive revivals followed his work and there were large gatherings. At the first Conference of the Primitive Methodists, in 1820, the membership was 7,842; at the second it had become 16,394; in 1822 the number was 25,218; in 1823 the membership was 29,472, and at the fifth Conference, in 1824, it was 33,507. This was most amazing growth, a development from about 4,000 in 1819

to over 33,000 in 1824. It was too rapid to be healthy, and the rate could not be continued. But it shows that there had been sweeping revivals, and among those who promoted them Mr. Clowes was foremost. His career as a preacher was brief but brilliant. His labors were exhausting, his economy was rigid, and the strains to which he constantly subjected his physical energies, combined with the excesses of his youth, soon laid him aside in premature decay. He had to be located in 1827, at Hull, where he spent the last twenty-four years of his life. His preaching was original, his power in prayer extraordinary, his heavenly-mindedness most marked. All recognized him as a man of eminent holiness, who lived the Gospel as well as preached it. Bourne was the Wesley, Clowes the Whitefield of the new Methodism, or like Bunting and Newton in later Wesleyan days. Both were great and good; each supplemented the work of the other. One was the organizer, legislator, administrator; the other was the pioneer missionary, the breaker-up of fallow ground. One had the penetration, foresight, tact, and grasp of the commander in chief; the other the heroism, dash, and fire of the general of division or the cavalry commander. Both were actuated by a pure and ardent desire to extend the Redeemer's kingdom.

How were their labors, and those of their coadjutors, received by the British public of that day? In a way that would hardly be credited did not authentic records bear unimpeachable testimony to the facts. They worked mainly among the ignorant, vicious, degraded masses, whose savage brutality found in their unresisting meekness plentiful opportunity to disport itself. The clergymen and magistrates, being as a rule much more scandalized by irregular ways of doing good than by any amount of wickedness, generally took the part of the mobs against the preachers. Indeed, they often set the rabble on, instead of restraining them, giving orders for the bells to be rung, the drums to be beaten, and the fire engines to be played, that the evangelists might be driven out of town and the cause of the devil properly maintained. Dangerous bulls were let loose to break up the congregations. Stones, clods, filth, and rotten eggs were used with the utmost freedom, and sometimes with fatal consequences. Poor men who opened their cottages for religious services often had their windows

and doors torn out, and an appeal to the magistrates not only brought them no redress, but subjected them to greater injuries from those who were encouraged by the attitude of the officials. The preachers were very frequently knocked down, kicked, beaten, and trampled under foot by ruffianly rioters, escaping with their lives as by a miracle. They endured pouring rain and pelting hail, the extremities of winter's cold and summer's heat, sleeping under the open sky when people were afraid to give them shelter, and going for days with scarcely any food, because no one would sell to them. They saw the inside of a great many prisons, but their enemies made nothing by it; for they took joyfully both the spoiling of their goods and the casting out of their names as evil, knowing that they had in heaven a more enduring substance; and, like the apostles, they were glad that they were "counted worthy to suffer dishonor for the Name." Jeremiah Gilbert wrote, "Within the last fifteen months I have been taken before magistrates for preaching the Gospel six or seven times; but I have never lost anything but pride, shame, unbelief, hardness of heart, the fear of man, love of the world, and prejudice of mind. I have always come out of prison more pure than when I went in." Mr. Bunn was committed to Bury jail for ten days on an unfounded charge of obstructing the highway. Even the prisoners were indignant at this shameful defiance of law and justice, one of them remarking to Mr. Bunn, "Sir, they sent you here for trying to do good, and me for doing harm." When George Stansfield was sent to Dover jail for seven days for preaching in the streets the prisoners thought, from his dignified appearance and gentlemanly bearing, that he was come to inspect the prison, and were astonished beyond measure to learn that he was to be confined as a criminal for praying and singing. Another, Mr. S. Waller, sentenced to imprisonment for three months, was taken severely ill, and through the neglect of the prison doctor his life was seriously imperiled. But kind friends bestirred themselves, and he was brought back from death's door. Mr. Isaac Hedges received twenty-one days' imprisonment with hard labor, being charged with blocking up a public foot-path, though he had simply preached to five persons in front of a wheelwright's shop, seventeen feet from the middle of the road. Mr. Thomas Russell, in 1830, for selling a few maga-

zines and hymn books without a hawker's license, was sentenced to three months' hard labor in Abingdon House of Correction. Arriving there, he was stripped before the doctor like a vile criminal, dressed in prison clothes, and placed among the felons. In a short time his health was so greatly impaired that he could not relish the food provided, and his hands bled from the cruel irons. But the unfeeling medical attendant only said, "Here he came to be punished, and here he must be punished." His case was brought before the Religious Protection Society of London, and in a month he was released. When the agent of the society asked him what he wished done about it he replied, "All I wish is to go on preaching unmolested by the magistrate," which was secured to him. Mr. James Bonser was jailed a good many times. When liberty was offered him on condition that he would promise to preach no more in the streets he replied that he would sooner die in prison than make such a promise. Unable to sleep for the cold, having only a few boards and a little straw to lie upon, he walked about and sang the praises of God, like Paul and Silas, declaring to those who tried to stop his noise that, though his body was confined, his tongue was at liberty. Summoned before the bailiffs at the Town Hall, and severely threatened, he defied them, maintaining that he had done no wrong; and, after much consultation together, having totally failed to intimidate him or extract any promises or fines from him, they were obliged to set him at liberty, "finding nothing how they might punish" him. Mr. Joseph Reynolds, after being trampled by a crowd, had his clothing torn and all his money taken from him. In consequence of which he says:

I have been obliged to suffer much hunger. One day I traveled near thirty miles, and had only a penny cake to eat. I preached at night to near two thousand persons. But I was so weak when I had done that I could scarcely stand. I then made a supper of cold cabbage, and slept under a haystack in a field till about four o'clock in the morning. The singing of the birds then awoke me, and I arose and went into the town, and preached at five to many people. I afterward came to Cambridge, where I have been a fortnight, and preached to a great congregation, though almost worn out with fatigue and hunger. To-day I was glad to eat the pea husks as I walked on the road. But I bless God that much good has been done. I believe hundreds will have to bless him in eternity for leading me hither.

These are but a few specimens of hundreds that might be given. Such was the heroic character of the earnest, unlettered men whose deeds fill the earlier annals of the Primitive Methodist Connection, and such were the things they were called to endure. They were plain, humble souls, with little education and no polish, but all the better adapted on this account to reach the classes that most needed them. These classes required the truth of the Gospel to be delivered in strong, blunt language, with homely illustrations, great earnestness of manner, and much depth of feeling. Smooth sentences and fine diction would have been thrown away. Rugged bodies and great powers of endurance, together with fervent souls, were more needed than highly cultivated minds. They were well endowed for the work they had to do. They did it well. In some cases they were protected by the officials; in other cases powerful nonofficial friends were raised up; in all cases they were entirely confident that the Almighty was with them. The Acts of the Apostles find a wonderfully complete parallel in these Methodist chronicles. The ignorant were enlightened, the fallen were uplifted, the lost were saved.

The denomination was introduced into Scotland in 1826, into Canada in 1829, into Ireland and the Channel Islands in 1832, and in various later years into Australia, New Zealand, and Africa, where it has had good success. In England, where the early hardships were so severe, it has experienced large prosperity. Great changes have taken place. Instead of preaching chiefly in the open air or resorting to kitchens and cottages, barns, and factory lofts, there are now nearly forty-six hundred connection chapels, besides twelve hundred and eighty other chapels and rooms. Many of these chapels or churches are spacious and elegant structures. The value of the Church property is more than three and a half million pounds. The congregations have correspondingly improved in intelligence, wealth, and social influence. The salaries and allowances of the preachers are more than double what they were, and their education, if not their abilities, has greatly increased. Elmfield College was established near the city of York in 1863, and Bourne College, Birmingham, was opened in 1876. Both together provide for 240 pupils. There is a ladies' college at Chapham Common, London, and a theological institute at Man-



chester. The Book Establishment at London is flourishing, its profits being nearly £5,000 a year, mainly devoted to the superannuated ministers' fund. There is a general chapel fund, a chapel loan fund, and a chapel aid association, all of which are doing good service in helping to erect new chapels and pay old debts. A Connectional Fire Insurance Company was formed in 1867, with a capital of £20,000. The interest on the investments is more than twice as much as the fire loss in ordinary years, and large grants are made to needy chapels. The Missionary Society celebrated its jubilee in 1893, and a thanksgiving fund of between forty and fifty thousand pounds was then raised, one fourth of it going to the missions.

The doctrines of the Primitive Methodists are precisely the same as those of the Wesleyan Church, and the polity is not widely different. There are twelve legal members of the Conference, instead of one hundred. The preachers are stationed by the District Meetings instead of by the Annual Conference, but there is an appeal to the latter body, which makes any needful alterations. Both the District Meetings and the Conferences are made up in the proportion of two laymen to one traveling preacher. The system of government thus contains a very unusually large admixture of the lay element, and is in most respects substantially Presbyterian.

It has been said that the most striking peculiarities of the connection are: (1) The vast amount of unpaid labor performed by laymen; (2) The influence of the laity in Church government; (3) The devoted and zealous attention paid to the lower classes. Another has mentioned lay agency, female preaching, and open-air work as the three usages to which the present strength and efficiency are due. Still another (Mr. Petty, the chief historian of the Church) says: "The main secrets of the success of the denomination are, under God, its extensive and persevering labors, and its spirit of earnest piety, ardent zeal, and glowing charity." Labors there certainly were of an almost incredible amount. Says Mr. Petty:

Each traveling preacher is expected to pray with thirty or forty families a week at least, on an average, for the year round; and we have reason to believe, from an extensive examination of official documents for a number of years, that though a few of the preachers have not equaled the amount a greater number have considerably exceeded it, and the majority have not

fallen short of it. Evangelical and pastoral labors so abundant, performed with energy and zeal, and accompanied by the blessing of God, will account in part for the multitude of souls which have been brought to the Lord and united to the denomination.

Mr. William Garner, whose record the historian regards as a fair example of the labors of his brethren in general, in the space of twenty-one years, from 1823 to 1844, traveled on foot, with trifling exceptions, 44,936 miles, and preached 6,278 sermons. These journeys did not include his daily perambulations in the towns and villages where his lot was cast, nor did the sermons include exhortations and addresses. When it is remembered that these journeys were made without reference to the weather, to meet fixed appointments, some under a scorching sun, some through depths of winter snow, some in drenching rains, the amount of toil and endurance indicated will be the better realized. And many of the local preachers, we are assured, were scarcely inferior to the traveling ones in their devotion to the work.

We deem it a most inspiring history. The movement was certainly from on high; not a split or secession from any other body begun in ill-will or springing from disappointed ambition, but an earnest, heaven-born desire to promote by unusual methods the salvation of those masses who were not being reached by ordinary agencies. A similar movement in our own day has taken the form of the Salvation Army, and its spread has doubtless been one of the causes which have somewhat checked, in recent years, the growth of the Primitive Methodists. It may be that, as a separate denomination, they have about run their course and done their work. That course has been most honorable, that work has been most important. Whatever the future has in store for them, the record of their past will long be studied, when men would be thrilled by noble deeds and incited to the largest outlay of all their powers for God.

*James Mudge*

## ART. III.—THE FORCES WHICH DETERMINE CHARACTER.

It is claimed by some so-called "liberal" advocates of Christianity that the time has come to reconstruct its creed on a more rational basis. Thus the Rev. J. Llewellyn Davies says:

I believe that it will be entirely to the advantage of Christianity that we should dismiss the idea of the "miraculous" from our contentions and our thoughts. The claim made in the name of miracles has had a pestilent effect upon the Christian cause. We are all familiar with the logical argument: our Lord and his apostles wrought miracles; miracles could only be wrought by supernatural power; it is at our peril if we refuse to accept the authority of those who had supernatural power at their back. Such an argument obviously challenges the keenest criticism of the evidence in favor of the alleged miracles—the kind of criticism with which we sift reports of modern miracles, if indeed we think it worth while to criticise them at all. It suggests to us to refuse belief to the Christian creed until we are satisfied that the evidence for the miracles is such as could prove the most improbable things to the most scientifically skeptical mind.

But why do Mr. Davies and others of his school desire the abandonment of miracles as one of the evidences of the truth of Christianity? The reason assigned is that "it is futile to enter into controversy about the Trinity, or miracles, or the efficacy of prayer, or the relation of science to religion, with those to whom there is no Father in heaven, and to whom Christ is a well-meaning enthusiast." Is it true, however, that the dismissal of these purely theological questions from the field of controversy would conciliate the opponents of the supernatural? There remains the vital question as to the forces which determine character. Professor Huxley, the champion of scientific agnosticism, declares that, if the Church would renounce miracles, he would estimate as highly as anyone "the purely spiritual elements of the Christian faith." His admirers refer to him as among "the thousands of men, not the inferiors of Christians in character, capacity, or knowledge of the questions at issue, who will have nothing to do with the Christian Churches on the ground that the evidence in support of the improbable things which the gospels relate appears to them utterly inadequate."

Yet, while the disciples of Professor Huxley profess to estimate highly the "purely spiritual elements of the Christian faith," they reject the claim of any supernatural agency in developing these "elements." The agnostic school admits that the dispositions which minister to the higher life of mankind are peace, joy, patience, hope, love, and reverence—all of which are Christian dispositions and embodied in the life and teachings of Jesus. But how these elements are developed in the human heart and produce the highest type of moral character is the question at issue, involving a controversy as bitter as any waged about miracles. Indeed, the same difficulty concerning supernaturalism presents itself.

Christianity adopts as fundamental the words of Christ addressed to Nicodemus, "Ye must be born again," and holds to the theory of a spiritual birth, which is not in accordance with natural law, but is supernatural, and therefore miraculous. As the agnostic school rejects the reality of Christ's physical miracles, it, of course, rejects his doctrine of the new birth, a moral miracle and the greatest of all. Christianity teaches that those virtues or dispositions which form the best type of moral character are the fruit of a regenerated heart, while the Huxleyan philosophy asserts that they are the fruit of evolution, or result from the operation of purely natural forces. The fundamental proposition of evolution is that "the whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulousity of the universe is composed." In other words, man is an automaton, and simply acts out of the human nature which comes to him by heredity. What he feels and what he does at any moment are the results of his inherited nature and the external forces influencing him. Everything is determined by that which precedes it, and hence could not be otherwise than it is. Effects in the ethical as well as the material world are the inevitable outcome of their antecedents. Morality is, therefore, the product of the interaction of the primary forces. According to this theory all men, the wisest and the most foolish alike, feel and judge and act as the primary forces intended they should. But Christianity teaches that man, instead of being a machine in God's universe, was created in the divine image, and is, therefore, a free moral being

capable of choice, influenced by motives, and susceptible of regeneration. Surely this exalted estimate of him, even though Christianity deals with him as fallen and in need of moral renovation, is in striking contrast with the view of the fatalistic philosophers who pretend to believe in the perfection of human nature. Nor will the Christian Church abandon the doctrine of the supernatural work of the divine Spirit in human hearts and thus deny the experience of the hundreds of millions of its devotees from the time of Christ to the present. Herbert Spencer asserts that the inherent natural forces will gradually and necessarily improve mankind, and cannot fail to produce a perfect society. He seems to regard the world as a garden to be cultivated and filled with fragrant flowers and luscious fruits, forgetful that weeds will there spring up abundantly and prevent the growth of flowers and fruits. But Christianity goes to the foundation and pulls up the evil by the roots. It recognizes the fact, taught by Christ and confirmed by human experience, that sin has introduced into the soul degrading forces which tend to individual and social ruin.

The Christian religion, considered only as a system of ethics entirely divorced from the supernatural, is superior to the agnostic philosophy because it enthrones conscience and makes a distinction between right and wrong. Mr. W. S. Tilly, while anxious to win to Christianity the so-called "determinists," does not indorse their ethical system. He says:

The old conception of conscience as the formal principle of ethics, the internal witness of the supreme Judge, "a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas," is put aside as outworn rhetoric. The moral sense, we are assured, is not primitive, is not innate, but a mere empirical fact transformed and established by heredity; a "phenomenon" (so they call it), variable and varying with the exigencies of the race. General utility, the good of the species, is then the only scientific and experimental criterion of human action, the sole rule of right and wrong; and morality consists in the apprehension of that principle and in conformity with it. And so John Morley, in his book on *Compromise*, dogmatically affirms that "moral principles, when they are true, are only registered generalizations from experience." Human society, in the view of this sage, is not an organism, but a machine; just as the individual men of whom it is composed are machines, a kind of company, as some one has happily expressed it, which insures against risks by applying the principles of solidarity and reciprocity, the taxes being the premium. And, as right springs

from the fact of living together, so duty springs from the necessity of living together. This agrees with Bentham's doctrine that what we call crime is really a miscalculation, an error in arithmetic.

How can men become better in heart and life, thereby promoting their own welfare and that of society, unless there be a higher standard than mere utility? It is not true that they can be induced to forsake evil and practice virtue because they believe that the latter course is the more profitable. A genuine reform in character results from a sense of duty to love and obey God as he is revealed in conscience and nature, agnosticism not conceding that he speaks in any verbal or written message. In proportion that man's responsibility is recognized to conscience as the tribunal which decides the quality of human conduct, in that proportion society will be elevated. But the school of "determinism," which treats ethics as a branch of physics, entirely ignores duty and responsibility as applicable to man. The only duty imposed on him by society is to avoid that which is detrimental to the general welfare. Beyond this he has no responsibility. Mr. Cotter Morison, an advocate of this theory, while repudiating moral responsibility as unscientific and absurd, virtually admits that human nature is capable of being modified by training for better or for worse. He says: "The sooner it is perceived that bad men will be bad, do what we will, though of course they may be made less bad, the sooner shall we come to the conclusion that the welfare of society demands the suppression or elimination of bad men and the careful cultivation of the good only." This concession that men "may be made less bad" is a recognition of the Christian doctrine that they can attain a higher type of character by the operation of spiritual forces. Of course, if bad men may be better, they must be free to choose; but how can they do so if, according to "determinism," "positivism," or "naturalism," they are automatic machines and products of a necessary evolution? Mr. Morison's plan for the purification of society is unique, if not humane. He says: "Society has the right to suppress the bad man in some effectual way, and, above all, prevent his leaving a posterity as wicked as himself." And again, "The soldier who deserts in presence of the enemy is deservedly shot. In civil life there are forms of criminality which are



worse than desertions; they are open hostilities to the best interests of humanity." Mr. Morison is not guilty of scientific consistency in his proposed method of exterminating the criminal classes, or even bad men not on the criminal list. If they are machines, and morality is the product of molecular forces, bad men are not to blame for their inherited natures. Herbert Spencer, however, does not favor the "suppression or elimination of bad men," but prefers to deal otherwise with the criminal classes and trust to penal reform as more in harmony with an enlightened and humane age. He expects the world to become better and happier by social evolution, the good finally predominating, on the principle of "the survival of the fittest."

How much more rational and humane is the Christian method of removing the evils of individual and social life! Christ sympathizes with man and appeals to his better nature, not regarding him as a machine, incapable of choosing between right and wrong, but as a free moral agent, possessed of a conscience and convinced of his responsibility. This estimate of even "bad men" invests them with a dignity which the agnostic philosophy does not recognize. Mr. Morison candidly admits that modern society is threatened with ruin, but his remedies are inadequate. Crime is rampant and defiant, corruption in public office abounds, and unrest in labor circles is unprecedented. What is needed is that there be preached with greater emphasis the teachings of Christ concerning love to one's neighbor, which implies love to God. The practice of the "golden rule" requires that best type of character which is the product of the "purely spiritual elements of the Christian faith," so highly praised by Professor Huxley.

The great defect in all existing systems of reform is the tendency to overlook, or minify, the heinousness of sin and to silence the voice of conscience. Even the pulpit is exalting the religion of culture, and is ignoring the absolute necessity of the "new birth." In seeking to eliminate the miraculous element from the Gospel some so-called reformers in the Christian Church are practically abandoning the doctrine of the supernatural work of the Spirit in human hearts. Mr. Davies—who, in his able paper on "The Higher Life—How is It to be Sustained?" makes such an eloquent plea for Christianity

and exposes the errors of agnosticism—shows commendable zeal in his efforts to popularize the Christian faith, but thus far the conversion of agnostics and materialists to his reconstructed system has not been encouraging. Evidently he is a believer in the divine Christ, though he would not urge men to accept Jesus because of his mighty works as recorded in the gospels. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, in referring to this Gospel, he says:

By presenting the Son of man as divine it makes every man sacred and dear to his fellow-men. It gives an entirely satisfying law of life, a sure basis of duty, a universal and progressive morality. It so far explains the sufferings and trials of life as to induce them to bear them with a refining patience. It holds out a light from beyond the grave which dispels the gloom of death. It opens a fount of joy too deep to be exhausted.

Surely a Gospel which has offered such possibilities to men in all lands and ages is a more exalted system than the mere vaporings of shallow philosophers. It is a provision for world-wide need; it is of supernatural origin.

*H. H. Fairall*

## ART. IV.—DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE IMMANENCE.

THE last word will never be spoken respecting the relation of God to his universe. Whoever thinks and writes on this great theme must do so with the understanding that he will not fathom the whole truth. It has been the problem of thoughtful minds in all ages, and many have derived from it a maximum of mental training who have reached only a minimum of truth. The problems involved cannot be settled by any preeminence of intellectual ability, or by a consensus of philosophical opinion, for the greatest minds of the race have neutralized their influence by discrediting each others' theories. It is not a question that can be decided by expert testimony. We may well distrust anyone who sets himself up as a final authority on account of any preeminence of philosophical grasp. Yet, whatever the difficulties which beset this problem, thoughtful men cannot and ought not to ignore it. They must think and study, and perchance God will give them a measure of truth.

In these times of unfettered speculation the ocean is traversed by numberless currents and cross-currents, while the air is boisterous with gales and cyclones. It may be well to see whether the Christian doctrine of God's immanence in nature maintains its anchorage or whether in this respect we are drifting with wind and tide. A belief in this immanence assumes that God created all things, and concerns itself with his relation to the universe after creation. Was he so closely related to his universe as to lose his identity in it? Did he create a vast machine which could run without his further care? Or, did he construct a universe distinct from its Creator and yet needing his constant guidance and control? Christian thinkers have generally given an affirmative answer to the last question.

We may look to John Wesley for a brief statement of the doctrine of God's immanence in nature:

He is the true God, the only cause, the sole creator of all things. . . . And as the true God he is also the supporter of all the things that he hath made. He beareth, upholdeth, sustaineth all created things by the word of his power; by the same powerful word which brought them out of nothing. As this was absolutely necessary for the beginning of their existence, it is equally so for the continuance of it; were his almighty influence withdrawn they could not subsist a moment longer. Hold up a

stone in the air; the moment you withdraw your hand it naturally falls to the ground. In like manner, were he to withdraw his hand for a moment, the creation would fall into nothing. As the true God he is likewise the preserver of all things. He not only keeps them in being, but preserves them in that degree of well-being which is suitable to their several natures. He preserves them in their several relations, connections, and dependencies, so as to compose one system of beings, to form one entire universe, according to the counsel of his will. How strongly and beautifully is this expressed: *Tὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν*, "By whom all things consist," or, more literally, "By and in him are all things compacted into one system." He is not only the support, but also the cement of the whole universe. I would particularly remark (what perhaps has not been sufficiently observed) that he is the true author of all the motion that is in the universe. To spirits, indeed, he has given a small degree of self-moving power, but not to matter. All matter, of whatever kind it be, is absolutely and totally inert.\*

This statement covers the ground of God's relation to material things. Mr. Wesley implies, but does not directly state, that the same relation exists between the Creator and created spirits. "He is also the supporter of all things that he hath made," whether in the realm of matter or spirit. He grants to created spirits a certain measure of freedom, but not such as to make them independent of the Creator. God is so necessary to the existence of the universe that were he to withdraw himself for an instant it would vanish into nothingness.

The doctrine of the divine immanence mediates between the extreme, on the one side, of an absolute transcendence which represents God as holding aloof from the universe, and the extreme of pantheism, on the other side, which degrades God to a level with the universe and loses him in it. We must not permit the true doctrine to be cumbered with objectionable notions, but must guard it from all misleading bypaths. In order to fortify ourselves in this belief let us look at a few considerations:

1. First, this doctrine is not inconsistent with a true view of transcendence. In fact, any correct view of transcendence must find its proper modification and complement in immanence. It goes without saying that God is above his creation. He does not bring himself to the level of nature by creation and preservation. A philosopher who has invented a rat-trap to protect himself from vermin does not bring himself to the level of this simple contrivance because he baits and sets the trap. A

\* Sermon of "Spiritual Worship."

man is above any machine which he is capable of inventing, building, and running.

But we cannot hold to any view of transcendence which represents God as turning away from his universe, and leaving it to run itself. The mechanical theory of God's relation to nature has value for neither philosophy nor religion. If we draw our illustration from the most perfect man-made machine, and press the analogy, it will utterly fail us. A machine cannot run itself. It depends on both God and man for conservation and preservation from destruction. It must be attached to some force of nature in order to run at all, and in order that its materials may hold together. And in attaching it to nature we attach it to God, who is behind and above nature and responsible for it. But in addition to this a man must stand over it and keep it in order. If left to itself it will finish a brief task and cease to run. An engineer starts a train and jumps off; it runs wild for a few hours, stopping at no stations, and probably ends in a smash-up. At best the fires will soon be out and everything come to a standstill. An immense knitting mill, run by water power, is set in motion; the doors are locked and it is left to itself. It is safe to say that in a few weeks, at most, the whole machinery will be a tangled wreck which has come to silence and will never sing again the song of useful industry unless the hand of man is invoked to put it in order. No theory of transcendence is rational which represents God as creating the universe and then leaving it to take care of itself while he looks on, or looks off, with indifference. The mechanical theory of the deists is no solution of the problem of God and the universe. The correct view of transcendence is that which joins with immanence and presents us an infinite, personal God, omniscient, omnipotent, speaking into existence a varied universe and then with fatherly care looking after its interests. The mere fact that we pronounce him infinite and the creation finite declares his transcendence. The Christian doctrine, which represents God as a father stooping from infinitude to superintend the destiny of a planet, a sparrow, a man, is the best exposition of the divine immanence. The two doctrines present a rational and beautiful conception of God, and we may humbly believe that the Creator has taken pains to thus reveal himself to men.

2. On the other hand, and from the opposite pole of thought, the doctrine of the divine immanence must not be confounded with any form of pantheism. Some Christian thinkers lean toward the absolute transcendence of the deists, for fear that some elements of pantheism are wrapped up in the doctrine of the divine immanence. Many persons see pantheism when it does not exist. It is not necessary to accept the mechanical theory in order to escape pantheism. We need not exclude God from the universe in our endeavors to save his identity from being swallowed up by it. God can keep his hand on nature without losing himself in nature.

Pantheism is a diversified system of speculation, and it would be well if earmarks were attached to its various phases, so that it could be easily recognized. A satisfactory definition of pantheism it is difficult to find. Webster gives this: "The doctrine that the universe, taken or conceived of as a whole, is God; the doctrine that there is no God but the combined forces and laws which are manifested in the existing universe." While this definition will not be accepted as adequate by many who incline to pantheistic views, it may serve as a starting point.

Dr. McCosh\* gives some of the leading phases of pantheism, although he does not claim to follow it into all its "shapes" — "if shape it can be said to have whose very nature is to be shapeless." His first division is "Material Pantheism." Of this theory he says: "According to this it is the mere matter of the universe, with its forces, its life, its thought, as the result of organism, which constitutes the One All, that may be called God." This is simply materialism, which finds whatever God there is in the material universe. There is no personality, of course, in such a God. Dr. McCosh's next division is "Organic or Vital Pantheism." God is the life of the universe. He is the life of the animal, the plant, the man. There is no personality here, but God is simply a life principle animating all things. His next division is "One Substance Pantheism." This is the system of Spinoza, the great apostle of modern pantheism. According to his philosophy God is the only substance, and this substance has two attributes, thought and extension, which correspond to spirit and matter. The God of Spinoza is not a personal being. He is simply the sum of all

\* *Intuitions of the Mind*, p. 399.

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things under the phases of thought and extension. It is a misnomer to speak of such a conception as God. Dr. McCosh's last classification is "Ideal Pantheism." This is the opposite pole from materialism, but each is alike frigid, for there is no place in either for a personal God. The material universe is lost in God, and God himself is lost in a system of ideas.

Thus do pantheistic theories sway from the extreme of materialism to the opposite extreme of idealism. Materialistic pantheism makes the "all" of the universe to consist of matter, while idealistic pantheism approaches the problem from the opposite side and construes everything as spirit. But both are alike atheistic, for, in the end, after bewildering speculations, the existence of a personal God is denied. Between these extremes there is room for many phases of pantheistic thought, but in them all the idea of a personal God is buried under the mass of the universe; and an impersonal God is a figment of the philosophical imagination. The God of pantheism, in every phase, is but a myth of philosophical speculation.

Let us now try to state, in a few words, the difference between the immanence of God in nature and pantheism. The doctrine of the divine immanence recognizes a *personal* infinite God. He is distinct from all things; is in no way tangled up with, or lost in, his creation. He stands in his personality above creation, over against nature and separate from it, yet upholding it and controlling it by his wisdom and power. But pantheism recognizes an *impersonal* absolute God. He does not create; he simply exhibits himself in various modes and phases in the universe. He is not distinct from the universe, but confused and confounded with it. The difference is simply immense between an unconscious absolute, evolving itself into the various forms of nature, and a personal God creating the universe and making it so dependent on himself that it must be constantly upheld by his power. It ought not to be difficult for Christian thought to draw a boundary line between two systems so radically unlike. No man need hesitate—through fear that such a doctrine has any fellowship with pantheism or is liable to lead to it—cordially to embrace the belief that God, while above nature, is in nature, upholding and keeping it in existence by his almighty power. Wherever there is a clear recognition of a personal God, of a creation entirely distinct from

the Creator, and of an active superintendence of nature, there is no pantheism.

3. We may comfort ourselves still further with the thought that the doctrine of the divine immanence is the most reasonable and sensible account that has been given of the relation of God to the universe. Why may not the theories of philosophy be subjected to the test of hard sense as well as other theories? Who will venture to say that a philosopher, bewildering himself with speculation and reaching the conclusion that the whole universe is a delusion, is any better guide than the plain man with common sense who knows no better than to take things as he finds them? Who shall say that the logical faculty, locating its premises in the dark, and relentlessly pursuing its speculations to absurdity and chaos, affords a surer path to truth than the good sense of the mass of mankind? Starting from different premises, this method has led myriads of speculators to contradict each other, and has yielded a plentiful harvest of philosophical confusion and bewilderment, while the good sense of mankind has practically agreed that there is a personal God, and a created universe distinct from God, yet under his superintendence and care. Says Professor Bowne:

Life abounds in practical certainties for which no very cogent reasons can be given, but which are nevertheless the foundation of daily life. Our practical trust in the uniformity of nature, in one another, in the affection of friends, in the senses, etc., are examples. Numberless logical objections could be raised which reduce all of these to matters of probability; but none of these things move us. The things which we hold, or rather which hold us, with deepest conviction are not the certainties of logic, but of life.\*

It may be profitable to place the doctrine of the divine immanence by the side of other theories, which have been claimed to solve the same great problem, and let the good sense of mankind judge between them. Is the doctrine not more rational than the mechanical theory, which represents God as creating the universe with such powers that it can run itself and then turning his back upon it? This theory is liable to the suspicion of trying to eliminate God from the universe. If there is such a personal God as we believe in, who is the Creator of all things, the only rational thought for us is that he is still

\* *Philosophy of Theism*, p. 32.

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interested in his creation and is looking after its welfare. When we think of a machine in operation the master's hand and eye are always upon it. Or is the doctrine of the divine immanence not more rational than the pantheism of Spinoza? According to this philosophy God is simply substance, and the only substance—not a person. The material universe and individual beings have no real existence. All that exists is infinite substance, if anyone can conceive what is meant by such a term. Under this theory there is no relation of God to the universe to be explained; and, as we have no real existence, we need not, cannot trouble ourselves with either God or the universe. Does any Christian wish to exchange the doctrine of the divine immanence for the specter of Spinozism? Or shall we prefer the "emanation theory," which pervades all oriental philosophy and represents creation as but an outburst of the substance of Deity, like a jet of gas from the sun, or a mass of matter thrown from a volcano, which after a little time drops back again to the original substance? Shall we conceive of God as projecting parts of himself in various directions, for his own amusement, and then recovering himself at his pleasure? And shall we conceive of ourselves as jets of Deity, thrown out for a little but doomed to be absorbed again in the original infinite substance? Or shall we prefer the subjective idealism of Fichte, which makes the ego the only reality, and construes all else as a product of the imagination? Do we in fancy create our own God and construct the universe to our own liking? Do the trees by the roadside grow in our imaginations and not in the solid ground? Are we the creator, rather than God? Is there no God, no universe, whose relations need explaining? Such is one of the results of philosophical speculation. Are we ready to accept it and lay aside the rational doctrine of Christian theism? Does any form of materialism seem more reasonable than the Christian doctrine of the divine immanence? Are we ready to believe that all the powers of the universe are wrapped up in matter? Or is the theory of blind force back of matter and operating through matter more rational than that of a personal God superintending the universe which he has created? Or will we believe that there is an "unconscious intelligence" at work between God and the universe, as an explanation of their relations? A man has a right to accept such a theory if

he chooses, but the rest of the world has also a right to ask what possible conception is awakened in the human mind by the term "unconscious intelligence." Are we ready to drop our theism and accept the notion that the "all" of the universe, by a process of evolution, reaches consciousness only in man, and that consequently the universe finds its acme in the human race? Or, with more daring fancy, will we place God at the end rather than the beginning of the series, and consider him the last and highest product of evolution? Will we attribute to the "universal substance" "intelligence and self-existence" without personality? Will we base our philosophy and our religion on a hobgoblin which is impersonal yet intelligent and self-existent? Will it please us better to think that there are no individuals in the universe, but rather an aggregate of life which transiently manifests itself in separate forms? Will it clear our thought to any extent to be told that we are "identical with the absolute," or that we are equal with God? Shall we solve all the problems of the universe by elevating man to God's place and worshiping ourselves or our fellow-men? Or will it dispel the fogs from philosophical speculation to wipe out the universe with one courageous stroke and declare that God, man, matter have no real existence?

Is there anything, in any or all of these theories, to drag the Christian thinker from his moorings? He has a right to scoff at such vapory speculations. In place of all this the common sense of mankind has believed in a personal God, who created the universe, and whose omnipotence keeps it in being. The Christian philosopher may confidently claim that this is the most rational account of God and the universe.

4. Such a discussion as this ought not to terminate without the fact being emphasized that the doctrine of the immanence of God in nature is in harmony with the teachings of God's word. We do not regard Scripture as a handbook of philosophy, but it will never be safe to leave the teachings of the Bible out of the account when making up our conclusions on any subject. Such a course will only invite revision at a later date. Doubtless every theory of science and philosophy will ultimately have to make its peace with the word of God, and so the Bible must be a factor in the discussion of all questions.

An exhaustive argument would make use of a large part of

the Bible, for its pages are filled with this doctrine. Nothing in Scripture is more frequently or emphatically affirmed than God's creative power and his perpetual superintendence in the affairs of the universe. Material things are molded by his hand as clay takes form under the skill of the potter. Animals are fed and cared for by his bounty. Men cannot escape from his presence. Heaven, earth, and hell afford no hiding place from his all-seeing eye. A few passages will show the trend of Scripture teaching. Look at this sublime utterance: "And, Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands. They shall perish, but thou remainest: and they all shall wax old as doth a garment; and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail" (Heb. i, 10-12). This cannot be construed as merely the poetry of the Old Testament, though it be a quotation from the Psalms, for it finds a place and an indorsement in the New Testament, where its sentiments are repeatedly found, as in Matt. xxiv, 35; 2 Peter iii, 7-10. Here we have clearly taught the great principles of Christian theism—a personal God, a creation, a clear distinction between Creator and creation, and the added thought that the continuance of the one is not dependent on the continuance of the other. There is no pantheism here. A decaying world is not a decaying God. It looks as though God might suffer the world to go to destruction without any harm to himself.

One passage more. Paul was himself a philosopher, and looked into many "things hard to be understood." He did not blink the "mysteries" of life in presenting the Gospel to men; and from his peculiar relation to God, and his superior mental equipment, we might look for a satisfactory solution of the most profound problems. He at one time had a discussion with certain Greek philosophers on Mars' Hill concerning the very question before us, and announced his theory of God and the universe in no dubious terms. Certain of the Epicureans and Stoics took the apostle to the place where the gravest questions were debated, and gave him an opportunity to explain some of the fundamental principles of the Gospel. The Epicureans were materialists. Matter unfolded itself into its various forms without any creating power. Human souls were only a refined

form of matter. There were gods, to be sure, but they had a good time in the interstellar spaces without any concern for the affairs of the universe. The Stoics were pantheists. With them God and the universe were identical. The universe was but "a period in the development of God" himself. In the face of their theories Paul thrust the wholesome doctrine of Christian theism, declaring a Creator, a created universe, an upholder of all things, a nourisher of nature, and a Father of men: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring" (Acts xvii, 22-28). Many truths are established in these passages, and they are the very truths that lie in the safe middle ground between pantheism and an extreme view of the divine transcendence. They touch the relations of matter and spirit to the God who created and upholds both.

Such is the teaching of Scripture on this important question, and the Christian may be thankful that the doctrine of the immanence of God in nature, which lays the foundation for the kindred doctrines of divine providence and the fatherhood of God, is both rational and scriptural.

Henry Graham



## ART. V.—DOCTRINE OF THE FUTURE LIFE IN THE BOOK OF JOB.

BELIEF in God and belief in a future life are the two limbs on which the colossus of religion stands as it strides the mystery of life. These fundamental beliefs seem eternally to join hands, so that a great theologian has remarked, "Theism in all its forms can as little dispense with the immortality of man as with the personality of God." As a deduction from this we would suppose that the philosophy or religion which sees God in clearest light would present the richest, deepest, most adequate doctrine of the future. And as a rule this is true. The philosophy of the eighteenth century, which was preeminently theistic, made the doctrine of the immortality of man, as Erdmann expresses it, "the dogma *par excellence*." But Hegel, whose idea of God is far more misty, speaks rarely and cautiously on the subject; and Comte, whose one absolute certainty is the nonexistence of the absolute, teaches everlasting annihilation rather than everlasting life. In religion, also, we see that the form under which God is conceived determines the specific form of the belief in immortality which is held. Brahmanism, with its pantheistic tendencies, naturally gives rise to a theory of human transmigration, while Zoroastrianism, because it adheres to the idea of a supreme will, emphasizes the doctrine of personal continuance.

In harmony with the general principle just stated we would expect to find in the Book of Job a very clear and adequate revelation of man's immortality; for, if anything is characteristic of this composition, which Carlyle called the "oldest choral melody as of the heart of mankind," it is the splendor of its theism. The consciousness of a personal God is the fundamental *differentia* of Hebrew thought, and nowhere is it displayed more brilliantly than in Job. Even in the most skeptical and despairing passages, where everything rocks and sways, the belief in a personal God is as stable as the position of Gibraltar by the sea. Says Zöckler: "Our best modern theology, in its most approved and philosophical symbols, may be challenged to produce anything surpassing the representations which this ancient writing gives us of God, as a spirit, eternal and unchangeable in his

being, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." The book is also given up to the discussion of a question whose enigmas only a true doctrine of the future life can illumine. The writer is a Hercules wrestling with that profound problem which has been handed down the ages, and which has been the ever-recurring specter at the banquet of human thought, "Why do afflictions befall the righteous?" What Job needs, to reconcile him to his fate and to snatch the veil of mystery from the face of the Sphinx, is, above all else, an adequate doctrine of the future; and hence, if anywhere, we have a right to expect that in this book the Hebrew belief will be set forth in a light both full and clear.

Whether this is the case or not is a question on which critical students have widely differed. On the one hand, we have those who, with Dewey, tell us that the writer of this book knew no more of the doctrine of immortality than the Philistines knew of the secret of Samson's strength. Says a somewhat recent review writer: "There is absolutely no knowledge of a future life in the Book of Job." On the other hand, we have writers, like Michaelis and Ewald, who claim that the aim of the book is to teach the immortality of the soul, and by the hope of a future state to reconcile man to the inequalities of the present.

That the author of this "divine drama of the ancient Hebrews" was not as ignorant of the theory of a future life, as the more negative writers affirm, we think can be easily shown from various arguments. (1.) The philosophical presupposition is against it. All peoples, as Cicero so long ago affirmed, seem to have a belief in the continuance of man beyond the grave. Indeed, this belief is not a dogma of religion, or a dogma of philosophy, but is an impulse of man's nature to be reckoned among the primary and necessary religious truths. Says Principal Fairbairn: "To the instinct of a living man, who has not yet learned to reason either from the facts of experience or the data of consciousness, death cannot suggest annihilation, because annihilation is a thought too abstract and repugnant to these instincts to be either intelligible or credible. In such a man faith is stronger than sight; he can conceive and understand life, but not its negation. If he thinks of the dead he thinks of them as living; the very attempt to represent them in thought is an attempt to represent living, not dead, men."

Now, Job, as a sincere religionist speaking out of his deepest consciousness and strongest feelings, and his friends, who stand like flint for the traditional beliefs, could not have been devoid of a belief in the soul's future existence, although they may not have developed it to more than a shadowy copy of present conditions. (2.) Again, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, Job's people certainly held to such a belief. They had every opportunity to embrace the doctrine, for Abraham came from Chaldea, where a very emphatic belief in the future life existed, as the lamps and remains of food found in their tombs testify. Doubtless the patriarch, before his call, had often united with his ancestors in praying that they might live forever "in the land of the silver sky," while in Egypt, also, the Hebrews must have been impressed with the great truth of future existence; for here the idea passed into the life and ethics of the nation, and was living and palpable. In the fact that the superstition of necromancy, notwithstanding a divine command against it, prevailed for centuries among the Hebrew people, we have a decisive evidence of their belief in a future life. Specific passages also manifest that, even in the oldest parts of the Old Testament, death is never thought of as annihilation, as the completed end of existence. When it is said of Abraham that he is gathered to his fathers certainly more is meant, dying as he did far from his ancestral home, than the possession of a common tomb with them. In David's remark, "I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me," the continued existence of his child is taken for granted. The author of Job, being fully in possession of the ideas of his people, could not have diverged from them so as to deny to man a species of immortality. (3.) But that Job held the belief in a future life is clear from a study of certain references in the book itself. Before we treat the more positive passages, however, it is necessary to say a word concerning those references which have been brought forward as implying annihilation. Thus, in chapter vii, 8, Job says to God, "Thine eyes are upon me, and I am not." And again, in chapter vii, 21 (R. V.), he asks, "Why dost thou not pardon my transgression, and take away mine iniquity? For now shall I lie down in the dust; and thou shalt seek me diligently, but I shall not be." In the last of these passages Job simply means that death will soon hurry

him away, and, unless God shows him a renewal of favor soon, he will have no chance to do this and thus vindicate his ways before men. In the former passage the thought is much the same. That the reference to being no more is not to be taken absolutely he proves by the simile of a cloud, which illustrates the impossibility of a return from sheol, and not the soul's utter destruction. Nor does xiv, 7-12, with other similar passages, give us dogmatic utterances, but popular representations of the grave, such as are still current in literature. In the visible order of nature the dead do not return again, but are consumed and vanish away like the flood. Says a commentator, "In enlarging on this aspect of death the writers of the Old Testament are not stating the real condition of the soul after death, but only its apparent one, as derived from the life we are now enjoying." Otherwise these negative passages would be in contradiction to those which clearly imply continued existence. Some of these passages are the references made to the shades and conditions of life in the underworld, which will be considered in a subsequent paragraph. In such references as that in xiv, 22 (R. V.), which says of man in Sheol, "But his flesh upon him hath pain, and his soul within him mourneth," we have a certain proof that Job thinks of the shades as existing, since he clearly means to indicate their experience of pain and sorrow as inhabitants of the joyless and gloomy underworld. One cannot read the famous seventeenth verse of chapter three without seeing that with Job the dead still in a sense continue their existence. Such a passage as xiv, 13 (R. V.), "O that thou wouldest hide me in Sheol, that thou wouldest keep me secret, until thy wrath be past," could only have been written by one who had some conception of a future life. The old proof text of immortality in xix, 26, 27, is held by many to refer to Job's vindication while he is still on the earth; but, as will be seen when we later examine it, the passage rather refers to a vindication which Job shall behold when he becomes an inhabitant of Sheol.

Still, while it is clear that Job believed in a future life we think those greatly err who place his development of the doctrine almost on a par with the New Testament revelation. It is one thing to have an idea of future continuance, and another to have an evangelical hope of everlasting life. That the latter

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was not possessed by the writer of the Book of Job is seen in the fact that the whole drift of its thought is against the supposition. Says one writer, and we think truly, "If a clear knowledge of the future had been held there would have been no problem, and the book could not have been written." Both by Job and his friends the doctrine of immortality is continually ignored, and that when it is the key to the mystery they are endeavoring to fathom. This doctrine would have wonderfully helped them in reconciling the experiences of life with the righteousness of God. It would have sustained Job in the fiery furnace of his trial. But, instead of this, through the poem runs the minor chord of the sufferer's despair. Job speaks out of the depth of his sorrow, a time when a soul would lay hold for comfort on all it knows; but he continually wraps himself in the densest gloom and hangs about him drapery as dark as a funeral pall, declaring that the thoughts of his heart bring night into the day. He sadly calls corruption his father, and the worm his mother and sister. The grave is his house, and the grave is to him a place where his hopes perish—a thing which he plainly dreads almost as much as his sufferings. Indeed, as we read Job's words we cannot but feel that the darkness of the future which is drawing its curtain about him—for he expects speedy death—is quite as much a cause of his anguish as are his misfortunes. With him, as with the Hebrews generally, the future was utterly without hope, a dire calamity desirable only to put an end to extreme misfortune.

The inquiry, therefore, becomes especially interesting as to what Job did believe on the question of the future life. In chapter xxx, 23, he says, "For I know that thou wilt bring me to death, and to the house appointed for all living." This house appointed for all the living is not simply the grave, but Sheol, "the great involuntary rendezvous of all who live in this world." The word "Sheol" is of disputed derivation. Winer, Hengstenberg, and others think it comes from שָׁאַל, which is equivalent to *poscere*, "to ask," so that the kingdom of the dead would mean that which is insatiable in its demands (Prov. i, 12, Isa. v, 14; Heb. ii, 5). The majority of modern Hebrew scholars, however, find the root of the word in שָׁאָל, which signifies "ravine," or "abyss." Sheol is located by Job, as by the ancients generally, below the earth, since in xi, 8,

he speaks of its depths. It is a sad and gloomy region, where the dead spread their couch in the darkness (xvii, 13). It is also termed (x, 22, R. V.) "a land of thick darkness, as darkness itself; a land of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness." Here we have as terribly vivid a picture of the superlative gloom of the underworld as when Milton, in his description of hell, writes of "darkness visible." The Vulgate corresponds with Job's idea when it speaks of Sheol as "a murky land covered with the thick darkness of death; a land of wretchedness and obscurities where is the shadow of death and no order, but sempiternal horror dwells everywhere." It is entered through barred gates (xvii, 16; xxxviii, 17), and in its dust its inhabitants lie down (vii, 21; xxi, 26). Although beneath the earth, its location is not known (xxxviii, 19), nor has anyone seen even the shadow of its gates (xxxviii, 17). Throughout its borders confusion reigns (x, 22). There is no exit from it. "He that goeth down to Sheol shall come up no more. He shall return no more to his house" (vii, 9, 10, R. V.). Yea, the heavens shall pass away before he shall rise (xiv, 12). In sharp distinction from the land of the living (xxviii, 13), Sheol is pictured as the land of destruction (xxviii, 22). Over it King Silence sways his scepter.

One cannot but notice the similarity of this description of Sheol to that found in the Babylonian poem called "The Descent of Istar." Here the underworld is spoken of as follows:

The land whence none return, the region of [darkness],  
To the house of darkness, the seat of the god Irkalla,  
To the house from whose entrance there is no exit,  
To the road whose course never leads back,  
To the house whose inmate is shut off from light;  
Where dust is their substance, clay their food,  
The light they behold not, in darkness they dwell,  
They are clad like a bird with a garment of feathers,  
Over the door and bolt is scattered the dust.

Nor does this similarity seem strange when we remember that to a considerable extent the Hebrew religion, although favored with a distinct revelation, grew up on the basis of Semitic thought and worship.

The condition of those in Sheol is drawn by Job in colors



equally dark with his description of the underworld itself. The departed are termed "shades," which is derived from a word meaning "to be slack, relaxed, exhausted, weak, powerless." Zöckler calls them "the marrowless and bloodless shades or forms of the underworld; the wretched inhabitants of the realm of the dead." Whether the body and soul were thought by Job to be together in Sheol is a question on which commentators disagree; but it is certain that he did not look at the soul as entirely without corporeity. Thus, in xiv, 22 (R. V.), he says of the dead that "his flesh upon him hath pain, and his soul within him mourneth." The idea of abstract spirituality is not found in the views of any early people; it comes only when the philosophic mind has been largely developed. Hence, notwithstanding the attempts of some to so explain this passage as to leave the soul and body separate in Job's mind, it is clear that he regarded the former as retaining a certain residue of its earthly body in the underworld. While the dead have a certain self-consciousness this seems only to extend to a vague realization of their misery, so that Sheol may be appropriately called "the land of forgetfulness." Especially is there no perception of what occurs in the upper world. "His sons come to honor, and he knoweth it not; and they are brought low, but he perceiveth it not of them" (xiv, 21, R. V.). Job's idea seems much the same as that in Ecclesiastes (ix, 5, 6, 10), where the dead are spoken of as knowing nothing, and as having no longer a reward, while their love, their hatred, and their envy are perished. Indeed, existence in Sheol is a condition more resembling death than life, and therefore it is often spoken of as a kind of perpetual sleep (xiv, 12). The power of God is sufficient to disturb it (xxvi, 6), and it is a proof of his omnipotence that this is so. Because of this deep lethargy, this semiconscious condition, in which the dead lie, the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest (iii, 17). All classes and conditions of men are blended together, the poor with kings and counselors of the earth who built up waste places for themselves or filled their houses with silver (iii, 14, 15). The differences so marked on the earth disappear. The servant is free from his master, and prisoners hear not the voice of their overseers. As Seneca says, "Death reduces by a just law to a state of equality all who in their

families and circumstances had unequal lots in life." The thought is similar to that of the Greek poet :

Where they an equal honor share  
Who buried or unburied are ;  
Where Agamemnon knows no more  
Than Irus he contemned before ;  
Where fair Achilles and Thersite lie  
Equally naked, poor, and dry.

Our conclusion, then, is that Job looked at Sheol as a dread and gloomy region, and the condition of those who had departed as one without hope (xiv, 7 ; xvii, 15). We do not wonder that, with all his conscious integrity, he shrank back from it as a calamity. Only for one reason could man welcome it—as a relief from pains and sorrows more dreadful to bear than the shadowy, vegetating existence of the underworld.

This view of the future world which Job gives us is much the same as prevails in classical antiquity. It is uniformly spoken of in such terms as "the dismal region," "the lonely land," "the dark regions," "the black place of eternal night," "the dolesome realm of darkness," or "the dark domain." In his visit to the realm of the dead Ulysses meets with Achilles, whom he thus addresses :

But sure the eye of Time beholds no name  
So blessed as thine, in all the realms of fame :  
Alive, we hailed thee with our guardian gods,  
And dead, thou rul'st a king in these abodes.

To which Achilles replies in the following words :

Talk not of ruling in this dolorous gloom,  
Nor think vain words, he cried, can ease my doom.  
Rather I'd choose laboriously to bear  
A weight of woes, and breathe the vital air  
A slave to some poor hind that toils for bread,  
Than reign the sceptered monarch of the dead.

Another important inquiry has reference to the doctrine of rewards which the Book of Job presents. This is, indeed, the central theme of the composition. The author is a highly poetic and meditative soul, and is troubled over the prevailing opinions of his day upon the question of retribution. A theory of temporal rewards and punishments had long been taught in Israel. The righteous are prospered and the wicked are afflicted. Against this doctrine, advocated by his three friends,

Job contends with all his might, and, falling back on experience, shows that often the wicked live and wax mighty in power (xxi, 7), while the righteous are troubled all their days. Where, then, is the solution? God is just and good; his righteousness is as the light. How can there be such a conflict between justice and moral worth? Or, how can the apparent contradictions in the law of rewards be explained? Job's friends try to reconcile them by the principle of hope—not the anticipation of future recompense, but the hope that, if a man continue in integrity, his momentary sufferings will give place to happiness, while the prosperity of the wicked must come at length to a terrible end. But this is not a solution; for no amount of subsequent prosperity, on the theory of merely temporal rewards, can atone for a good man's misfortune and misery. And it is here that the weakness of the epilogue of the drama comes to view. The giving of double to Job for all he lost did not excuse the righteousness of God in making him suffer—which is the point in dispute. Elihu comes forward, however, with a different and better solution. He points to the fact that the explanation is to be found in the infinite wisdom of God, which it is folly for man to seek to follow, and in the fact that sufferings may come to the righteous as a purifying discipline. To this Job assents, and confesses that the way of God is in the sea, and that man must humbly submit to what the higher wisdom brings him. But this submission is without hope. There is no indication that the light will ever emerge from behind the cloud; and there is no suggestion that any compensation will ever come to the man who has perished in his misery. As Schultz says, "The real difficulty is not touched." The one-sided idea that suffering is penal is not balanced by any doctrine of the future adjustments, as must necessarily have been the case if Job had known anything more than the doctrine of merely temporal rewards and punishments. The thought of the whole poem seems to be that this world is the only place for the action of God's government, and that a failure in its justice here would be a breach in the entire system of moral order. Some have professed to see suggested in certain passages the rewards of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked in the future world; but there is not a verse in the book which, rightly

interpreted, gives this thought. The reason there is no doctrine of future rewards in the poem—a doctrine which presents one of the most powerful motives for human action—is plainly the empty character of the future life as Job conceived it. And this is true of the entire Old Testament. We find that neither the law, the moralists, nor the prophets appeal to reward and punishment beyond the grave as a motive for right action—a fact that seems very strange when we remember how largely the Hebrew religion is an ethical one. The reason for this is that the doctrine of immortality is too vague and unsubstantial to admit of it; and another reason is that, until the time of the exile, the idea of the individual is largely merged and lost in the idea of the nation.

In this particular, also, we find a striking similarity between the ideas of Job and the old Semites. The ancient Babylonians taught the same doctrine of temporal rewards and punishments in much the same way. Their gods dealt almost exclusively with the living. As early as 4000 B. C. we find kings erecting temples for the preservation and prolongation of their lives. Tiglath-pileser says of his grandfather Asur-dân, "The work of his hands and the offering of his sacrifice pleased the gods so that he arrived at the highest age of all." The punishment of evil-doers was likewise with earthly sickness, misfortune, and death. In an incantation we read, "Whoso fears not his god, like a reed shall he be cut off." However, for a few special favorites of the gods there was a happier state, as they were translated to an isle of blessedness and there continued, enjoying the same kind of existence they had in this world. Later, as the doctrine of immortality was developed, there came to be granted to men the same privileges that had at first been extended only to the heroes of epic song. This similarity of view between the Hebrews and Babylonians is found in the common derivation of both, for there is much truth in the remark of Schultz: "The view of Mosaism of the condition after death is clearly, throughout, not an Old Testament religious doctrine. It is a national or racial one in all its characteristics."

There yet remains one phase of the doctrine of the future life in the Book of Job to be investigated. This relates to the resurrection of the dead. Did Job have a belief that at last men would rise from Sheol to a renewed life? Many

writers are very confident of this. Pope, in his *Theology*, says that no criticism can rob us of Job's ancient testimony to the resurrection of the body. Adam Clarke tells us that in Job we have a revelation of the general resurrection. Dr. Cooke, in his book on *Doctrines of the Resurrection*, devotes twenty-five pages to an attempt to show that "in various places throughout the Book of Job the doctrine of a resurrection is distinctly taught or implied;" and, "if this be denied, many passages will be wholly without satisfactory meaning, and the interpretation of the book as a whole somewhat doubtful." These writers but express the opinions of scores of others.

But, notwithstanding all that is said, we have here a case in which the wish is father to the thought; for there is no correct exegesis which can show such a doctrine in the book. In the first place, the thought of individual resurrection is the last of the religious ideas developed in the Old Testament. It is clearly taught only in one passage (Dan. xii, 2), and even here a general resurrection is not spoken of. "Many," says Daniel, not all, "shall awake." As Reuss suggests, it is probable that to the prophet the favor of a resurrection is reserved for the Jews only. In Isa. xxvi, 19, we have a passage which, with the indefiniteness of poetry, suggests that the idea of individual resurrection was increasing among the people. In some of the later Psalms, as, for example, xlix, lxxiii, cxxxix, we may have more or less distinct foregleams of the thought, although some of the ablest critics contend that their references are to protection from the penal death of the wicked, and rest and blessedness in the present life. Ezek. xxxvii has been much relied on by those who see this doctrine in the Old Testament. On this Schultz has well commented, as follows:

Undoubtedly the real reference of this passage is to the people of Israel. Some might, indeed, find in the very simile used by the prophet a proof that the resurrection of the dead was a thought with which pious minds were then familiar. But it seems to me to prove the very opposite. If the belief in a resurrection of individuals had been known to the prophet, then his reply to the question, "Can these bones live?" must surely have been, "Certainly, Lord." And, in that case, this whole vision would be no longer a sign. The field full of dead men's bones would no longer be an emblem of a hopelessness too great for human thought to overcome, nor the raising of the bones a miracle of miracles. On the contrary, the bones would of themselves be a sign of hope; and their being raised

would be an event to be expected as a matter of course. Instead of a miraculous pledge of something otherwise incredible we should have a rather weak parable, "As certainly as those corpses will rise again, so certainly will dead Israel also be raised from the dead." Consequently this passage was well suited to arouse in the reader a belief in the resurrection of individuals also. But a proof that such a belief already existed it most assuredly is not.

These passages are the principal ones claimed for a belief in a resurrection, except those in Job, which we shall soon examine, and all of them except the one in Daniel are deficient. Hence we claim that the presumption is against the doctrine of the resurrection being taught in Job, since it was not a dogma of Hebrew theology in his day, and did not develop till a much later date, of which Reuss writes as follows:

The feverish expectation of the end, a hatred of oppression that was not satisfied by the prospect of a temporal and fleeting vengeance—above all, the conviction that eternal righteousness could not allow the countless victims who died for their God and their faith to fall unrewarded—all these causes finally gave rise to a belief in the resurrection of the dead and a judgment beyond the tomb.

If we turn to an examination of the passages in Job which are claimed to teach the resurrection we shall have the presumption sustained. In xiii, 15, we find that famous verse which is the basis of several celebrated hymns and poems: "Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him"—an utterance which Cooke calls "an expression of the most triumphant hope in the salvation of God." Unfortunately for him, however, the proper translation of this passage is, "Lo, he may slay me, yet will I wait for him." Delitzsch renders it, "I wait for him that he may slay me." The thought seems to be that, through his disease, Job will soon be brought to his dissolution, and seeing his condition is hopeless he waits for his end. Again, chapter xiv, 7-14, is often brought forward with great confidence. Says Cooke, "Every figure here used indicates Job's belief in a resurrection." We must, however, differ with him. In the earlier verses Job says that man's condition is more hopeless than the palm tree, which if hewn down may sprout again, or, though its root wax old and its stock die in the ground, may be revived when it feels the vivifying energy of water. "But man dieth, and wasteth away: yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea,



and the river decayeth and drieth up; so man lieth down and riseth not: till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be roused out of their sleep" (R. V.). Unlike the tree whose death is only apparent, but like the dried flood which perishes without hope, is man. Some say, however, that Job held that finally, at the destruction of nature, when the heavens and earth pass away, men will awake and be restored. Cooke tries to show that the destruction of the heavens was a current belief among various ancient peoples; yet some at least of those whom he quotes did not think of the destruction of the universe, but only of the periodical renovation of the earth. Our real inquiry, however, should be as to what the Hebrews thought on this question. Delitzsch has well pointed out that they viewed the heavens as imperishable. He says:

What does not happen until the heavens are no more never happens; because God has called the heavens and the stars with their laws into existence (Psalm cxlviii, 6); they never cease (Jer. xxxi, 35); the days of heaven are eternal (Psalm lxxxix, 30 [29]). This is not opposed to declarations like Psalm cii, 27, for the world's history, according to the Scripture, closes with a change in all these, but not their annihilation.

Says Zöckler, "According to the popular conception of the Hebrews, the heavens endured forever (Psalm lxxxix, 30 [29]; Jer. xxxi, 35)." Says Professor Evans, "It is assuredly straining the language, and at variance with the connection and with Job's present mood, to assume in the expression an implication that when the phenomenal heavens should disappear man would awake." Canon Cook, in the *Bible Commentary*, alludes to the expression as "equivalent to a denial of the possibility of restoration to life." In chapter xiv, 13, Job hopes that Sheol may be a place of safety for him till the wrath of God is turned away, when he trusts he may be remembered again in mercy. This is his wish; but he recoils from it as if without foundation, asking, "If a man die, shall he live again?" Yet he does not suggest the possibility of an affirmative answer, but the reverse. "All the days of my warfare would I wait till my release should come" (R. V.). Here he likens his life to the service of the soldier who must endure the privation and suffering incident to his occupation, and says he will wait till his change of condition comes.

The principal utterance of Job, however, which is relied  
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upon to teach the doctrine of the resurrection is in chapter xix, 25-27. It is not necessary to say that this is a very difficult passage. It is involved and obscure, and there is not a little probability that the text has become corrupt. Many writers may be quoted on both sides concerning its reference to the resurrection, though nearly all the later critical scholars agree that it does not. The reasons for their opinion are that this supposition is out of harmony with the design of the poem and the course of the argument; that, if it makes such reference, the idea must have been alluded to in order to solve the problem discussed; that the connection in which it stands and the reply of Zophar are against the interpretation; that neither Job's friend, Elihu, nor the Almighty refers to it as a source of consolation; that it is inconsistent with Job's frequent longings for death as the end of his miseries; that the later Jews who searched the Scriptures for proofs on this question never bring it in evidence; that the correct translation of the passage does not support it, and that the subsequent passages show no such changes of thought on the part of Job as they must if he has suddenly awaked to new light. What, then, is the proper interpretation of the passage? Job has been appealing to his friends not to persecute him further. He wishes that his assertions of innocence were recorded in a book, engraved with an iron pen on a rock, and the engraved letters filled in with lead to render them still more imperishable, that they might go down to posterity as a witness to the integrity of his conscience. Then his faith in the righteousness and justice of God asserts itself—a faith rooted in the deepest consciousness of the true Hebrew—and he cries out, "I know that my avenger liveth"—Elvah is here implied—"and that he will arise over the dust," that is, the dust in which he is soon to make his grave; "and after my skin and the flesh adhering to it shall have been torn to pieces, or rotted away in the grave, yet, free from my flesh," or "out of it," for this is the better rendering of the original, "I shall behold Eloah." This does not mean that Job considered he would have a purely incorporeal existence in Sheol, for, as we have seen, such was not his belief. He thought of the soul as having a substantial, though vague and shadowy, corporeity in the underworld. Thus, the passage simply teaches that the time will come when Job shall see from Sheol

God vindicating his integrity against his enemies. It is the desperate affirmation of his tormented spirit at a time when he expects soon to die, rising to grasp in a larger way his belief in God's righteousness and justice. If it is objected to this that Job did not believe that those in Sheol could see what occurs on the earth, we may reply that he teaches God's power to be such that it can arouse the sleepers; and he probably feels that the case is so important that he will be permitted to see his vindication. Or, as is more probable, he may be speaking in vision, merely meaning to affirm that such a vindication will occur. This interpretation is more in harmony with the obvious phraseology of the passage than the view that Job will live to see, before he dies, his vindication and restoration. Our conclusion, then, is that the passage teaches the existence of the soul in Sheol, but that it in nowise teaches the doctrine of a resurrection. On this subject Job was in ignorance, as were all the other Hebrew writers before the exile.

Such, then, is the doctrine of the future life in the Book of Job. While the thought of future continuance was in the writer's mind the larger hope as revealed in the New Testament was not known to him. It is Jesus Christ who has brought life and immortality to light; not that he introduced the conception, but that he filled up the vague and shadowy outline with revelations of infinite meaning. He made the doctrine a living force in the lives of men. He enriched and developed it so that it has become one of the strongest motives in influencing human action. All that is really helpful and inspiring in the doctrine we owe to him.

*Samuel Plaut*

## ART. VI.—THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF BALZAC.

FRENCH romance, until recently read by few Americans, is now rapidly becoming a staple of our literature. Rabelais, Alfred de Musset, Alexandre Dumas, Paul de Kock, Gautier, George Sand, Victor Hugo, Balzac are names as familiar as those of our English novelists. Our schools have opened the floodgates of a foreign tongue, and the waters are pouring forth in babbling torrents. Curiosity had been whetted by warnings and appetite intensified by our excited life; so that the American mind was prepared to receive these streams of brilliant story. Translators who timidly experimented with a few of the most Englishlike of the French novels were astounded at the avidity of their reception, and are now putting the most Frenchlike into our speech. Imitations are made; with what success is seen in the unparalleled popularity of Du Maurier.

It is often asserted that the charm of the French romance is its immorality. If that were true it would soon lose its life. The charm of vice is not its viciousness. When corruption is stripped of its enticing garb it is revolting. Even those who live in filth do not admire it. The charm of the French story is its vivacity, its transparent clearness, its sparkling gayety, its fragrance of philosophic mysticism emitted from the bloom of a richly colored flower, its cheerful view of life, which contrasts so happily with the sober and almost sermonish air of many an English tale. These are the qualities which give to French romance its magnetism. If they shelter an irreverence toward religion or a glorification of uncleanness they are indeed perilous. A harlot adorned as a goddess, though worshiped under the vault of Notre Dame, is a harlot still; and, if she can be dethroned only by the destruction of her shrine, then it would be well for every lover of the pure to join the ranks of the iconoclasts and batter down the noble temple which houses the abomination.

Can the charge of immorality which is so often made against French romance in general be sustained against the work of Balzac in particular? He has his detractors. Rome and Madrid at one time prohibited his works. Venice through an entire carnival reveled in a masquerade of his characters.

The question is a serious one ; for this colossal figure has come into romance as Shakespeare came into drama. Less than fifty years have passed since Victor Hugo pronounced the funeral eulogium over the open grave of his friend in Père la Chaise, and already the ablest critics give him the foremost place in his sphere, unapproached and unapproachable therein through all time and all countries.

Never in the literary world was genius more closely wedded to erudition, industry, personal purity, artistic finish, productiveness. His fecundity is astounding. His biographer, Sal-tus, has with great accuracy prepared a Balzac bibliography ; and the titles and dates of his books cover thirty-four 12mo pages. He had planned to write for his *Comédie Humaine* one hundred and forty-four stories ; eighty-eight were finished, together with numerous other treatises, essays, articles, and plays, when his prolific pen fell from his wearied fingers. Nor do any of these stories bear the marks of haste. His severest critic was himself. His mode of handling his proofs was as pathetic as it was laborious. He would erase, interline, cover the margin with whole paragraphs, and sometimes leave hardly a trace of the original. The second proof was handled as the first ; and such was his desire for perfection that this process he would often repeat ten times before he sent out his work to the world. The result was, every stone he laid in his edifice was a finished work of art and will bear the closest scrutiny.

But each part is so closely related to the whole that to appreciate what this architect has done we must view the building in its entirety. Gautier likens the work of his friend to a cathedral of a town, hidden by the neighboring houses, but which seen from the horizon is outlined immense above the flattened roofs. "The structure he buildd towers upward as we recede from it and awes us by its hugeness ; and surprised generations will ask each other, 'What manner of man is this giant who alone has heaved up these formidable blocks and reared so high this Babel where are heard the murmurings of all social orders?'" Such a phenomenal product will be read and studied as the centuries move on. Lovers of literature will yield to its fascination as they do to the bard of Avon, and lovers of purity will anxiously inquire as to its moral influence.

The character of the man prepares us to believe in the

essential purity of his work. His was an exceptionally chaste life. George Sand, who knew his habits, says, "His private life covers no black spots." Gautier describes the moral code which his intimate personal friend laid down for himself as one that rivals the severity of Trappist or Carthusian friars. Against all examples to the contrary, he insisted that simple habits and absolute chastity were essential to the development of the highest literary faculty, and that all excess is the ruin of talent. His ablest disciples say that *Louis Lambert* is largely autobiographical. If so his was a great and aspiring soul struggling in its chrysalis for that beautiful and lofty life for which every human spirit is destined. That so-called novel is really a profound psychological study, as pure and as delicate as a Hebrew psalm. *Albert Savarus* is supposed by many to be a picture of the author's relation to women. Fiction gives no more heroic and spotless love. Not even Ibsen, whose frosty purity is unquestioned, and who has conceived a similar situation, can equal the high tone of Balzac's passion and the all but divine mode of its use.

Balzac was more than moral. He was religious. We have often been pained by the utter inability of most of the great English novelists to conceive and correctly present true ministers of the cross. These are usually represented as weak, hypocritical, or ridiculous. This Frenchman, with his amazing gift of insight into the springs of human character, is almost the only great story-writer who fathoms the motive of the sacred calling. His priests and nuns are the veritable creatures who so nobly combated the triumphing wickedness and distress of the restoration. While a sacred name did not deter him from exposing the vices of professionalism he everywhere exhibits reverence for the genuinely good.

He was, however, too great a spirit to limit his faith to the current doctrine of the Roman Church, in which he was born. Nor was he oblivious of its grievous errors. He studied and almost worshiped the Bible. His *Jesus Christ in Flanders* is a most powerful phantasmagoria, in which the decrepitude of the Church is pictured as an old hag, hairless, toothless, withered almost to a skeleton, with wrinkled skin over her livid face, clad with dusty rags of holy office. He addresses her, "Miserable woman, why do you prostitute yourself to men? You



grew rich in the heyday of your passions, and you forgot your pure and fragrant youth, your sublime devotions, your innocent principles, your fruitful beliefs. You abdicated your primitive power, your supremacy wholly spiritual, to gain the powers of the flesh. Abandoning your linen vestments, your mossy couch, your grottoes illumined with divine lights, you have sparkled in diamonds, in luxury, in lust. Proud, insolent, desiring all things, obtaining all things, overthrowing all things that were in your way, like a prostitute in vogue who pursues her pleasure, you have been sanguinary as a queen besotted by will." Thus he presses his scathing indictment of the mother Church in a way that would have delighted the heart of Knox or the most savage anti-Romanist. But he closes his story with, "To believe is to live. I have lately seen the obsequies of a monarchy; we must now defend the Church."

Who but one who knew the life of God in the human soul could have uttered such sentences as these: "The final life, the fruition of all other lives to which the powers of the soul have tended, and whose merits open the sacred portals to perfected man, is the life of prayer. Who can make you comprehend the grandeur, the majesty, the might of prayer? Be now here what you may be after cruel trial. There are privileged beings, prophets, seers, messengers, and martyrs, all those who suffer for the word and proclaim it: such souls spring at a bound across the human sphere and rise at once to prayer. So, too, with those souls who receive the fire of faith. . . . God welcomes boldness. He loves to be taken by violence. . . . A single cry uttered under the pressure of faith suffices. God reveals himself unfalteringly to the solitary thoughtful seeker."

Like most men of deep intuitions, Balzac was strongly attracted by the mystical schools of thought. He reveled in the misty philosophies of Swedenborg, the spiritual contemplations of Madame Guyon, and the occult studies of the Orient. Out of these came that unique piece of heavenly fiction, *Seraphita*. She is the final efflorescence of the spiritual principle after its complete triumph over the animalism in which the divine is sown. A corrupt heart could not conceive, or, conceiving, could never execute, so divine a figure.

But while we acknowledge the personal purity of the author of the *Comédie Humaine* the fact remains that in many of its

stories low vice, passion, intrigue, deception, pass before us in such a way as to disturb our Puritan sense of decency. Some of them, such as *La Physiologie du Mariage* and *La Cousine Bette*, we would put out of the reach of young people. But to be just we must say that these stories were made necessary by the purpose of his work, which was to picture the entire life of the first half of the nineteenth century in France. His work is not in the ordinary sense a novel. It is a profound sociological and ethical study. The story would not be complete without the Marneffes, the Hulots, the Brideaus, whose vile descendants pollute our half of the century as they did the first. Balzac disowns that they are the creatures of his imagination. He merely described what he saw. Nor are his descriptions in any way debasing, excepting it be for those who are already corrupt and who would suck impurity from things most sacred. They do not resemble the offensive brutality of Tolstoi, nor the exaggerated coloring of Zola, nor the reckless abandon of George Sand. The story is told with a clearness that conceals nothing, yet is not shocking. Without any moralizing the natural unfolding of events awakens a horror of low vices which wreck fortunes, homes, and character. Virtue glows with a beauty that kindles the admiration even of those who will not follow her. He says: "My blushing critics veil their faces before certain personages in the *Comédie Humaine*, who are, unfortunately, as true as the others and set in strong relief in my vast picture of the morals of the times. But I defy them to cite a single passage in which religion or the family is attacked." His resentment is just. Nowhere does he make vice respectable or virtue degraded in his readers' eyes. Whichever triumphs, the meaning of the book is never left doubtful. It is the scientific and moral purpose which pervades these tales that is their justification. His fiction is a work of ethics which the people can read and understand.

Another thing should be considered. An absolute moral standard has not yet been given. Moral principles, perhaps we should say conventionalisms which are taken for principles, vary with latitude and language. The unveiled faces of our women are, according to Mohammedan thought, a gross indecency. But Christian thought takes the veil to be a badge of a shameful heart, proclaiming, rather than concealing, the

festering immorality. Suppose that veil to be woven of speech rather than fabric, does the difference affect the principle?

It is not fair to judge Balzac by his English dress. The transference of a French form into our speech does not bear with it the French view-point. That indescribable something we call the life of a tongue does not inhere in its articulation, but in the soul that breathes its thought. Accurate translation will often turn an exquisite work of art into a shocking reality. At once it is corrupt and corrupting. For this reason it were better that much of our great French philosopher should never be rendered in English. As it is, he should never be placed in the hands of children, if, indeed, children could be induced to read a work so mature. He himself said, "I write not for girls, but for men." But for those who can feel the deep, sad life of this sinning and suffering race—ignorant of its meaning, fainting in the pursuit of chimeras, perplexed by its supermundane mysteries, seduced by its vices, miserable in its pleasures, confused by its antagonizing religions, aspiring for the heavens from out of the despair of a deadly animalism—we commend the *Comédie Humaine*.

Among the two or three thousand types that there pass before us every reader will behold himself and his neighbor. He will see the good and the bad mingling together in the diverse complications of actual life. Actions will be traced along the line of varied motive back to their original spring in the depths of character. The innermost of the human soul with its depravities and its sanctities will come forth from their concealment and exhibit themselves in unrobed truthfulness. The history of passions will be followed on through their self-deceptions and disguises to their natural destiny. It is a sad picture. But such is this quivering social order in which we live, and which we call Christian civilization. Balzac saw it all, and faithfully and accurately reported what he saw. But amid that all but universal ruin this one fact stands forth as unmistakable as truth—it is the good alone that remains erect, itself unharmed and constituting humanity's final hope.

A. H. Tuttle.

## ART. VII.—THE RETURN TO FAITH.

FOR about a generation past the thought of the English-speaking world has been marked by certain negative tendencies best characterized by the term "agnostic," coined for their description by the late Professor Huxley. On the Continent a similar period of negation began somewhat earlier, and the process of disintegration has covered a wider field. In Britain the agnostic movement was for the most part a development of the empiricism traditional to English philosophy, in alliance with natural science and invigorated with new life by the doctrine of evolution. On the Continent it has been the downfall of the *a priori* systems of speculation; the advance of the scientific, not to say the materialistic, spirit; the development of the historical method in its application to the origin of human institutions, especially to the origins of religion; the criticism of the documentary records of Christianity; and the growth of democracy, not only in its revolutionary but also in its socialistic and anarchistic phases, that have made our time one of uncertainty and travail.

Within a twelvemonth, however, a striking series of deliverances by various leaders of opinion has given rise to the belief that this era of doubt is drawing toward its close. In France M. Brunetière has used his visit to the Vatican as a text from which to preach the bankruptcy of science as a guide for life, and to proclaim a return to the bosom of Mother Church as a present duty, in preference even to the neo-Christianity of M. Melchior de Vogue, and to the other neo-religions so numerous in the Paris of recent years. In England Mr. Huxley's Romanes lecture of May, 1893, on "Evolution and Ethics," which culminated in the thesis that "the cosmical process" and "the ethical process" stand in direct antagonism, had not ceased to be a center of debate, when three notable books appeared, each of which in turn brought evidence of a new movement in the direction of philosophical or religious faith. In his work on *Social Evolution* Mr. Benjamin Kidd brilliantly argues in behalf of the position that the evolutionary process, in its social manifestations, is itself dependent on religion as a motive and a sanction. Mr. Balfour signalized his leisure from the cares of

state by giving to the world his *Foundations of Belief*, in which, with an echo alike of Hume's skepticism and of Bishop Butler's analogical method, he maintains that the necessary implications of natural science have their parallel in postulates that serve to bulwark the fundamental truths of æsthetic, moral, and religious life. Finally, the posthumous *Thoughts on Religion* of Professor Romanes show that before his death he had returned to the enjoyment of theistic and Christian belief; so that the "Physicus" who twenty years ago wrote *A Candid Examination of Theism*, with its agnostic conclusions, had matured a "candid examination" of religion in a distinctly apologetic spirit.

Not less remarkable than the appearance of these works has been the reception which they have met. The eagerness of the public to hail them as signs of a return to faith has proved how deep the faith still strikes its roots in the heart of the western world, and has revealed the tension under which many earnest minds have suffered; but it has also shown how greatly the age has misconceived the nature of the forces at work in its midst. For, like the man who counts his own burden heavier than that of any other of his kind, we have been so blinded by our doubts and difficulties that it has been easy to fear our age was to be marked by the final dissolution of fixed beliefs. Friends and foes of systematic thinking have combined, the ones to dread, the others to hope, that the perplexities of thought which the last half century has brought were so grave that no way of escape could possibly be discovered. Thus we have overlooked the fact that our troublous time is not unique in the history of the world. Proud of our enlightenment, we have committed the unenlightened blunder of taking our own experiences too seriously, in forgetfulness of the truth that the world has seen several such skeptical periods in the past—the age of the Sophists in Greece, the transition from mediæval to modern times, and the eighteenth century in Europe, to name no others; that these various eras exhibit a family likeness; and that one characteristic point of resemblance among them is the law of action and reaction, under which the skeptical movement works out its own dissolution until the period of doubt gives place at length to one of more positive belief.\* In consequence the

\* See "Transitional Eras in Thought," by the same writer, in *The New World*, September, 1896.

struggle with the problems of the time has been severer than it might have proved had the men of the nineteenth century been conscious the while that the conflict in which they are engaged has had its parallels in the past, and that the experience of their fellows gives them the right to look forward with hope to the future.

Moreover, the tokens of a change in the temper of the age have not been confined to the year just ending, or to any one country, or to any single department of thought. Philosophy has revived as men have felt anew the perennial impulse to seek answers for the great questions of existence, so that, if the time is still far from being an age of speculation, there is a marked recovery from the decline of a generation ago. In Germany the progress of science has itself occasioned the study of those principles of method and of knowledge which lie at the basis of scientific investigation. In England speculative thinking has gone farther than the German philosophy of the day, which for the most part remains shy of the deepest metaphysical problems, and in the revived idealism of the neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian type has advanced the most systematic counter-theory to agnostic evolutionism that the age has known. In the United States there has sprung up a marked interest in the newer psychological researches, and, more notable still, as our civilization progresses and education develops, a vigorous movement toward the consideration of philosophical questions in their most general and principiant aspects.\* On the side of practice, also, it is not hard to recognize a deeper note as the age grows older and the principles of its life work out their results in conduct. To mention but one factor in the ethical movement, the social perplexities of the time are forcing thought back to the discussion of ethical principles, for, while naturalism begins to recoil from the practical developments which in part, at least, must be counted its own product, thinkers of various schools are perceiving how large a measure of truth is embodied in the doctrine expressed by the title of a recent German treatise, "The Social Question an Ethical Question." In the matter of religion it may be noted that, like philosophy and morals, theology is not without its tendencies of

\* See "Philosophy in the United States," by the same writer, in the *Educational Review*, June, 1895.



reaction toward more conservative theories, as well as those "advanced" or "liberal" movements which have formed so prominent a feature in recent theological opinion. For, if questions of criticism now stand in the forefront of theological discussions, and if the Old Testament records seem in danger from a disintegrating attack, which must radically alter the view hitherto taken of them by the Christian world, it must be remembered that the New Testament writings, passing through the same fire of criticism, have been found to stand the test much more successfully than appeared possible in the early days of the controversy, and that, in regard to the older book as well, there are evident the beginnings of a movement to reconstruct, on the basis of critical results, more positive theories of the history and religion of Israel. Apart, too, from special questions of theology, there is observable in many quarters a new disposition to estimate religion at some real value. It may be too much to say, as it has recently been said, that there is to-day no scientist who reckons religion a delusion; but it is plain that both science and philosophy have retreated to a not inconsiderable degree from the negative, or even contemptuous, attitude assumed by some of their adherents in times little removed from the present.

More broadly still than by these developments in philosophical, ethical, and religious thought the altered spirit of the times is indicated by a certain temper on the part of many thinkers as they approach ultimate questions, of whatsoever sort these may be. If the problems attacked are philosophical there is a conviction abroad, though a number of schools continue exempt from its influence, that philosophy itself must not be too nice in endeavoring to proceed without assumptions, lest in the end it should find its vaunted completeness a simple repose *in vacuo*. With the sense of the importance of ethical questions has come the belief that, after all, abstract thought must find limitation in the postulates of practical life. In religion there is a movement favored by thinkers of widely divergent forms of belief, advocated, in fact, by some who hold that religion must be reduced to the narrowest limits as well as by the most flourishing school of contemporary theologians in Germany—the reference is to the followers of Ritschl—which finds the ultimate basis of religious conviction in faith. Now, this tendency is a phenome-

non of great significance to the student of the history of opinion. For it has been characteristic of many skeptical eras since the records of human thought began, and has often marked the beginning of the end, the point at which transition and change have overtaken the transitional era itself. Reappearing, then, at the present juncture, it suggests the query whether our own time has not almost reached its term. May not, there is a temptation to ask—may not the turn of the centuries coincide once more with the turning point of human progress? As, in the long transition from mediævalism to modern times, the German Reformation burst into a glow when the year 1500 was but scarcely past, may not the twentieth Christian century be ushered in by a new birth of positive thought?

The historian of opinion, however, is of necessity a cautious prophet; and when all the elements in the complex problem are taken into account he must be confident indeed who would predict an immediate solution. For there is one aspect of the case in which it may be said that we are contending with the accumulated difficulties of the whole modern period. There are fundamental questions, typical of the modern spirit, which, still awaiting their definitive answers, form not the least among the critical issues that this particular age has to face. The questions of naturalism and materialism, for instance, are no new outgrowth of the half century which has been marked by the discovery of the law of the conservation and correlation of energy and the promulgation of the principle of evolution in its modern forms, however much they may have been emphasized by these epoch-making results; but ever since the replacement of the scholastic metaphysics by the method of inductive inquiry, and since the early triumphs of modern science, the naturalistic view of the universe has been pressing hard upon the defenders of a spiritual philosophy and the Christian faith.

Beyond our inherited difficulties, moreover, there are others special to the age in which we live, or at least special in their present forms; and these have not yet been felt in their full force, or are not fully included in the reaction begun in other departments of thought. One of these is to be found in the extension of the methods of natural science to the study of mental life, and the conclusions to which investigations of this character are leading, especially on the side of the relations of

consciousness to the body and its physical environment. The present writer, indeed, has no sympathy with the attitude of those who would inconsistently brand such investigation and results as materialistic. In fact, crass materialism is nowadays not much in favor. Almost everyone who is entitled to speak on the subject rejects the identification of consciousness with any physical function whatsoever; and those who talk of the brain as self-sufficient, if scientists at all, are generally scientists of the popular sort. But there are two features of the situation calculated to give rise to critical problems. The first is empirical, the tendency to explain consciousness, though it be admittedly distinct from brain activity, by the laws of the latter. Sense perception, for example, may be analyzed as an integration of nervous stimulations rather than as a synthesis in consciousness; memory is held by the great majority of psychologists to be essentially conditioned by molecular inertia in the brain, while the laws of the association of ideas are interpreted as laws of cerebral, rather than of mental, dynamics; habit is action become organic in the nervous system; personality and character exhibit grave alterations under the influence of disease—in general, conscious phenomena are always dependent on cerebral phenomena, and the causal explanation which science demands, it may be argued, should be sought in the physical rather than in the psychical series. The second factor in the problem is that the newer researches suggest changes in our view of the nature of mind itself, or even doubt of its existence, as well as changes in our interpretation of the facts of mental life. This is particularly marked because the “new psychology” has been projected into, or rather has grown up in, an age already full of philosophical unrest. Great scientific discoveries our time has seen in numbers, and great systems of universal science. But these do not lighten the philosophical problem for the present; the rather do they add to its gravity, so that our psychological results become part of a great body of new truth, to be articulated into our general view of the world and of life at a time when the fundamental principles of such correlation are in flux. It is evident, therefore, that in any consideration of the intellectual forces now at work, and in any hopeful outlook toward the dawn of a new period of faith, the situation in psychology must be taken into account. Happily, so far the

new science has been fairly free from dogmatic controversies which would have hindered its vigorous development; but the conclusions which it reaches have important bearings, philosophical, ethical, and religious; and these will have to be faced before it will be possible to say that the work of the age is finished.

This view of psychology will meet dissent from some who foresee no such problems in the way. Few, however, will dispute the fact, if it be said that the social and sociological questions of the day constitute a second great issue which awaits its settlement. This is so patent that the atmosphere of our time is filled with the din of those who propound their remedies for the ills of the social organism. Here, therefore, attention need be called only to the truth that the prevailing discontent among the lower orders of society is an effect whose causes complexly intertwine with many of the other forces which have made the age a period of confusion. Thus the social problem becomes, as it were, a summary of the critical questions with which thought finds itself constrained to grapple. It would be unfair, for instance, to charge the scientific spirit, or any given system of philosophy, with the burden of socialistic or anarchistic theories, more unfair than it would have been a hundred years ago to make the philosophers responsible for the discontent among the people of France. Yet socialism has its philosophy, or at least its philosophical alliances, and these for the most part are not of the constructive or spiritual sort. The social unrest is notable, also, because it forms a link between opinion and life. For, although we may not look for a revolution like that which marked the end of the eighteenth century as about to form the close of the present age, no one now is ignorant that one of the sorest points in the body of our time is just this where negation impinges on the questions of the social order and the constitution of the State. And it will scarcely be doubted that the demands of the proletariat, from which these difficulties spring, are themselves a reflex of conditions of life that the age has established or taken over from the past.

The existence, then, of definite critical problems still unsolved is a grave difficulty for those who hold that the present skeptical age is approaching its close. A second objection, and

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one which professed students of opinion must consider formidable, is the absence of any philosophical system showing promise of general acceptance in the near future. Naturalism, often with an agnostic preamble, is held by its adherents to be the legitimate, if not the satisfactory, outcome of the modern movement as a whole. But, to say no more, it is evident that as the forces of recoil gather head at all they tend directly toward the denial of the cogency and the sufficiency of naturalism as a solution of the world problem. The revived idealism, neo-Kantian or neo-Hegelian, which in the last two decades has gone forth from Oxford and Glasgow, and which now spreads itself over the whole English-speaking world, stands at the other extreme to naturalism, and like it claims to hold the key for all the riddles of thought. Or, rather, the new idealism goes far beyond naturalism, for its first principle is to oppose the agnosticism of the former by a defense of the possibility, or even the actuality, of a completed theory of the universe. But, without following Mr. Balfour in the scanty justice he has shown to the idealistic movement, and acknowledging the important service the school has done in withstanding agnostic and naturalistic theories, one still must doubt whether it is destined to furnish such a principiant explanation of the world as will bring our age to a conclusion. The deeper metaphysical issues involved lie outside the scope of this paper. But, apart from these, apart also from the weakness of the movement outside Britain and America, idealism of the revived type is open to the serious practical objection that it is not made "to be understood of the people;" whereas the systems which it seeks most of all to combat have so entered into the thought of the time that the people at least believe that they quite comprehend them. Again, and less popularly, it has to face some of the same difficulties as those which confronted its prototypes and sources. It offers a spiritual, nay, "the spiritual," philosophy; but the world cannot forget that the movement which began with Kant and culminated in Hegel issued in the materialism of the left wing, as well as in the speculative theology of the conservative right. It offers a religion, "the absolute religion," but it may be said without dogmatic bias, and from the strictly historical standpoint, that the religion which it offers is at best a rationalized interpreta-

tion of Christianity; so that the common faith finds the new hope of escape conditioned on the necessity of a new transformation. Between these two extremes the desired system is still further to seek. There have been attempts, more than one, to mediate between the results of modern thinking and the demands of the ethical and the religious consciousness, that have exhibited a nobility of spirit on the part of their projectors and distinguished ability in the execution of the work, but there is no theory of this kind which promises a full or permanent answer to the questionings of the time. Outlooks of great value they have not failed to provide. A considerable number of the principles which they have advanced have proved of service in the present emergency, and some seem fitted to take their places in some more adequate synthesis than any yet announced. But it is impossible to believe that any one of them will prove to be the completed system which we need. And, among the philosophical theories which lie outside this classification, there is even less prospect of a successful issue to the search. Schopenhauer and Hartmann, for instance, have their numerous followers, especially in German lands. Yet the pessimistic solution of the universe would, in the opinion of most thinkers, be a remedy little less dolorous than the disease itself; even should it prove the ultimate outcome of our deepest thinking it contains elements sure to provoke many a crisis and many a reaction before the worn-out age could settle to its fate.

Doubt and skepticism, however, do not always require a new constructive system for their replacement. Often undogmatic in themselves, and dependent on practical as well as upon abstract conditions, they yield to forces which include no completed system of principiant thought. The mass, moreover, is incapable of appreciating abstract theory when it is at hand. Those higher in the scale, the so-called intelligent classes, for the most part do not, and cannot, bring their opinions to the test of metaphysical consistency. It is chiefly systematic thinkers by profession who look for systems of principles or try their conclusions by such; and many of these have learned that a perfect solution of the universe is a millennial hope rather than a present expectation. Hence it results that the transition from an age of negation to an age of belief may be

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an organic, rather than a logical, change. It is found that the facts or laws which for a while appeared destructive of all earlier conclusions are susceptible of a different explanation. Revision of old doctrines, it begins to be said, may be necessary, but the essence of the matter remains unaltered. Thus, a few fundamental principles being discovered to continue true, or being believed so to continue, the rest are left to work themselves out while the age goes on its way with diminishing concern about that which before had caused it crucial anxiety. A capital example of this process is at hand in the varying attitude of opinion during the last thirty years with reference to the principle of biological evolution. At first friend and foe greeted it as destructive of religious belief. Theism, much more Christianity, was believed to be destroyed, if species developed, especially if man was descended in any part of his nature from some lower form of life. And there are still those who, on the one side or the other, believe in the incompatibility of the new science and the old faith. On the whole, however, we are far enough removed from the first shock of the controversy to perceive that, even for those who consider that Darwinism has made good its claims, religion may still endure. For before long discerning minds began to recognize and point out the fact that the dilemma was less exhaustive than had been supposed. These made attempts at reconciliation. They asserted and showed that the difficulties, to some extent, concerned processes rather than principles; that the substance of theism, for instance, was not altered, but rather the formulation of it, and of certain of the proofs therefor. We have even heard Christian voices proclaiming that the new scientific theory yields additional support instead of a fresh blow to theistic belief, and that the laws of development join the precepts of Christianity in culminating in the "royal law of love." Now, it is true that the importance of the questions at issue has sometimes in these later days been minimized or ignored; and there are relations of evolution to ethical and religious doctrine which still perplex those who try to hold both and to complete their reconciliation and adjustment. But it may safely be predicted that, in regard to this particular question, the future will not see the doubt and the dismay which so much disturbed the past.

One perplexing problem having thus lost its sting, remaining difficulties are likely to grow lighter in an analogous way. Men are weary of negative thought. Moreover, some of the outstanding questions of the time include factors which hint at the possibility of their own answers. The troubles of the body social are forcing men to renewed consideration of ethical principles; but it is quite as evident that social questions have their important religious bearings as that they involve moral issues. Shall it be said, then, that the social problem is likely to generate a reaction toward faith? Probably anyone who should to-day maintain the affirmative of this question would encounter much ironical criticism; yet, if all the elements in the situation be taken into account, the suggestion is far from being unfounded. For, while religion in its general aspects is involved in the issue, Christianity stands in a special relation to it. The cures for social ills which have been so loudly heralded by certain parties in the Church may indeed be of doubtful efficacy when tested by sober reason; but there is a striking kinship between the Christianity, doctrinal and applied, which is needed by the closing nineteenth century and that which proved so potent a force when the Christian religion was first fighting its way to recognition. There are few evidences of religion so convincing as religion in action, and so fast as Christianity proves itself able to grapple with the evils which beset society its renewed acceptance will be a direct corollary from the laws under which opinion normally develops.

The question whether this skeptical age is soon to end must receive a hesitant answer. There are signs, both theoretical and practical, that the self-contented negation of a decade or two ago is fast yielding its supremacy. Man's inborn hunger for positive truth is reasserting its power. But critical problems remain with which the age has scarcely begun to grapple. The absence of a dominant philosophical system forbids belief in an immediate complete solution from principle. As M. Brunetière says, philosophy and religion have reconquered part of their prestige; to term their victory complete would be to overstate facts and to offer doubtful aid for their further conflict.

*A. C. Armstrong, Jr.*

## ART. VIII.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAYER.

IN the analysis of prayer the divine "how" is not clearly perceived by the ordinary mind. The Christian world was for a moment prostrated by what the Church was pleased to call the audacity of Professor Tyndall in proposing his remarkable prayer test. But it is due to him to remember that he did not misrepresent the creeds. His declaration was that, if it be true that "God preordained every fact and event of the universe, and these facts and events come to pass as thus arranged without possibility of change, answers to prayer are impossible, in the nature of things." It is a psychological truth that faith and prayer are alike impossible in a system of government where every event is the result of previous arrangement. It matters not whether this arrangement be of theistic or atheistic origin; there can be no place for the existence or exercise of prayer where every event is predetermined.

Prayer is based on the fact that there are alternatives with God and with man, and that in the act of prayer there are alternatives presented to the petitioner. Prayer implies the existence of an indefinite number of possibilities, any one of which may become a fact. As faith and prayer are both voluntary, fatalism and prayer are incompatible and cannot be harmonious parts of the same moral system. Prayer is an act that is only possible between two volitional beings. Therefore, if we assume that God directs every event by a stern decree of law or caprice that has no alternative, we must admit that Christians and materialists occupy the same platform; and it becomes apparent even to the thoughtless that in a system of government whose central idea is necessity there is no legitimate sphere for the exercise of prayer.

In the philosophical adjustment of this subject there are two principles involved. The first relates to the immutability of God. Can there be alternatives with him? Is immutability possible where contingencies exist? It appears to us that divine sovereignty is perfectly harmonious with moral agency. Citizenship and sovereignty are facts of relationship, rather than of strength. God is the sovereign; man is the subject of law which prescribes his relation to his sovereign and his fellow-

citizen, and determines the fact of his amenability. Mr. Watson says:

The true immutability of God . . . consists, not in his adherence to his purposes, but in his never changing the principles of his administration; and he may therefore, in perfect accordance with his preordination of things and the immutability of his nature, purpose to do under certain conditions dependent on the free agency of man what he will not do under others; and for this reason, that an immutable adherence to the principles of a wise, just, and gracious government requires it.\*

By the law of his own essential being God must always do right. He cannot by his acts violate the rules of his own kingdom nor mar the purity of his own personality. Therefore, when he proposes to execute any purpose on a nation or a man, a change in the conduct of that nation or man necessitates a corresponding change in the actions of God toward the party or a change in his principles and character; and because of the immutability of his character the change is made in his administration. This principle of the divine immutability is illustrated in the case of every penitent sinner who abandons his evil way and receives the pardon of his sins at the hands of a just God.

The second principle involves the scientific fact, so well established, that a natural law cannot be changed, reversed, or suspended in its operation. The laws of God are all irreversible; they are not the product of his will, but are coeternal with him and flow forth from him. We must therefore discover some way in which God can perform a miracle or answer prayer without reversing, suspending, or in any manner interrupting natural laws; or we must yield the case and admit that prayer cannot benefit humanity at all. Prayer and miracles involve the same philosophical principles. So we perceive that if God ever wrought a miracle he can on the same basis answer any prayer that comes within the limit of the divine promise.

A miracle is not wrought by reversing or suspending a law of nature; it is dependent upon the presence of a personal God possessing intelligence and power. The impersonal forces of the universe could not create the universe, nor can they perform miraculous feats. When God performs a miracle he does not act on the law. He operates on the body that is the object of the miraculous effort. He takes the object out of the control

\* *Institutes*, vol. II, p. 492.

of the law that governs it in its normal condition, and does with it what he will. When the young man of the Scripture let his ax fall into the river and it was miraculously made to swim there was neither reversal nor suspension of law. The water rolled on smoothly, the pebbles at the bottom of the stream remained undisturbed. Everything obeyed the behest of nature, but the invisible power of God brought the ax to the surface as the visible hand of the owner would have done if it had been within his power. The suspension of the law of gravitation, if it had been possible, would not have brought the ax to the surface. Law is helpless of itself. Inertia is a property of matter, and the iron would obey that law. The impersonal forces of nature could not move the ax; these forces always act according to law, but never administer the law, being subject to it. The suspension of a law, could this be accomplished, would precipitate systems and constellations into one general ruin and inaugurate a reign of terror in the physical world. Such a disaster is avoided by the continuous presence of the all-wise God, who is in no way trammled or embarrassed by the laws of his own kingdom.

The God of Christianity is not an impersonal force, is not the sum total of all forces, but is the Almighty. He possesses intelligence, will, affections, dominion, everything in an infinite sense. When he created man he gave to him as the constituent parts of his being every attribute, quality, and element of the Godhead. Man possesses in a finite degree everything that the Father possesses in an infinite degree. Man is God's child, made in his own likeness and image. Prayer is God's method of communion with his children, the channel of his fellowship with humanity. We are not to think of him simply as a force or influence. If we grant the fact of the divine intelligent personality, and also concede that man is a being of God's own creation, prayer is the easiest and most natural method of communication between this God and his dependent children. But the varied forces of nature never become administrative agencies. In answering prayer God, as the intelligent administrator, takes hold of the object of prayer, whatever it may be, removes it from the control of the forces that govern it in its existing condition, and subjects it to the environment of other laws and the influence of other forces and conditions. Answers to prayer

therefore imply much more than the reflex action of the petitioner's desires on his own life, much more than the filling up of a space in a program prepared from all eternity. They are the compliance of the compassionate Father with the request of his helpless children. This compliance on the part of the Father may be in the realm of nature or of grace, but is always in harmony with law. It is generally instantaneous, wrought by the going forth of his divine power, as in Christ's healing the leper, giving sight to the blind, raising the widow's son, or giving health to the woman who touched the hem of his garment; or as in the pardon of a penitent sinner, the sanctification of a devout believer, or the bestowment of consolation on a stricken soul.

Because God's immutability and power must remain the same in all ages, and because the answer to prayer involves the same philosophical principle upon which miracles are wrought, it must be apparent that prayer always has been, and must ever remain, one of the most important factors in the government of the world.

*William Jones —*



ART. IX.—THAT PSEUDO-JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF  
1888—A FRIENDLY APPEAL TO CONSERVATIVE  
EXPERTS.

IN 1888, as is well known, the "Committee of Seventeen" recommended the General Conference to adopt the resolution quoted below,\* together with a resolution that a certain protest was "sustained by the Discipline." An increasing number of persons in the Church—persons occupying very diverse party standpoints—firmly believe that while the adoption of these resolutions, or of the entire original report of the committee, by the General Conference would have been an unqualified and perfectly legitimate and defensible judicial interpretation and declaration of the then existing law touching the eligibility of women, the adoption of the *amended* report, under all the parliamentary circumstances, was not such. Their reasons for this conscientious belief may be presented in barest outline as follows:

1. In order to the giving of a perfectly legitimate and defensible judicial interpretation of the law of a self-governing body in any particular instance at least a majority of the competent court must deliberately, and with definite intent, unite in the interpreting judgment authoritatively rendered.

2. In order that an interpreting judgment thus rendered may be made binding upon all the constituent members and subsequent lawmakers of such an organization it is necessary that they should be afforded the ordinary or else clear extraordinary evidence that in the manner above described a clear majority of the competent court did unite in the interpretation for which authority is claimed.†

3. The total number of General Conference members who voted for or against the undivided amended report was four hundred and thirty-five. It was made up of two classes:

A. Those who, considering the probable intentions of the Church in 1872, conscientiously held that without new legisla-

\* "Under the constitution and laws of the Church as they now are women are not eligible as lay delegates in the General Conference."

† The "ordinary evidence" in the case of the General Conference, acting in a judicial capacity, should of course be sought in the official record of the body; what would constitute "clear extraordinary evidence" it is not easy to state in terms that would be applicable to more than a single case.

tion in the form of a constitutional amendment women could not legally be chosen or admitted as lay delegates, and who by their affirmative vote intended to declare this conscientious judgment.

B. All others, whatever their views of the original report, or of the amendment, which proposed to "consult the Church," or of the desirableness or undesirableness of combining the two.

Of both these classes some voted in the affirmative and some in the negative, but how many on the one side or on the other no man knows or ever knew.

4. Now, if the vote had not been by orders, and *if it were known* that every one of the one hundred and fifty-nine ministers and every one of the seventy-eight laymen who voted for the amended report belonged to Class A, it might be argued, not with absolute but with considerable fairness, that, despite the unfortunate obscuration of the purely judicial question by the introduction of considerations for and against the proposed appeal to the Church, the final action adopted by a total majority of thirty-nine was probably *equivalent* to a valid judicial declaration.

5. On the other hand, *if it were known* that of those who voted for the amended report forty per cent belonged to Class A, while the other sixty per cent voted for it for one or the other of these reasons, to wit: (a) because they felt uninformed as to the intention of past legislation on the subject, and preferred to evade the responsibility of a personal vote by "consulting the Church generally;" or (b) because, while fully believing no new legislation necessary in order to the admission of women, they yet deemed it more conducive to peace and good will in the Church to accept the slower method of constitutional amendment, no reasonable person would claim that the adopted paper met the requirements above formulated as essential to the delivery of a legitimate and defensible judicial decision. Only forty per cent of such an affirmative vote would have a genuinely judicial quality and intent, and could in fairness count toward a binding judicial determination and declaration of the meaning of the existing law. Even if ninety per cent were from Class A they would manifestly fail to create even a probability of a judicial result unless their numerical aggregate exceeded the numerical aggregate of all the negative

votes added to the number included in the remaining ten per cent of the affirmative votes.

6. Applying, now, this reasonable and only reasonable principle of counting as judicial those votes only that had a judicial quality or intent—that is, those that *by intention of their givers* expressed a distinct and conscientious judgment touching the scope and intended meaning of *the existing law*—it is manifest that if even two of those laymen who voted for the amended report did not belong to Class A, but voted as they did for reasons “a” or “b” above, or for any other similar reason, the due subtraction of their two votes from the lay majority of two in favor of the so-called judicial declaration leaves the declaration itself without enough “judicial” votes for its adoption. The total paper is not defeated; the number voting for it and the number voting against it remain unchanged; but for an unqualified and perfectly legitimate and defensible “*judicial declaration of the existing law*” it has not vote enough that have the judicial quality.

7. Of the total number that actually voted for the amended report a generous proportion no doubt belonged to Class A, and their votes had a proper judicial quality and intent. But that seventy-seven out of the seventy-eight laymen that voted for the paper belonged to Class A is to all persons acquainted with the sentiments of the laity at the time extremely improbable. Even those who are foremost in claiming that a proper and valid judicial decision was given do not claim that all the affirmative votes, or that among the laity all but one, were given by persons belonging to Class A, or, on the other hand, that all the negative votes were given by members of Class B. One prominent defender of the action makes the majority to have consisted of at least two classes of persons, the minority of at least three, so making five classes in all, each class having its own distinct views and motives in voting.\* How many

\* Compare this statement from the *Christian Advocate* of September 13, 1894 (Italics mine): “Most of the believers in the eligibility of women under the law voted against it [that is, the amended report]; some who did not believe in the eligibility of women under the law, and were wholly opposed to their ever becoming eligible, voted against the report after amendment, because of the proposition to submit the change of the constitution to the Church; and for the same reason some who could not decide for eligibility voted for the amended report.” As an eminent judge has repeatedly pointed out, a vote on the wisdom of changing the law is one thing, while a vote on the meaning of the law as it reads is quite another. The result of the hybrid vote of 1888 was neither defensible interpretation nor legitimate legislation.

of the affirmative votes were expressive of strictly judicial judgment and intent is not known, and can never be known, and the same must be said of the negative votes. By tabling the fair-minded motion for a division of the amended report the General Conference rendered it forever impossible to determine how a vote on the judicial question alone would have fallen out. Under these circumstances, as the laity has neither the ordinary nor any clear extraordinary evidence that a majority of the persons who voted for the amended report indisputably belonged to Class A, and accordingly that they *intended* to unite in a strictly judicial declaration as to the true force and meaning of *the existing law*, it seems to many intelligent and conscientious people, irrespective of party preferences, that no one is legally or morally bound to defend the adopted paper as a regularly obtained and legitimate and binding judicial declaration. It also seems to them that any method of judicially interpreting the existing law of the Church *by the aid of votes given for other than judicial reasons* is self-evidently wrong.\*

Calling now the foregoing paragraphs a preamble, let us add to it a form of declaration or subscription, as follows:

*Despite the foregoing considerations, and all similar ones, we the undersigned hereby publicly affirm that in our deliberate judgment the peculiar method by which the legislative and the judicial portions of the amended report of 1888 were made to stand or fall together, according to the issue of one and the same vote, was a legitimate and perfectly defensible method of judicial procedure—one safe, as a precedent, in any future case in which the true meaning of a constitutional provision may be in question.*

The above preamble and declaration were prepared many months ago. In view of the now renewed discussions and votings they are brought forth from the drawer for the purpose of testing the real sentiment of the most conservative of the recognized legal authorities in the Church touching a question of fundamental and abiding importance. The writer questions

\* For a fuller consideration of the illegitimacy and of the perils of this method the reader is referred to an article in *Zion's Herald* of January 16, 1895, entitled "Let Us Turn the Case About—What Might Have Happened in 1880." The article also appeared at about the same date in the *Western Christian Advocate*, and in the *Northern*. It showed how, by the Neely amendment process, in a perfectly possible case, a majority of one more than one third of the General Conference with one more than one fourth of the Annual Conference members might overthrow a fundamental safeguard of the Church's constitution.

no brother's motives or judgment in any past action; he only desires to know whether he himself understands the unprecedented and double-headed action of 1888 aright, and whether others understand it aright. For the sake of ascertaining this the writer, in the most brotherly spirit, here respectfully and earnestly invites those who claim that in the action of 1888 a legitimate and defensible "judicial declaration" was given to find any three of our sixteen general superintendents, or any seven delegates who have ever been selected to serve on the Judiciary Committee of a General Conference—excepting those selected in 1892\*—who are willing to subscribe to the above declaration without qualification, and to permit it, with the preamble, to be printed with their signatures in any of the official periodicals of the Church. If within four weeks of the time of the publication of this communication the called-for subscribers shall be found, the present writer publicly promises to withdraw his teachings on this subject for careful reconsideration, and, if possible, for absolute retraction. If, on the other hand, the subscribers cannot be found, he will feel entitled to take the result as an abundant unpartisan vindication of the view expressed in the first title of the present article.

POSTSCRIPT, THREE MONTHS LATER.

From recent private correspondence with certain of my conservative friends I am led to believe that some of them hold that, while the parliamentary process by which the so-called judicial declaration of 1888 was secured was not defensible or safe, the result was a legally and morally binding interpretation of the law. To test the opinion of conservative experts with respect to this position, I here add a second public declaration, as follows:

*The undersigned hereby publicly declare that in their deliberate judgment the General Conference of 1888 rendered a legally and morally binding judicial decision touching the eligibility of women under the existing law, but by a parlia-*

\*The reason for this exception is found in the well-known fact that in their unsuccessful report to the General Conference the members of the Judiciary Committee of 1892 precommitted themselves on the side of the above declaration, recording apparently a vote of fourteen to one against my view. The extraordinary strength of this vote places in a most striking light the superabundant fairness of the above proposals and the great confidence of their author in the soundness of his position.

*mentary process indefensible in principle and unsafe as a precedent.*

If any three of the bishops, or any seven of our Judiciary Committeemen who served before 1892, can be found who will sign and appropriately publish this latter declaration with the foregoing preamble I will at once gracefully retire from the arena of this debate and content myself as best I may with praying for the peace of Jerusalem and for the enlightenment of her future rulers.

William F. Warren.

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ART. X.—THE REAL JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF  
1888.

It may seem to be presumption in me to respond to President Warren's "friendly appeal to conservative experts." Moderately conservative I may claim to be, but an expert, by no means. Nevertheless, I may be able to answer the reasoning of the preceding article. I wish to do it in the sweet and kindly spirit which characterizes that. In order to find the right starting point it will be profitable to see, in brief, a little more clearly just what was the action of the General Conference of 1888 pertinent to the subject in hand.

Five women appeared at the bar of the Conference, presenting certificates of election as lay delegates, and claiming seats as such. A protest against their being seated was also presented. The question of their eligibility, with the protest, was referred to a select committee of seventeen, made exceptionally strong by its composition. After due deliberation the committee reported "that under the constitution and laws of the Church as they now are women are not eligible as lay delegates in the General Conference," and as a consequence that the protest "is sustained by the Discipline." During the discussions the report was amended by adding the following: "But since there is great interest in this question, and since the Church generally should be consulted in regard to such an important matter, therefore, *Resolved*, That we submit to the Annual Conferences the proposition to amend the second restrictive rule by adding the words, 'and said delegates may be men or women,' after the words 'two lay delegates for an Annual Conference;' so that it will read, 'nor of more than two lay delegates for an Annual Conference, and said delegates may be men or women.'" When the report, as so amended, came up for action the debate was closed on behalf of the committee by Warner Miller, who was one of its members. Before the final vote a division of the question was moved, but the motion was laid upon the table. The report, as amended, was adopted by a majority of thirty-seven on the ministerial vote and of two on the lay vote.

Now, the substance of Dr. Warren's argument is that this final action was not a "legitimate and defensible" decision of a

question of law, for the reason that not all of the majority votes had what he calls the judicial quality. He does not put this on the ground that two things were united in the determining vote, one the decision of a constitutional question (which was judicial), and the other a proposition for a submission to the Annual Conferences of a proposed constitutional amendment (which was not judicial); for he admits that if it were known that everyone who voted for the amended report belonged to his Class A (those who conscientiously held that without constitutional amendment women could not be lay delegates), it might be argued with considerable fairness that "the final action adopted by a total majority of thirty-nine was probably equivalent to a valid judicial declaration." Indeed, it needs no admission from anyone to establish the fact that such would be the result.

But Dr. Warren's contention is that some of those who voted for the amended report did not conscientiously believe that women were ineligible "under the constitution and laws of the Church as they now are;" that is, they did not believe all that they voted; therefore their action had not the judicial quality and is not binding. His whole argument rests on this foundation. It is only needful, therefore, to examine this assumption of fact. It is not necessary to take down the superstructure piece by piece if the corner stone gives way.

Dr. Warren divides the majority into two classes: "A," those who hold that the first part of the final action (the original report) was correct, and "B," all others, whatever their views. This is certainly an original way of analyzing the action of either a judicial or a legislative body. I will undertake to say that no judicial decision of any court consisting of two or more members, or any act of any legislative body, could stand the test under such a process if you once give the objector a free hand and the use of an unrestrained imagination. All he need say is that the majority is composed of those who really believed what they voted and "all others," and that "no man knows or ever knew" what was the number of the "all others," and you have the sovereign annihilator of all legislative and judicial obstacles in the way of universal progress.

Logically, it makes no difference that the measure passed was twofold. That was only to the disadvantage of the com-

bined proposition. It is altogether likely, as Dr. Warren says, that some who believed in the law as declared disapproved of the appeal to the Church, and so voted with the minority. The amended report as adopted thus had a double load to carry, as it had to get votes in favor of both of two distinct propositions instead of one. It is perfectly legitimate to suppose that some voted with the minority on the ground above indicated, because it is in accordance with probabilities and with reason and conscience, and is consistent with their votes; but it is not legitimate to attribute to anyone voting either way an opinion directly contrary to what he expressed by his vote.

Dr. Warren gives us two canons of interpretation (his 1 and 2), apparently constructed for the occasion, but they seem to be fair, and at any rate will serve the present purpose. The reader is referred to them without full repetition here.

We are not at liberty to presume that any of the voters united in the interpreting judgment except deliberately and with definite intent. The occasion was a serious one; the discussion was earnest and exhaustive; every man was conscious that he was charged with a grave responsibility, and that he was acting under the eye of the whole Church. Never were men put more thoroughly upon the very mettle of their judgment and conscience. So much for the first rule.

And then, is not the judgment which was rendered made binding by the very kind of evidence provided by the second rule as sufficient? Is it not supported by "ordinary evidence," which, we are told, should of course be sought in the record of the official body? We have the record, and it shows that a "clear majority" (any majority is a *clear* majority) did unite in the interpretation. What other evidence could there be in the record?

And yet Dr. Warren, without a particle of proof, so far as appears, to support his speculation, proceeds to mystify himself by supposing, for fanciful reasons, that some unknown proportion of the voters were actuated by motives and beliefs at war with the declaration of their votes. He seems to take the case of the lay delegates as presenting the best vantage ground for his argument, probably because there was only a majority of two in the lay vote in favor of the report as adopted. He says: "But that seventy-seven out of the seventy-eight laymen that

voted for the paper belonged to Class A is to all persons acquainted with the sentiments of the laity at the time extremely improbable." Is a formal and solemn declaration of the General Conference, then, to be impeached by what any number of persons may think as to the sentiments of the laity? It would be as easy to say, and probably nearer the truth, that a vote of seventy-eight to seventy-six fell short of expressing the preponderance of lay sentiment in favor of the decision.

But it is utterly immaterial what the prevalent sentiment of the laity was; the only important thing in this discussion is, How was the lay vote in the Conference cast? Dr. Warren seems to suppose that there were probably at least two of the seventy-eight laymen who either "felt uninformed as to the intention of the past legislation on the subject, and preferred to evade the responsibility of a personal vote," or believed that "no new legislation was necessary in order to the admission of women," and yet for the sake of peace thought best to go through the slow method of constitutional amendment, and so voted that new legislation *was* necessary. Is it not apparent how perfectly gratuitous such an assumption is, besides being ever so uncharitable? Even if it were lawful to impeach the members of the court in this way it would still not disturb the force and verity of the judgment. The record speaks for itself; it is not ambiguous; it cannot be frittered away by gossip or surmise. But it ought to be said that, if any delegate confesses that he voted for a report the main and decisive part of which was against his belief, self-stultification would be the mildest term to apply to such an offense.

Our friend complains bitterly that the question was not divided. We have already seen how its not being divided would be likely to operate against the affirmative; but if those believing in the eligibility of women, as a bare proposition, or if those who favored a constitutional amendment had been in a majority either party could have ordered the division. All parties seem to agree that there were some members of the Conference (it is reasonably certain there was a considerable number of them) who desired to see women admitted to the General Conference but believed they were not eligible as the law stood. These might well desire to see a proposition for a constitutional amendment coupled with the decision, so that

while in their votes they might be loyal to their intellect, they might at the same time provide for the gratification of their wishes. They would naturally oppose a division of the question, and it would be "legitimate" for them to do so.

Other speculations might be indulged in which would be quite as probable as those of Dr. Warren, as, for instance, that some who desired the admission of women *at that time*, if they could obtain it, but also wished to provide for a change of the law, if necessary for that purpose, opposed the division of the question so as to force all those who supported the original report to also support the amendment. This may have been considered a fair parliamentary device. Whether it was so or not, our better way is to attribute no motives except such as are creditable. Let us believe that all the votes "by intention of their givers expressed a distinct and conscientious judgment touching the scope and intended meaning of the existing law." In that case it is admitted they would have the "judicial quality and intent." And we have no right to believe anything else. Perhaps no question was ever decided in a deliberative assembly with less admixture of unworthy or even doubtful motives. The members must have acted with a solemn sense of their responsibility to the great Head of the Church. What right, then, have objectors to say that any minister, or any layman, had not sufficient information or intelligence to form a well-defined opinion as to the state of the law as it then stood; or that he voted one way, or the other, because he had no such opinion; or that, having an opinion one way, he voted the other for the sake of peace? And yet it is substantially alleged that there were some liable to one or another of these charges. "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth; yea, he shall be holden up: for God is able to make him stand."

And as an answer to the whole scheme of this attack let it be borne in mind that a decision *is* a decision, whether it be of an ecclesiastical or any other court; and it is none the less so because some subsidiary matter may be coupled with it. How would a party fare in a court of law if he should attempt to evade or overthrow a decision of the Supreme Court previously made, as not having the judicial quality, by showing that the court in connection with it recommended the legislature to con-

sider the expediency of repealing or amending the law under which the judgment was pronounced? Yet that is precisely the drift of the article which I am essaying to answer.

As a sort of supplement to the discussion Dr. Warren advertises two very remarkable proposals. Seriously as he takes his own arguments, it is hardly possible that he can be serious about these. By the first he declares in effect that unless, within four weeks, either three bishops or seven members among all of the judiciary committees of the General Conferences previous to that of 1892 shall sign a certificate that they consider the manner in which the subject was disposed of by the adoption of the amended report a legitimate and perfectly defensible method of judicial procedure he will take such failure as a vindication of his views. Of course he does not expect any such answer to his challenge, whatever may be the views of any, or all, of the persons included in the designation; but I think I can give him a fact which is equivalent to the statement he calls for. It is necessarily implied by the terms of the offer, that all the men who have been selected for those several judiciary committees would naturally be, and were, men of such weight and character that he will commit his case to any seven of them, as being equal to three bishops. Of course such men would not vote for any action which they did not consider "legitimate and perfectly defensible." Now, I point out the fact, from the record, that not only *seven* but *nine* of the thirteen members of the Judiciary Committee of 1888 voted for the report in question as adopted on its final passage, thus virtually vouching for its fairness.

The persistent efforts that have been made in various ways, and with great versatility of invention, to break the force of the decision of 1888, I must humbly submit, are all pernicious in their tendency. It was attempted to have the Conference of 1892 directly reverse that of 1888. Then we had the now discredited Hamilton plan the most illegitimate and indefensible of all contrivances; we have now, from a high quarter, a forced and artificial classification of votes, upon assumed and unwarrantable distinctions, for the purpose of impugning the record, which the same authority tells us is the ordinary evidence of legislative or judicial transactions.

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in view is to break down the safeguards of constitutional law and of judicial authority, though by no means so intended by the authors and promoters. It will be found easy to inflict great if not irreparable injury upon the Church by seeking to accomplish results in any but a direct and straightforward way; much easier to inflict than to repair. No enemy from without could do us half the damage that we can do ourselves. A great observer of human events, as well as of human nature, has said:

O, then beware!

Those wounds heal ill that men do give themselves.

However our opinions may differ, we can surely all unite with Dr. Warren in the prayer that the Church may be guided to do those things which are wisest and best.

G. G. Reynolds

## ART. XI.—REASON AND SENTIMENT AS FACTORS IN SOCIAL PROGRESS.

It is generally held by philologists that the word which in the Teutonic tongues designates the head of the animal kingdom is closely allied to a verbal root whose signification is "to think." Man is, therefore, the thinking being *par excellence* in the realm of animated nature. Whether this derivation be correct or not, and necessarily without reference to it, man is wont to assert for himself the proud preeminence of occupying the highest place among the creatures that inhabit the earth, and to claim that this position has been accorded to him, or that he has won it for himself, because he alone is the possessor of reason. It may be interesting, and it is certainly not without profit, from the practical point of view, to examine to what extent the history of the race, so far as it is fairly well authenticated, bears out the common belief that reason has been the prime factor, the chief motive power, in human progress. Such an examination will prove almost beyond a doubt that ideas, impulses generally irrational, tradition, interests real or imaginary, and national traits have played a far larger part in the records of the past, and are doing so still, than is generally believed. A saying attributed to Franklin, that there would be no advantage in being a reasonable creature if one could not find a reason for doing what he wants to, pointedly expresses the subordination of reason to other motives that impel men to action.

When a man makes up his mind to do a thing he can generally prove by a mental process to his own satisfaction that he ought to do it. Let us take the burning social problem of the day and see how far the influence of reason has been effective in dealing with it. We mean the drink problem. The advocates of temperance have nearly all the reasons on their side; their opponents have everything else, including the appetites of those who drink and the avarice of those who sell. The intelligent class among all European peoples are on the side of temperance. Writers and speakers are warning their countrymen against the dangers of alcoholism. They are demonstrating from day to day that more than one half the evils that afflict

the body politic are due to drink. They point to the uncontradicted testimony furnished by the records of poverty, crime, and wretchedness as evidence of the reasonableness of their teaching. Yet how little has been accomplished, how few drunkards have been reclaimed, by argument! Often the very men who are firmly convinced of the danger of meddling with strong drink—and who is not?—are unable to resist an appetite when once strengthened by indulgence. The inefficacy of reason to stand against the desire for drink has been so fully demonstrated that it has largely changed the methods by which the demon of alcoholism is to be combated. Instead of arguments addressed to reason, training is applied for the formation of right habits. Prophylactic agencies are brought to bear upon the child while in the plastic state; and, though the reasoning powers are yet weak, this has been found to be the more effective, and indeed, the only generally effective, preventive of drunkenness. We have no desire here to enter into a discussion of the temperance question, and have only touched upon it because it illustrates in a striking way, and by examples familiar to all, the subordinate position of reason in directing human affairs.

Among the uncomplimentary remarks made by Schopenhauer about men there is more truth in the following than most of us like to admit:

Brainless pates are the rule, fairly furnished ones the exception, the brilliantly endowed very rare, genius a *portentum*. How otherwise could we account for the fact that out of upward of eight hundred millions of existing human beings, and after the chronicled experience of six thousand years, so much should still remain to discover, to think out, and to be said? By far the greater part of humanity are wholly inaccessible to purely intellectual enjoyments. They are quite incapable of the delight that exists in ideas as such, everything standing in a certain relation to their own individual will, in other words, to themselves and their own affairs. In order to interest them it is necessary that their wills should be acted upon, no matter in how remote a degree.

The material of which reformers is made is furnished by nature in such small quantities that none of it gets into the great mass of mankind. They are pretty well content with the world as it is, and expend far more thought in making themselves as comfortable in it as may be than in making it better. "We must take the world as it is," or "Why should

we concern ourselves with the doings of our neighbors so long as they do not directly interfere with our own?" has always been the conscious or unconscious creed of a large majority of the human race. The researches of anthropologists and historians have thus far failed to discover any evidence of the existence of human beings upon earth who were intellectually inferior to those now living. In so far as there has been or is any inferiority it is quantitative rather than qualitative. The most abject races can be civilized in a generation or two when placed under proper conditions. No new faculties need to be created; it is only necessary to develop those already existing. Yet human progress is a comparatively recent thing. But faint traces of it are discoverable until the advent of the Greeks. Egypt and Babylon appear to us, at the other end of the vista of historical perspective, about as we find them two or three thousand years later. This could hardly have been possible if reason had been a force in ancient society. In so far as it was, it can only have been the reason of the modern Turk, who finds the idea of progress utterly repugnant to him and who is content to be what his father was before him. If progress is founded upon reason, and not upon race characteristics, it is impossible to explain the wide differences that exist among the inhabitants of the globe.

There is no question affecting the relation of man to man upon which the civilized world is at present more nearly agreed than that slavery is wrong. So deep-seated has this feeling become that the foremost nations of our time have not only ceased to tolerate it among themselves, but have undertaken to extirpate it from the face of the earth. While we may question to some extent the disinterestedness of the motives of some of those who engage in its suppression, there is no doubt that they have a strong public sentiment back of them. How glaring is the contrast of public opinion to-day upon this question with that of antiquity! No intelligent man will assert that in the power of thought, in the ability to reason, the world has advanced one iota in two thousand years. It is universally conceded that no greater men ever lived than Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These men, to say nothing of many others, seemed to have divined by a sort of superhuman prescience almost all the lines of human progress for all time to come. Yet how

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little they have to say upon slavery, except to recognize it as an existing institution! Aristotle even enters into an elaborate discussion to show that servitude is the natural state of a part of the human race. Might has always made slaves. Even slaves found nothing reprehensible in the practice and submitted calmly to their condition, though they now and then rebelled against oppression. Those who had themselves been slaves never hesitated to enthrall others when by a turn of fortune they found the power in their hands. Not many years have passed since it was a common thing to defend slavery, and even the pulpit took a share in this defense. We were frequently told that it was ordained by God himself; that its abuse was no reason for its abolition; that it would be just as reasonable to turn all children over to the care of the state because some parents maltreated or neglected their offspring. Dean Alford, writing in 1864, expressed his contempt for the American people for several reasons, and among others for their "reckless and fruitless maintenance of the most cruel and unprincipled war in the history of the world." This dignitary of the Church uttered not only his own sentiments, but that of the entire aristocratic class in England, to which the Anglican Church professes to belong. How delusive the progress of the last score of years has proved the learned dean's reasoning to have been! How few persons can be found to-day who defend slavery! England itself abolished slavery, not because it was more unreasonable in the nineteenth century than in the eighteenth, but because the growth of the altruistic sentiment among the English people would no longer tolerate it.

It is doubtful whether in the last analysis war is ever a reasonable procedure. Under certain conditions a people may be justified in taking up arms. When a government becomes so tyrannical that its subjects can endure its domination no longer there is sometimes no recourse but rebellion. But not many of the wars that have drenched the earth with blood have been of this sort. Generally they are born of the lust of conquest or of the desire to uphold that peculiar sentiment, national honor. Many wars have been undertaken from a religious motive, and these have usually been the most relentless; yet the superiority of one religion over another is the last question that can reasonably be settled with the sword.

Hardly different is the case when national honor is involved. Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian war. The French people held that their nation was insulted in the person of their ambassador. All knew that this was a mere pretext for engaging in a conflict that had already been determined upon. Two individuals who happen to have a dispute can usually settle their differences by referring them to a third party, especially if force in the guise of law is behind the arbitrator. It is generally found that one or the other party is in the wrong, or it may be both. In the nature of the case a national dispute might be decided in the same way. But it is rarely done. It must be decided in a way that always proves costly to both parties and terribly costly to one of them. Reason and experience have proclaimed their lessons, for the most part in vain. In spite of our boasted progress there is a painful amount of truth in the recent words of a congressman: "Nineteen hundred years have passed since the advent of the Man of Nazareth, and instead of growing nearer and more near to the universal era of peace all the energies, all the inventive talent, all the genius of the human mind are now devoted to the manufacture and construction and suggestion of implements of war more horrible, more fatal in the power of execution, than any which the world has heretofore seen." The intellectual preeminence of the Athenian people is well known. But how did they use their intelligence? Was it employed to promote the welfare of one another? It was rather used to defend the institution to which they had fallen heir by no effort of their own. Far more thought and labor were expended in trying to injure one another than in the work of promoting their own welfare or that of their neighbors.

There is probably no sentiment that dwells permanently in the human breast, and is hardly ever absent from any member of the race, for which so little can be said on the ground of reason as the love of early scenes. Tacitus failed to see how anyone could endure to live in such a country as Germany, unless it were his native land. But affection for home and familiar surroundings is hardly ever effaced, no matter how unpleasant they may have been, and how far subsequent prosperity has removed one from them. Early habits leave such an abiding impress on us that we review the familiar scenes

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with a certain degree of pleasure, even when this is not untinged with sadness. The Irish peasant never forgets the land of his birth, though his recollections are wholly of abject poverty, of squalor and half-satisfied hunger; and he is ready at all times to take up arms against the government that he holds responsible for his woes. The German seeks to transplant his native customs to every land that hospitably receives him, and to make his new home in many respects as much like the land of his birth as he can. The Scandinavian from the far North, a land almost unendurable to those accustomed to warmer regions, is never so happy as when he is permitted to return to his early haunts and to live over again the familiar scenes of his youth. There is no explanation of this curious psychological fact except that we feel a certain pleasure in doing over again that to which we have been accustomed, though at first it may have been unpleasant and even painful. Men are prone to run in grooves. It is hard to get those who have not been trained for it to do some new thing, to entertain new thoughts, to strike out new paths. Much easier is it to accept a tradition than to examine its trustworthiness. There is no harder work than thinking; and it is a kind of labor to which the common man is much averse. No wonder that he finds pleasure in doing and believing what has become familiar and easy. No wonder that early habits and beliefs have such a powerful hold on most of mankind that they are ready to fight and even lay down their lives to preserve them. And what shall we say of the influence of chivalry upon the history of the world, using the term in an ethical rather than an historical sense? It is almost the sole secular motive that lights up the dark wilderness of mediæval history. "Order, veracity, loyalty, self-sacrifice, and mildness of manners, the protection of the weak and the innocent, and the punishment of wrong" were the motives that gave it birth and nourished it into full-grown maturity.

From the mythical age of *Hæmon* and *Antigone* to the day of the contemporary novelist and poet affection between persons of the opposite sex has been a powerful incentive to human action. The fact that it plays so large a part in the literature of fiction is but the proof that the shadow furnishes of a substance not far away. What deeds of prowess and daring has it not inspired and carried to successful issue! It is true

that its reign has not been one of unmixed good. From the courts of emperors and kings to the home of the peasant it has exerted its baleful or benevolent influence. We are not here concerned with the purity of the motive, but with its strength. No one who takes time to reflect can doubt that the devotion of the lover to his lady, or of the lady to her lord, has been one of the most powerful factors in the development of the race. Whether it has been the ephemeral passion, whose fierce flames burned out the fuel upon which it fed in the brief space of a day, or the conjugal fidelity as abiding as life itself, its potency none will dispute. Often the source of its inspiration, as in the case of Lady Macbeth, was demoniacal rather than divine. Yet it was none the less potent as the arbiter of the destinies of individuals and of nations.

Perhaps no fact in what we may call ethnological psychology is more potent than the constitutional inability of any nation to form a just estimate of itself. And this weakness increases, if such an expression be admissible, with the rank and intelligence of those who exhibit it. No reader, except a native, will rely upon the history of any country written by a native historian. In nine cases out of ten, wherever there is in the narrative an opportunity for the display of national bias we are sure to find it. That France marches at the head of civilization is an assertion one would endeavor in vain to refute in debate with a Frenchman. In their opinion they have never had occasion to go abroad for anything that was desirable. Yet it is an accepted fact that the French people know less of other countries than almost any people of Europe. Another typical case is afforded by recent histories of Germany. The success of the Germans in the Franco-Prussian war has turned the heads of almost the entire people; and the German historians frequently talk of their fellow-countrymen as if they belonged to some higher order of beings and had always so belonged. This, too, in spite of the fact that German literature, from the close of the Reformation almost to the time of the French Revolution, is hardly more than a blank; while for a still longer period the German people, oppressed at home and despised abroad, were of no political consequence whatever. Difficult is it to get material for self-glorification out of German history. But national prejudice has abundantly demonstrated its power

to accomplish this feat. As few persons have access to original records, the great majority see facts only at long range and through the distorted medium of national vanity or prejudice, or both, with results that may be and often have been painful enough. It is sad indeed that so few persons can be led to see that truth alone makes free. Zeus is represented in a passage of the "Odyssey" as saying: "Lo, how men blame the gods! From us, they say, spring troubles. Yet of their own perversity, beyond what is their due, they meet with sorrow." It is evident that Homer's chief god was a careful observer. His sagacious remarks were not only history, but prophecy also.

In one of his lectures Professor Giesebrecht used the following language: "The sovereignty belongs to Germany because the Germans are an *élite* nation, a noble race; and for the same reason it ought to exercise an influence on its neighbors that it is the right and duty of every man endowed with superior intelligence and force to act upon those individuals less highly endowed about him." How an honest man who knows the history of Germany can give utterance to such sentiments exceeds belief. Sometimes poor mortals who have lost their reason imagine themselves to be God. Such persons are usually confined in asylums, where they can harm neither themselves nor others. But in Germany we find men in professors' chairs, and even wearing titles of nobility, telling their countrymen that they belong to a race of demigods, the speakers included, and are charged with the mission of enlightening their neighbors. This would be amusing if it were not likely to lead to grave consequences. Everyone who has associated with those Prussians who give tone to public opinion knows that they are haughty and overbearing, and are always ready to make their superiority felt by the same methods that won for the lion the title of king of beasts.

In France the case is not greatly otherwise. Their pride has been humiliated in the loss of two provinces to a nation they have been taught to despise. Yet what can it matter to the people of Alsace-Lorraine who governs them, provided they are well governed and permitted to possess their property in peace? Their attachment to France is all the more ridiculous for the reason that they are radically German. Here, again, we see the inability of reason to make progress against a

mere sentiment. Many a brave Frenchman has laid down his life for the delusive phantom *la gloire*, and to what purpose? Taine, speaking only of the Napoleonic era, says :

According to him [Napoleon] man is held through his egoistic passions, fear, cupidity, sensuality, self-esteem, and emulation ; these are the mainsprings when he is not under excitement, when he reasons. Moreover, it is not difficult to turn the brain of man, for he is imaginative, credulous, and subject to being carried away ; stimulate his pride or vanity, provide him with an extreme and false opinion of himself and his fellow-men, and you can start him off head downward whenever you please.

The results of proceeding upon this policy are thus summed up by the learned writer :

Between 1804 and 1815 he has had slaughtered more than 1,700,000 men born within the ancient boundaries of France, to which must be added probably 2,000,000 of men born out of these limits, and all for him, under the title of allies, or slain on his account, under the title of enemies. All that the poor, enthusiastic, and credulous Gauls have gained by confiding their public welfare to him is two invasions ; all that he bequeaths to them as a reward for their devotion, after this prodigious waste of their blood and the blood of others, is a France shorn of fifteen departments acquired by the republic, deprived of Savoy, the left bank of the Rhine, and of Belgium—losing 4,000,000 of new Frenchmen which it had assimilated after many years of life in common, and, worse still, thrown back within the frontiers of 1789, alone diminished in the midst of its aggrandized neighbors, suspected by all Europe, and lastingly surrounded by a threatening circle of distrust and rancor.

A few years before the French people, for an idea which they expressed in the trinitarian formula, "Liberty, equality, fraternity," destroyed every man and every institution that seemed to stand in the way of a practical realization of the creed it embodied. Yet hardly a decade had passed before they were ready to follow implicitly the most uncompromising tyrant that ever deluded a people. The desire to be free from oppression is eminently reasonable ; but what can we say of a people who had just broken the yoke of bondage that had so long and heavily lain upon their own necks and yet tried to fasten a new one upon their neighbors as well as upon themselves ? No wonder Napoleon had a poor opinion of men when he saw how easily they could be led *en masse* into crime and misery.

During the past few years we have heard much about the so-called Monroe doctrine. In definition it apparently amounts to

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about this: when any government administered in Europe interferes in the affairs of any country on the western hemisphere, except in the case of its own possessions, the people of the United States are to regard such interference as a direct menace against them. Yet the territory virtually owned by Great Britain on the western continent, to say nothing of other European governments, is probably equal in extent to the Union, and England may therefore reasonably be supposed to have an equal interest here with ourselves. Nor is there any doubt that the Spanish American States, if they were administered by an enlightened people like the English, in spite of their shortcomings, would enjoy peace and prosperity such as they have never known. We have assumed that the attitude of a monarchy toward a republic is always that of an oppressor, and without always inquiring into the facts in the case. Again, there is now a strong feeling of sympathy for the Cubans in their struggle to free themselves from the yoke of Spain. This feeling is evidently strongest in those States that fifty years ago led the United States into a most unjust war with Mexico and a few years later plunged the country into civil war to keep the chains of slavery on four millions of human beings—a far worse state than that of the Cubans under the government of Spain.

The fundamental activity of the soldier is expressed by the poet in the lines,

Theirs not to reason why,  
Theirs but to do or die.

The soldier is not to inquire for a reason; he has but to do what he is ordered to do. He is usually a young man; not so young that his reasoning powers are undeveloped, but yet so young that his energy is prone to find expression in action rather than in deliberation. War needs not only men who are physically strong, but men who can be depended upon to subordinate their reasoning powers to the word of command. Whether the command be a reasonable one does not enter into the problem. The best soldier is not he who looks at war in a large way, and who is capable of understanding the cause for which he is to lay down his life; but it is he who is best able to use the means within his reach to accomplish the ends placed before him by those in authority over him. It is a question whether intelligence is so important a factor as is generally believed. No coun-

try has been so uniformly successful in war as Russia, because no armies fight more bravely than the Russian. The Russian peasant, crassly ignorant as he has always been and is, never hesitates to lay down his life for his emperor, if the latter wills it. Apparently he has never concerned himself about the reason why. Yet what astonishing results have rewarded his prowess! While he cannot frame into words the Horatian *dictum*, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori," he does more—he is the living exponent of it. Public sentiment finds ten heroes on the battlefield to one in civil life. That foolhardy bravery is often displayed and life lost in unwise and foolish conflict makes little difference. The world is interested directly in the act, and looks no farther. Physical courage is still rated far higher than moral courage; if it were not so the world would to-day present a far different aspect from that which we see.

From the consideration of mere personal bravery the transition is easy to the contemplation of patriotism. Here is a sentiment that is as universal as man himself. Every man, no matter how low in the scale of civilization, feels a certain degree of affection for the land of his birth; it is an affection akin to that which he feels for himself. But patriotism is an idea that, *per se*, will not for a moment stand the test of reason. The patriot is not necessarily better or worse than the man whose motto is, "Ubi bene, ibi patria." The Fuegian loves his country just as fervently as Gladstone or Bismarck. If the former were compelled to change place with either of the latter both would be equally unhappy. The one would protest as loudly against the efforts to elevate him as the latter to degenerate him.

Patriotism is not necessarily unreasonable, but it is always unreasoning. A man may be able to give a good account for the faith that is in him, and he may not. Lessing wrote, "Of love of country I have no conception; it appears to me but a heroic weakness which I am right glad to be without." Goethe was frequently blamed for his lack of patriotism. And, in truth, there is little in his writings that exhibits a distinctive German feeling, and there was equally little in his life. Plato, a corypheus among philosophers, is singularly free from national bias. When the historian Polybius made a study of the history of Rome he found that its steady growth was not an accident. Though a foreigner he could see that its government was



stable from the absence of the forces that made the government of his own people unstable. The Romans had instinctively put into effect those principles which the Greek philosophers had for centuries preached in vain to their own countrymen. The Romans were no philosophers, and despised philosophy. But they had the instinct of government, and rarely followed this instinct to their own detriment. Practical wisdom does not come through knowledge, often not even through experience. It may serve men who think, but this class is generally too small to make its impress permanently felt in the growth of States. Frederick the Great is reported to have said that, if he wanted to ruin one of his fairest provinces, he need only place it under the government of the philosophers. Akin to this is his remark that "one pinch of common sense is worth a university full of learning." Perhaps he had in mind the scholastic pedantry of his day that had its seat in the German universities, rather than the wholesome thinking that men may do if they have the proper incentives. It is true Plato thought that unless philosophers became kings, or kings philosophers, there would be no cessation of calamities among men; but he probably found few persons to agree with him. Fortunately or unfortunately, there is hardly any point upon which philosophers, the professed lovers of wisdom, are agreed among themselves. This is specially true where national prejudices come into play. But even among men of the same nationality there are often the bitterest animosities. Truth is not an abstraction. Those who are engaged in search for what they believe to be the truth are men with passions like ordinary mortals, and as likely to be blinded by them. Here, then, we find the same difference as to what is reasonable, sentiment again overmastering reason. Reason is artificial, deliberate, skeptical. Its function in human affairs is to regulate and control, not to supply a motive force. It decides how to do, rather than what to do. Only in a restricted sense can it be said that intelligence rules the world. We believe the author of *Social Evolution* has stated a truth of far wider application than he makes of it when he says:

It has to be confessed that in England during the nineteenth century the educated classes, in almost all the great political changes that have been effected, have taken the side of the party afterward admitted to have

been in the wrong—they have almost invariably opposed at the time the measures they have subsequently come to defend and justify. This is to be noticed alike of measures which have extended education, which have emancipated trade, which have extended the franchise. The educated classes have even, it must be confessed, opposed measures which have tended to secure religious freedom and to abolish slavery. The motive force behind the long list of progressive measures carried during this period has in scarcely any appreciable measure come from the educated classes; it has come almost exclusively from the middle and lower classes, who have in turn acted, not under the stimulus of intellectual motives, but under the influence of their altruistic feelings.\*

Progress needs a motive force, and this reason does not provide. The most powerful emotion that moves men partakes more or less of a religious character. It is everywhere in the foreground in the Babylonian and Assyrian wars. It played an important part in the struggle of Greek with Greek, or of Greek with barbarian. A Roman army was invincible only when it was confident that it went into battle with the favor of the gods. The religious idea carried the victorious armies of the Saracens over a large portion of the known earth in an incredibly short time. It is not necessary to enumerate any farther; everyone can recall the course of events for himself. Christianity itself does not appeal primarily to the reason. Its Founder taught "as one having authority, and not as the scribes." His precepts are not usually supported by what men call reasons, nor are they arrived at by processes of ratiocination. Their truth is intended to be spiritually apprehended, not to be worked out by the rules of logic. Herein lies their strength and their universal applicability. They are intended for those who can feel, as well as for those who can reason. And how large the preponderance of the former over the latter!

If we have read the history of philosophy aright it takes singularly little interest in the emotional nature of man. The ancients, indeed, make a great account of the passions, but they generally regard them as a sort of disturbing element in the economy of society. Modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes and ending with Kant, seems to regard man's emotional nature as a matter of little consequence; as a sort of penumbra of the reasoning powers. With the advent of Rous-

\* *Social Evolution*, p. 253.

seau a different state of affairs began to prevail. Rousseau himself was not much of a philosopher, because he lacked system in everything he did. But he was full of fruitful ideas, and he came at a time when the world was ready to listen to what he had to say. In his mental make-up the emotional element largely predominated; he was so much a creature of impulse that there is nothing surprising in the extent to which he moved the world. The world had come to recognize that, while reason must not be ignored in the instruction of youth, it cannot be wholly depended on as a guide. Modern pedagogy lays large stress on training, on giving direction to the young citizen or the young Christian before he is old enough to reason much about it. It seeks to cultivate his sympathies for the needs of society before the selfishness that he is destined to find all around him in later life gains the mastery over him. He is taught that the poor and degraded have a claim upon his charity, although this charity is to be kept under the control of reason. He may not let the slave or beggar perish from neglect, even though both are largely responsible for their condition. It is sympathy, not reason, that is the moving force in the philanthropic spirit that we see manifesting itself so powerfully wherever man has any claim to be called civilized. Examples are numerous and ready to hand everywhere. Surely nothing can be more reasonable than the doctrine that every man is inherently as good as another; yet how slow the world has been in recognizing this self-evident truth, even in theory! Christianity first enunciated it, but even Christianity was not able to bear up permanently against the tide of sentiment and tradition that bore down upon it. The early Christians themselves were slow to accept the doctrine, with all the consequences that seemed likely to flow from it. Even to-day it is far more a matter of theory than of actual practice, so slowly does the world outgrow its prejudices.

The spiritual nature of man, that prescience of God's plan in the government of the world, that sublime faith in the ultimate triumph of right which we often see manifested in highly endowed natures, is in no wise amenable to the laws of reason. We see this exhibited in the most marked degree in the Hebrew prophets. Their lofty faith in the coming of a

Messiah who should rule the world in righteousness was a trait of a highly endowed spiritual nature. The intellect colored its outward expression, and to some extent modified its form, but was not its source. Many of the world's greatest benefactors—in truth, the large majority of them—have not been men of preeminent intellectual endowment. They were men whose emotional nature was stirred by the wickedness, the spiritual darkness, around them, and whose will was aroused to activity by a contemplation of the situation in which they found themselves. Kant said there is but one good thing in the world, and that is a good will. But the emotional nature seems to be more clearly related to the will than to the intellect, and to be more readily influenced by it. The result is that progress, in the best sense of the word, is not primarily intellectual. Its various phases do not, in the main, originate with the intellectual class, though men of large intellectual endowments often identify themselves with it. It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that by stimulating and cultivating the intellect we can make the world better. Knowledge is not even power, as we are so often told. It is, indeed, an indispensable prerequisite to power; but power is latent unless stimulated into activity by the will. They are sadly mistaken who imagine that nothing is necessary to insure the continuous amelioration of the condition of mankind but a continuous increase of the world's stock of available knowledge.

*Chas. W. Super.*

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## EDITORIAL DEPARTMENTS.

## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

IN the "Arena" of this number Dr. James Mudge makes friendly answer to the critics of his book, *Growth in Holiness toward Perfection; or, Progressive Sanctification*, and endeavors to correct certain misapprehensions. He is allowed space equal to that occupied in our last number by Dr. Lowrey's criticism, to which especially he replies. We earnestly invite contributions to our "Arena," but no communication for it should exceed one thousand words.

WITHOUT lowering the dignity which has belonged to the *Review* in its best estate, without incurring any risk of having it classified with light literature, without transforming it into a mere family magazine, without neglecting in the least the biblical, theological, or philosophical, we believe we may promote the advantage and the pleasure of our readers by adding to the range and variety of its contents, in lines profitable to ministerial culture, and especially by giving it in every number, if possible, some distinct literary interest and value. For this course, if it were criticised, a very strong defense might easily be made. Some such policy of extension and enrichment must be pursued by the editor, who recognizes his responsibility to continue that progressive development which has marked the seventy-seven years of the *Methodist Review*.

ABOUT twenty years ago a book written by Dr. J. T. Crane, of the Newark Conference, was issued by our Book Concern, regarding which Dr. Whedon wrote in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* as follows :

Had we been privileged to peruse Dr. Crane's brochure, *Holiness the Birthright of all God's Children*, before its publication, we should doubtless have endeavored to convince him that there is no such difference in his views as to require him to place them in so frank an antagonism to Mr. Wesley's. . . . Mr. Wesley and Dr. Crane agree that, at justification, there is conferred a degree of "power" over sin and against temptation. Both would agree that according to the degree of that "power" is the degree of sanctification. Indeed, we think one of the best definitions of sanctification is: *The power, through divine grace, more or less com-*

plete, and more or less permanent, so to resist temptation and avoid sin as to live in the fullness of divine favor. Where the correlation between the inner state of the soul is such that there is no power to avoid sinning, "and that continually," the depravity is entire. Where, *secondly*, there is power through grace, by faith, largely but partially and precariously to avoid sin, with usually but a dim sense of divine approval, then we should by parity infer that the pravity was not entire but partial. If it were the case of one who had been previously in the *entirely* depraved state, we should imagine that it was a trace of that previous entire state. And viewing this to be about the condition of the ordinary justified person, we look upon this deficit of his spiritual power as a remains of his previous entire inability. Where, *thirdly*, the power is such as to enable one, with the exertion of unremittent care and energy, to maintain, with a clear and regular continuity, the avoidance of such sin as diminishes the light of God's smile upon us, we might with trembling trust call that entire sanctification. Where, *fourthly*, such is the correlation between the soul and temptation that the avoidance of sin is a matter of perfect normal and natural ease, and may be rationally predicted as forever and absolutely permanent (even though there is a free power for sin, and though sin be most abnormally the actual result), there is clearly no depravity. And this is Adamic perfection. But it is quite irrelevant to quote Adam and Eve before the fall to illustrate either of the previous cases. *Finally*, where the soul is entirely removed from the sphere of sin, perfectly filled with God, and framed within a body incapable of sin, so that sin becomes impossible, the holiness is finitely absolute. This last stage of complete indefeasible bliss will be at the resurrection. It is that glorious day to which St. Paul, earnestly looking, beholds the whole creation groaning for the manifestation of the sons of God. Regeneration is, indeed, truly a specific term in theology, and yet it comes under the grand genus of the final renovation. Then, for the first moment, the impairment we, one and all, have derived from Adam and sin, shall be completely repaired. Hence, our regeneration here, as individuals, is but initial, as part of the entire regeneration completed at the resurrection. Let us not be impatient because God is so slow as to leave an imperfect "residue" within us. "God is patient, because God is eternal." . . .

Sanctification is, perhaps, less the taking away anything from our inward nature than the bestowment of a repressive power over our inward sinward tendencies. . . .

Our definition of entire sanctification being questioned with a challenge to compare it with that of Wesley, we will place them side by side. We are sure the reader will discern their oneness of ultimate essence under a variety of forms:

#### *Our Definition.*

Such a measure of Power over sin as holds us with more or less of continuity in that same perfect fullness of divine approbation as rested upon us when justification first pronounced us through Christ perfectly innocent of sin.

#### *Wesley's Definition.*

Sanctification in the proper sense is an instantaneous deliverance from all sin, and includes an instantaneous Power, then given, always to cleave to God.

Both these definitions make the sanctified state consist of two things: *First*, "deliverance from sin" (by perfect justification at first); *second*, "power," namely, to maintain that perfect "deliverance from sin." Both definitions make the sancti-



fication proper consist in "POWER." Wesley says, "power always to cleave to God;" ours says, "power to avoid sin, so far as to retain the perfect divine approbation." Both express the same "power;" ours completely and fully, Wesley's briefly, and rather crudely for a definition. Even the merely regenerate man has "power to cleave to God." Nay, an unregenerate Theist does, as against Atheism, exort "power to cleave to God." Wesley's words are, therefore, inexplicit and inadequate, not completely expressing his own meaning. Taking, now, the previous point: Wesley says "deliverance from sin" (that is, the guilt of sin, by justification); ours, too, makes the justification from sin the starting and measuring points. Both are, in brief, justification for past sin and power over and against future sin. Both imply that the complete justification at first, maintained by the divinely accepted avoidance in the future, is *holiness*.

#### POE'S "EUREKA" AND ADDENDA.

For several years a revival of interest in the singular genius of Edgar Allan Poe and its strange products has been noticeable both in America and Europe, particularly in France. For the purpose of obtaining money to start a monthly magazine which he was ambitious to establish, Poe, who by reason of his irregularities and intemperance was chronically impecunious, delivered at the Society Library in New York city on February 9, 1848, a lecture on the cosmogony of the universe. One who heard it says: "It was a stormy night, and there were not more than sixty persons present. . . . His lecture was a rhapsody of the most intense brilliancy. He appeared inspired, and his inspiration affected the scant audience almost painfully. His eyes seemed to glow like those of his own Raven, and he kept us entranced for two hours and a half." This lecture appears in his published works under the title of "Eureka, a Prose Poem," filling one hundred duodecimo pages. Its brief Preface is:

To the few who love me and whom I love—to those who feel rather than to those who think—to the dreamers and those who put faith in dreams as in the only realities—I offer this Book of Truths, not in its character of Truth-Teller, but for the Beauty that abounds in its Truth; constituting it true. To these I present the composition as an Art-Product alone:—let us say as a Romance; or, if I be not urging too lofty a claim, as a Poem. What I here propound is true:—therefore it cannot die:—or if by any means it be now trodden down so that it die, it will "rise again to the Life Everlasting." Nevertheless it is as a Poem only that I wish this work to be judged after I am dead.

As to the motive of "Eureka," he says at the beginning of the essay: "I design to speak of the Physical, Metaphysical, and Mathematical—of the Material and Spiritual Universe:—of its Essence, its Origin, its Creation, its Present Condition and its

Destiny. I shall be so rash, moreover, as to challenge the conclusions, and thus, in effect, to question the sagacity, of many of the greatest and most justly revered of men."

Remarking that "whatever the mathematicians may assert, there is, in this world at least, no such thing as demonstration," he states his general proposition thus: "In the Original Unity of the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their Inevitable Annihilation." To illustrate and illuminate this proposition he takes a comprehensive survey of the universe, meaning by "universe" "the utmost conceivable expanse of space, with all things, spiritual and material, that can be imagined to exist within the compass of that expanse." And this makes up his "Eureka," of which Mr. R. W. Griswold, whom Poe appointed his literary executor, writes:

To the composition of the work he brought his subtlest and highest capacities, in their most perfect development. Denying that the arcana of the universe can be explored by induction, but informing his imagination with the various results of science, he entered with unhesitating boldness, though with no guide but the divinest instinct—that sense of beauty in which our great Edwards recognizes the flowering of all truth—into the sea of speculation, and there built up of according laws and their phenomena, as under the influence of a scientific inspiration, his theory of nature. I will not attempt the difficult task of condensing his propositions; to be apprehended they must be studied in his own terse and simple language; but in this we have a summary of that which he regards as fundamental:

"The law which we call Gravity," he says, "exists on account of matter having been radiated, at its origin, atomically, into a *limited* sphere of space, from one individual, unconditional, irrelative, and absolute Particle Proper, by the sole process in which it was possible to satisfy at the same time the two conditions, radiation and equable distribution throughout the sphere—that is to say, by a force varying in *direct* proportion with the squares of the distances between the radiated atoms, respectively, and the particular center of radiation."

Poe was thoroughly persuaded that he had discovered the great secret; that the propositions of "Eureka" were true; and he was wont to talk of the subject with a sublime and electrical enthusiasm which they cannot have forgotten who were familiar with him at the period of its publication. He felt that an author known solely by his adventures in the lighter literature, throwing down the gauntlet to professors of science, could not expect absolute fairness, and he had no hope but in discussions led by wisdom and candor. Meeting me, he said, "Have you read 'Eureka?'" I answered, "Not yet;" "I have just glanced at the notice of it by Willis, who thinks it contains no more fact than fantasy, and I am sorry to see—sorry if it be true—suggests that it corresponds in tone with that gathering of sham and obsolete hypotheses addressed to fanciful tyros, the *Vestiges of Creation*; and our good and really wise friend Bush . . . thinks that, while you may have guessed very shrewdly, it would not be difficult to suggest many difficulties in the way of your doctrine." "It is by no means in genious," he replied, "to hint that there are such difficulties, and yet to leave them unsuggested. I challenge the investigation of every point in the book. I deny that there are

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any difficulties which I have not met and overthrown. Injustice is done me by the application of the word 'guess.' I have assumed *nothing*, and proved *all*."

Mr. Griswold's own opinion of "Eureka" is given by him as follows: "I could not help but think it immeasurably superior as an illustration of genius to the *Vestiges of Creation*; and as I admired the poem (except the miserable attempt at humor in what purports to be a letter found in a bottle floating on the *Mare Tenebrarum*) so I regretted its pantheism, which is not necessary to its main design."

To some of the criticisms of objectors Poe made answer in the following characteristic letter to the editor of the *Literary World*, Mr. C. F. Hoffman:

Dear Sir: In your paper of July 29 I find some comments on 'Eureka,' a late book of my own. . . . I feel that I might safely claim the right, which every author has, of replying to his critic *tone for tone*—that is to say, of answering your correspondent, flippancy by flippancy and sneer by sneer—but, in the first place, I do not wish to disgrace the *World*; and in the second, I feel that I should never be done sneering, in the present instance, were I once to begin. Lamartine blames Voltaire for the use which he made of (*ruse*) misrepresentation, in his attacks on the priesthood; but our young students of Theology do not seem to be aware that in defense, or in what they fancy to be defense, of Christianity, there is anything wrong in such gentlemanly peccadilloes as the deliberate perversion of an author's text—to say nothing of the minor *indecora* of reviewing a book without reading it and without having the faintest suspicion of what it is about.

You will understand that it is merely the *misrepresentations* of the *critique* in question to which I claim the privilege of reply. . . . The first misrepresentation is contained in this sentence: "This letter is a keen burlesque on the Aristotelian or Baconian method of ascertaining truth, both of which the writer ridicules and despises, and pours forth his rhapsodical ecstasies in a glorification of the third mode—the noble art of guessing." What I *really* say is this: That there is no absolute *certainty* either in the Aristotelian or Baconian process—that, for this reason, neither philosophy is so profound as it fancies itself—and that neither has a right to sneer at that *seemingly* imaginative process called intuition (by which the great Kepler attained his laws); since intuition, after all, is but the conviction arising from those *inductions*, or *deductions*, of which the processes are so shadowy as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, or defy our capacity of expression. The second misrepresentation runs thus: "The developments of electricity and the formation of stars and suns, luminous and nonluminous, moons and planets, with their rings, etc., are deduced, very much according to the nebular theory of Laplace, from the principle propounded above." Now the impression intended to be made here upon the reader's mind, by the "Student of Theology," is evidently that my theory may be all very well in its way, but that it is nothing but Laplace over again with some modifications that he (the "Student of Theology") cannot regard as at all important. I have only to say that no gentleman can accuse me of the disingenuousness here implied; inasmuch as, having proceeded with my theory up to that point at which Laplace's theory *meets* it, I then *give Laplace's theory in full*, with the expression of my firm conviction of its absolute

truth at all points. The ground covered by the great French astronomer compares with that covered by my theory, as a bubble compares with the ocean on which it floats; nor has he the slightest allusion to "the principle propounded above," the principle of Unity being the source of all things—the principle of Gravity being merely the Reaction of the Divine Act which irradiated all things from Unity. In fact, *no point of my theory* has been even so much as alluded to by Laplace. . . . The third misrepresentation lies in a footnote, where the critic says: "Further than this, Mr. Poe's claim that he can account for the existence of all organized beings—man included—merely from those principles on which the origin and present appearance of suns and worlds are explained, must be set down as mere bold assertion, without a particle of evidence. In other words, we should term it *arrant fudge*." The perversion at this point is involved in a willful misapplication of the word "principles." I say "willful," because, at page 63, I am particularly careful to distinguish between the principles proper, Attraction and Repulsion, and those merely resultant *sub-principles* which control the universe in detail. To these sub-principles, swayed by the immediate spiritual influence of Deity, I leave, without examination, *all that* which the "Student of Theology" so roundly asserts I account for on the principles which account for the constitution of suns, etc.

In the third column of his "review" the critic says: "He asserts that each soul is its own God—its own Creator." What I *do* assert is that "each soul is, *in part*, its own God—its own Creator." Just below the critic says: "After all these contradictory propoundings concerning God we would remind him of what he lays down on page 28—'of this Godhead in itself he alone is not imbecile, he alone is not impious who propounds *nothing*'—: a man who thus conclusively convicts himself of imbecility and impiety needs no further refutation." Now the sentence, *as I wrote it*, and as I *find it* printed on that very page which the critic refers to and which *must have been lying before him* while he quoted my words, runs thus: "Of this Godhead, *in itself*, he alone is not imbecile, etc., who propounds nothing." By the italics, as the critic well knew, I design to distinguish between the two possibilities—that of a knowledge of God through his works and that of a knowledge of him in his *essential nature*. The Godhead, *in itself*, is distinguished from the Godhead observed *in its effects*. But our critic is zealous. Moreover, being a divine, he is honest—ingenuous. It is his *duty* to pervert my meaning by omitting my italics—just as, in the sentence previously quoted, it was his Christian duty to falsify my argument by leaving out the two words, "in part," upon which turns the whole force—indeed, the whole intelligibility of my proposition.

Were these "misrepresentations" (is that the name for them?) made for any less serious a purpose than that of branding my book as "impious" and myself as a "pantheist," a "polytheist," a Pagan, or a God knows what (and indeed I care very little so it be not a "Student of Theology") I would have permitted their dishonesty to pass unnoticed, through pure contempt for the boyishness—for the *turn-down-shirt-collar-ness* of their tone; but, as it is you, you will pardon me, Mr. Editor, that I have been compelled to expose a "critic," who, courageously preserving his own *anonymosity*, takes advantage of my absence from the city to misrepresent and thus vilify me *by name*.

EDGAR A. POE.

Fordham, September 20, 1848.

We have printed thus much concerning Poe's "Eureka" in order that our readers may better understand the first article in

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this number of the *Review* as well as our reason for publishing it; although, of course, no one can fully comprehend that article except by reading it in connection with the "Eureka," of which it is in reality an extension and continuation. That no scientific or practical worth was ever attached to Poe's "Eureka" by anybody but himself hardly requires to be stated. Its only value is as the gravest undertaking of a strange and unnatural genius, the most surprising freak of an acute and brilliant but unbalanced mind. He spent most of the year 1848 perfecting this "last and grandest effort of his genius," expounding it to occasional visitors at his poverty-stricken home in Fordham with feverish intensity, amazing splendor of diction, and entire positiveness of belief. Twenty days after Poe delivered "Eureka" as a lecture in New York city he wrote the letter which is referred to in the first article of our present number and which contained Poe's Addenda—"A PREDICTION"—that constitutes the greater part of that article. The latter portion of the article is made up of comments by the person to whom Poe wrote the letter—comments on Professor Stringham's criticisms upon Poe's Addenda. In the Addenda there is, of course, no value different from, or other than, that which belongs to the "Eureka," to which it is a supplement. The *Review* presents it as a literary curiosity, unpublished until now, *apropos* of the Poe revival and made the more interesting by the near approach of "the beginning of the next century," by which time Poe expected, as he wrote in his "Prediction," that his theory would be accepted by scientists and put into their books.

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#### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

OFTEN in the current discussion of various questions we are impressed that a crusade for more general education in American history is needed. The most contradictory statements of historical facts are confidently made, and nobody seems to feel bound to find out what the facts are except a few professors. Take, for example, the money question: Why should the text of the coinage law of 1892 be evidently as little known to thousands who write and talk on the subject as a chapter of the Koran or the Vedas? We refer to these point-blank contradictions, indicating amazing and contented ignorance on one or both sides, not with intention to discuss the merits of a question in which we do not claim to be expert, but because it illustrates one great defect of American education. The American people are too largely ignorant of

their own past. In Britain public men and the intelligent portion of the population are more thoroughly grounded in and familiar with the history of their own nation. They seem to know their thousand years better than we know our one fifth of a thousand.

All public questions are historical; they have roots in the past; indeed, man himself is every way historical; and all science is mainly concerned to trace out the history of things. Any given state of a public question is a result of a previous course of events and opinions; and in our case all that history is close, clear, and plain. If the text-books omit parts of it, accessible public records contain the whole. One of our forty-page dailies could print the full text of every coinage and currency act without displacing any valuable matter; but because there is no demand for the record it is not published. After long wrangling and fighting in the dark over the subject somebody bethinks him to refer to the record, and it is then produced, with clarifying and quieting effect. The propriety of beginning a controversy by taking a glance over the history and getting the exact facts in hand at the start ought to be obvious, but is often overlooked. Great questions are jumped at on the moment, and treated as if they had no past. It is not remembered that anything has ever been said or settled about them, and men discuss them offhand, glibly and crudely, without availing themselves of the wisdom and light to be found in previous great debates. The Monroe doctrine, of which so much is just now heard in connection with the Venezuelan trouble, is purely a piece of history; but the most wildly contradictory notions are uttered about it, for want of taking time to refer to the historic records which show the nature, scope, and bearing of that doctrine. It is asserted that twenty-five years ago, when we had fewer schools and poorer newspapers, the people knew their history better. The spectacle recently seen of two statesmen first betting about the provisions of an act of Congress and then referring to the record to settle their bet would have seemed absurd then; it is not so regarded now. We have retrograded in this respect mainly through our unhistorical press—a journalism which seldom expounds any subject in the light of what happened day before yesterday. History in the form of incidents, reminiscences, novels interweaving facts with fictions, isolated chapters, and broken fragments we get in abundance; but history in any connected view showing the evolution of dominant principles, the trend and set of great currents, the ebb and flow of strong tides of opinion, the landmarks and boundary stones fixed by past



struggles and judgments—this is not found in the periodicals from which our people derive their daily instruction. We fail to see questions whole and round in their historical setting, because we are in such a rush that we will not take time to look back, and we pass hasty snap judgments on present events without inquiring whether they have any roots, whether they are plants or pebbles—though, in fact, even a pebble carries its history inside of it and cannot be understood without finding out where it came from and how it migrated hither. We begin life anew with a vengeance every morning, forgetting that we had any yesterday; and as to the fund of wisdom we should have accumulated and carried forward out of our experience, we go into insolvency every night. This is not the whole truth, but there is so much truth in it that we frequently see a great people blundering along with one step forward and the next backward, stumbling and staggering to and fro illogically and sometimes disastrously, not remembering its painfully acquired lessons, not knowing its own mind from one year to the next. Contrast the election of 1888 with that of 1892, and that again with those of 1894 and 1895, and you see the nation reeling back and forth on ground so solidly historical, and so familiar if one looks into the past, that a people ought to know by this time which way it wants to go; instead of which it keeps wandering about, east, west, north, south, like a babe in the woods. Like a creature bereft of memory it recognizes nothing as familiar, and does not seem to know it ever went this way before. No mere animal could do such a thing; it would be sure to detect the scent of its own tracks or recognize something; brute stupidity in man sometimes seems the chief characteristic that distinguishes him from the beast. Questions which previous generations, the makers and preservers of this nation, regarded as defined and decided by history are puzzled over and fumbled with as if they were novel problems which the country had never had any chance to consider; or they are treated as footballs to be kicked about in the air for political amusement rather than as established parts of a structure built upon foundations and braced together to endure as the home and fortress of a nation's life. Often a political party in want of a campaign issue and planks for its platform picks up some question which the nation had for years regarded as decided, and as to which a settled policy had been pursued, and tosses it into the field for a scrimmage; and then it is to the interest of at least one party to keep history out of sight

and prevent the people from remembering that they or their fathers passed upon that question and settled it a long time ago for reasons eminently sane and satisfactory.

In the course of time the muddled and meandering nation usually gets back to the path. After guessing about the facts for a while and going through a panic of disaster and alarm the groping public mind, in the course of years, two or ten or twenty, gets hold of the essential facts and acts in view of them; which facts, however, it is in danger of forgetting when the bet is settled or the crisis is past. An agile and facile, if not flighty, people we surely are, and no faculty is more conspicuous in us than our facility for forgetting; nevertheless consistency of action, coherency of utterance, stability of mind, and steadiness of progress are elements which make for national strength and growth and dignity; and these elements cannot be possessed and preserved except by knowing our history, keeping hold of its lessons, and instructing each new generation therein. There is really no way of steadying a nation in its course without keeping its history before its eyes and making the record dear to its heart by marking thereon in distinct figures the tremendous cost-price paid for that history. And no man is a statesman unless he habitually views every question in its wholeness from its beginning to the present hour, its genesis, its gist, its recorded course, and its ascertainable bearings.

Nine tenths of the news which our present-tense press pours forth does not concern us except as a momentary curiosity, yet the very flood of it washes away the records we need to remember. The average man has no interest in and little respect for the study of history. The laudable efforts of some schools and lecture courses to bring historical studies to the front are a dead pull against the current taste of the time; which is why they advance so slowly. And historical study by a few college men, useful as it must be, does not meet our need in its wide extent. The importance of such study must somehow be impressed upon the people at large. The dwellers in a certain ancient city were ever on the alert to hear some new thing. That was less harmful than our itching desire to do some new thing, but even this might not endanger our welfare if we read history enough to know why existing things exist, and how all our institutions have grown, and that they are a harvest from the plantings and labors of long-gone years, and that all harvests have their growing time of "four months" or four centuries or four millenniums. It is not

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merely holding the facts of history as knowledge that is essential, but rather the sense of history as a development. Every act of Congress has some past and goes into some future. The reasons for its adoption and the probable consequences thereof can only be visible by the light of yesterday. A people ought to know its common past as each man knows his individual past, and to determine its future, as he decides his, by an intelligence which holds on to the acquirements of time. It is not respectable to despise our predecessors in this great heritage of free institutions. Worship of ancestors is the Chinese extreme; contempt for ancestors is the American extreme. There is a safer middle way, to study the deeds of the fathers and, without being in bondage to any errors of theirs, consider and vote upon all questions in conference with them, listening respectfully while they "tell their experience."

It seems important to the stability of our institutions that historical instruction be given to, and the historical feeling created in, the mass of our people. For the schools to do this alone, against the sweeping flood of perishable news, is impossible. A daily paper making a specialty of the historical treatment of all current discussion and presenting the data for a comprehensive view of all questions might command a certain patronage which would grow as the interest in and taste for such scientific and philosophic elucidation increased and spread. In time the practice of reviewing the previous vicissitudes, the evolutionary progress of whatever question assumes public importance, would extend generally through journalism. The daily is the average man's working library, affecting his ideas and sentiments more than his occasionally read books. The consequence is that, as things now are, he usually sees things out of their relations and without historical perspective, because that is the way the newspapers give them. Hence it comes that his voting is so often zig-zag and self-contradictory, and the ship of state is knocked about, now this way and now that. That stately craft, the British empire, steers a steadier course, through all successive administrations, because the statesmen who man her keep one eye on that great past of which they are so proud, and feel bound to preserve essential consistency therewith. The safety of the French republic—which may God protect!—depends on not forgetting the lessons of the past. Only men with memories, men "of large discourse looking before and after," are fit to be trusted with the guidance of nations.

## THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SAINTS.

CORRECT epistemology—the philosophy or theory of knowledge—is necessarily conducive to sound reasoning and safe conclusion. The philosophy of religion is the theoretic justification of theological belief. Especially is this true of saintly knowledge—the highest and most precious of all knowledges—understanding and knowing the Lord; the knowledge of which the Great Teacher spoke in his high-priestly prayer, “And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent;” of which Peter wrote, “According as his divine power hath given unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue;” of which Paul the aged, from the depth of his Mamertine prison, wrote to Timothy, “I know whom I have believed [trusted], and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day;” a knowledge that is the common endowment of God’s spiritual Israel, of whom he says, “All shall know me, from the least to the greatest,” and of which the Spirit of prophecy affirms that “the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.”

This is a knowledge of God as an infinite and eternal spirit, present in all things and yet distinct from all things; perfectly intelligent, wise, truthful, just, good, and beneficent; the causer of all phenomena and reality, the governor of all agents, the source of all blessing, and the judge of all moral being. This is a knowledge induced by the consciousness of interblending fellowship of the unseen human with the unseen divine Spirit, of communicated truth, of unerring guidance to best issues, of felicitating love, abiding comfort, increasing strength, and inspiring hope; of an operative, persistent force that changes nature and character into the likeness of God in “knowledge,” “righteousness, and true holiness;” and that, concurrently with free will, prepares the whole man for fuller revelations of the Father, and for entire bliss in his heavenly presence, where is “fullness of joy,” and where are “pleasures for evermore.” This consciousness voices itself in all its subjects in the grateful utterances of the saints, as exemplified by those of the old and new dispensations. Each and all speak of personal knowledge and experience—a knowledge to which they were once strangers, but which clarified and waxed more influential with advancing years and closer

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communion. Their testimony is of the best class of credible witnesses.

Associated with saintly knowledge of God is that of Jesus Christ, whom he has sent into the world. Human nature longs for the definite, the visible, the tangible, the focusing of divine attributes and perfections in personality that shall convey knowledge to the spirit through the five pinholes of the senses. This inextinguishable longing is the explanation, in part, of the world's idolatries. It is gratified by the incarnation of the Logos, who is God, "the brightness of" the Father's "glory, and the express image of his person," "full of grace and truth." For more than thirty years, and most impressively and unforgettably in the three years of his public ministry, men "beheld his glory." They spoke and wrote of what they saw, of the glory of divine ideal manhood, true, tender, inflexibly just, yet supremely merciful, that "went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil;" that loved even the evil and unthankful, and by his teaching, example, suffering with and for them, strove to elevate them to the light, love, and life of communion with the Father. The evangelists tell us of those who knew him to be not only the best and greatest man of all time, but also "the Christ, the Son of the living God"—"God manifest in the flesh." Since his ascension millions uncounted of men have known him, not only as Americans historically and politically know George Washington and Abraham Lincoln—patriots, lovers of the human race, sages, exemplars, but as spirit knows spirit and soul knows soul, drawing from him wisdom, grace, and power of love that casteth out fear. The number of those who critically "know him and the power of his resurrection" is vastly larger in this than in any previous era. This knowledge is deep, distinct, felicitous; is "eternal life"—the lower depth in earthly conditions of that well of water springing up into the refulgent splendors of eternal bliss, the growing germ of the beautiful and fragrant flower that will expand into changeless perfection in presence of the Christ's unveiled glory and majesty.

What is the philosophy of this knowledge? How is it obtained? It begins in belief of what we are told is true. Here faith has its genesis. "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." Belief of religious truth rests primarily upon authority. It is unquestioning when the believer knows the goodness of the teacher's character. Questioning usually follows the rude shocks received from hypocrisy. It inquires into the reason of beliefs.

and seeks for their proofs. When proof is adequate the formerly unquestioned or questioned passes into the category of reasoned belief. Trust, with expectancy of desired benefit, follows. It brings the whole being into touch with the divine. Mysterious force enters the trustful, calming, gladdening, invigorating, expanding, uplifting, so that the man is a "new creature," creation renewed. This he knows, and in the knowing knows also the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom he has sent.

It is with this latter knowledge, as possessed by the percipient spirit, that we are more immediately concerned. "What shall I do to be saved?"—from sin and ill—is the deepest and most urgent inquiry of a soul awake to its spiritual relations. "Place yourself, so far as you can, in concord with the Lord's will. Believe that Jesus Christ is the divinely appointed Saviour of men—of yourself. Then shall you receive the Holy Spirit, the peace of God which passeth understanding, an assurance of forgiveness, of adoption, of renewal in righteousness," is, in substance, the evangelical reply. These instructions assume belief in God, Christ, the Holy Spirit—a belief that may fall far short of the truth, and yet be instrumentally saving. Essentially this belief is of the same nature as belief in material things with which the individual is in sensible proximity. Any one of these—a locomotive, for example—produces certain sensations of the nervous system, which sensations are perceived by the mind or spirit. Our knowledge of the fabric is determined by the nature, number, and order of these sense-perceptions. Definition is limited by them. Of the inner nature of the materials composing the structure we know nothing. So true is this that philosophers like Berkeley have plausibly argued, contrary to experience, that matter is a creature of the imagination, and that the whole universe of sense consists in perception of an order of sensations. Either Mill or Berkeley being judge, our consciousness or knowledge of the objective not-self is the certainty corresponding with the reality; which certainty is obtained immediately by spirit-perception of what invisibly passes in the system of nature.

So also with the spirit, the *ego*, the recipient and percipient of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions. This feels and thinks and wills. Of its inmost nature we are as much in the dark as of the inmost nature of matter. Yet of it, as of matter, we know that it is, and that it excites thoughts and emotions as body excites sensations. Our knowledge of mind, as of body, in its last analysis is determined by self-perception of the influence



or force it exerts upon us. So saintly knowledge of God is determined by the influence of his attributes and perfections upon our material and moral being, *plus* the influence bearing upon us through and by our Lord Jesus Christ, whom—like Paul—we have trusted; and who, we are persuaded, is able to keep the precious soul treasure we have committed to him until that day. Knowing God and Jesus Christ, knowing that we are passed from death unto life, knowing that we have received of his Spirit, lays the foundation, in the full assurance of faith, of that knowing that if the “earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.”

Saintly knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ is not, however, exclusively, and perhaps not chiefly, through reason. This is not the sole course of legitimate beliefs. “Theology would be unnecessary if all we are capable of learning about God could be inferred from the study of nature.” “From the world as presented to us by science we might conjecture a God of power and a God of reason [the ordered system of phenomena compels us to postulate a rational Author. ‘That he created it, that he sustains it, we are driven to believe’]; but we never could infer a God who was wholly loving and wholly just. So that what religion proclaims aloud to be his most essential attributes are precisely those respecting which the oracles of science are doubtful or are dumb.” Knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ is not only through reason, but is also through intuition, or the power of immediate knowing, in which the mind stands face to face with reality, in the absence of distorting *media*. This power is not confined to axioms and pure intellections. Reason is powerless when unserved by simple cognitions or intuitions. Bishop R. S. Foster truly remarks that “all knowledge is, in the last resort, intuition;” and that the mind intuits itself, the external world, and ethical distinctions when rightly related to them. Intuition and reason are complementary. Intuitive reason cognizes realities not given in sensation; also “universal, necessary, conditioning truths and laws”—the reality of force in the universe, the great law of cause and effect, the existence of an agent competent to the production of any effect or change, and the underived existence of the Being anterior to all change. It cognizes supersensible beings who conduct commerce of thought and love between themselves while eluding the powers of sense. Spencer admits that “reason cannot take even a first step toward discrediting the in-

tuitions which yield the consciousness of external existence without tacitly positing these intuitions as data, and connoting the existence of subject and object by all the words it uses." Reason is based on sense-perception, which in itself is spiritual. But sense-perception is not more clear, fundamental, and universal than intuition, or pure, nonmediated, spiritual perception. The latter testifies as positively and trustworthily to the reality of beauty in nature, art, music, and moral life as the former to external phenomena. The child sees something in the mother, the friend something in the friend, that cannot be detected by ocular vision. Moral qualities, transcending sense-perception, are clearly distinguished by spiritual perception. The revelation of God in nature, and in direct communication, has from the beginning been, more or less, the heritage of our race. In the blending lights devout souls have always believed in him and sought fellowship with him. They believe in his love, wisdom, and beneficence. "We must believe that somewhere, and for some being, there shines an unchanging splendor of beauty, of which in nature and in art we see, each of us from our own standpoint, only passing gleams and stray reflections, whose different aspects we cannot now coordinate, whose import we cannot fully comprehend, but which at least is something other than the chance play of subjective sensibility or the far-off echo of ancestral lusts."

Men understand God and Jesus Christ infinitely better through the inspired writings than through the testimony of nature. These, addressed to the reason, are accepted on evidence as divinely true on all questions of faith and morals. They bring Jesus Christ within the field of spiritual perception. The soul, yearning to be right and to do right, intuits or knows him, as thus represented, to be of purity immaculate, knowledge exhaustive, wisdom infallible, love transcendent, power omnipotent; knows him as having resources infinite, which supply desire for all good, while they develop capacity for its enjoyment, both in this life and in the life which is to come. It perceives and knows that "in him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily."

Thus in intuition and in reason are the changeless grounds of belief, and in triformed unity of the individual believer is the consciousness, the reasoned knowledge, that corresponds with the divine and Christly realities. All—sustained, empowered, and illustrated by example and testimony—justify and explain the *γινώσκω* and *γνώσις* of believers singly, and of the Church of God as a whole. Such is the epistemology of the saints.

## THE ARENA.

## A FRIENDLY WORD WITH MY CRITICS.

AMID the general approval which *Growth in Holiness* has called forth from all parts of the country some discordant voices have been heard, which, considering its departure in some respects from previous volumes on this theme, was to be expected. As some have misconceived the purpose of the book and its principal positions, I write to correct these misconceptions.

With the main lines of Wesleyan theology on this subject I have no quarrel whatsoever; I am entirely orthodox, so far as I know what orthodoxy is. I firmly believe, as readers of the book can see, that all men are born in an abnormal or depraved condition, which condition, at conversion, is greatly altered but not entirely made right. I also believe that all these who are thus constituted by the new birth children of God, holy because he is holy, as they go forward in the discharge of Christian duty receive greater illumination as to their inward state, and by deeper consecration, with its accompanying faith, receive correspondingly increased purification, which purification may, and should, become so far complete that they will lead a thoroughly loyal and every way consistent Christian life, without conscious condemnation, not doing at any time what they know to be wrong, and yet perpetually pressing on toward that goal of entire Christlikeness, that destruction of "the whole work of the devil in man," which John Wesley says (Sermon 67) the Son of God does not effect so long as we remain in this life.

That this glorious doctrine of Methodism is substantially correct, and that its blessed experience should everywhere be promoted, I heartily believe. But the terms in which it has generally been described I have long felt to be objectionable. Those who find the old-fashioned phrases satisfactory and helpful I have no desire to disturb. By all means let them cling to the ancient nomenclature, if it conveys to them scriptural truth and feeds their souls. But it had come to my knowledge that there was a large class of people in the Church who were not satisfied with, nor helped by, the established statements; who found Wesley's *Plain Account* anything but plain; and who were greatly stumbled by what seemed to them palpable inconsistencies, clear contradictions, and unscriptural positions in the current teaching. It was for them I wrote, deeming it a manifest duty to let shine for their benefit the light which God had given me, and in which I had long been walking with great freedom and much spiritual joy. I have so far seen no reason to suppose that I mistook the divine voice. The large sale which the book has had, and the large pile of letters on my desk testifying to the good it has done, amply confirm my impression that such a book might be helpful to some in the present condition of the Church.

One of my critics has seen fit to say of the volume that "it is needless

to many, hurtful to more, helpful to none." That it is needless to many I have no hesitancy in admitting; the same could be said of a large proportion of the good books that are published and the good sermons that are spoken. As to how many it may hurt I cannot say; nor do I hold myself responsible for such harm as may incidentally come to some, remembering what the apostle Peter said concerning the epistles of his "beloved brother Paul," "wherein are some things hard to be understood, which the ignorant and unsteadfast wrest, as they do also in other scriptures, unto their own destruction." But when this excellent brother goes so far as to declare my effort "helpful to none," I submit that he goes further than any facts in his possession can possibly warrant. His ignorance, however extensive, concerning the good accomplished cannot nullify my knowledge, however limited. I take the liberty to append a few quotations bearing on this point culled from letters received by me, some of them from persons in high position in the Church:

"What a blessing your book has been to me! It has helped me very much; I know I shall have a better Christian experience because of it in the years to come." "I have read it with great pleasure and profit." "It has been a great blessing to me." "The best work on this subject that I have ever read; a book greatly needed in the Methodist Church, and one that will help thousands of Christians." "It cannot be answered, I think; and will do a world of good." "I am under great obligation to you for your *Growth in Holiness*; it is an era in Methodism. It is from the standpoint of the New Testament, and not Methodist tradition. Thank God that you have such courage." "Your book is the best ever written upon that subject." "It has been beautifully done." "Your book must do great good; it is to me the best I have ever read, considered from the standpoint of psychology, exegesis, and experience." "The Church has long needed just such a restatement of our attitude on sanctification."

In the same line should be noted the following published declarations, mostly from editors of our Church periodicals:

"A most timely, useful, and inspiring book; it will speedily take rank as a standard with those who are most capable of influencing the mind of the Church." "It cannot fail to aid those interested in the progress of the religious life." "This well-reasoned book proves Dr. Mudge to be a singularly sane and sympathetic advocate of the doctrine of sanctification." "A book worth reading from a man entitled to be heard." "A valuable and scholarly book; its spirit is above criticism. It will mark an era in the discussion of this subject; it will do good and only good." "The most remarkable book that has dropped from our denominational press in a generation." "I regard its publication as an epoch in Methodism; a theory of holiness consistent with the latest developments of the science of the human soul." "A much-needed and valuable discussion of the great theme. We venture the judgment that there are but few positions taken in this book which can be overthrown. The volume will command attention by the keen, penetrating knowledge of the human heart which it reveals, by its psychological analysis, by its manly search for the truth, and by its courteous spirit." "Taken in all and all, Dr. Mudge has written, we do not hesitate to say, the best book on sanctification that has yet appeared in any branch of the Methodist Church. The distribution of ten thousand copies of it in every part of our Church would be an untold blessing."

That *Growth in Holiness* has been greatly helpful to very many must be perfectly clear from the above quotations, which could be greatly extended were space allowed me. Why, then, should there have been aroused in any quarter such violent animosity against it? The head and front of my offending seems to be that I have dared to become, as Dr. Lowrey puts it, "a critic of Wesley." Again and again this

unheard-of enormity is dilated on by various persons, with uplifted hands and bated breath, as though it was scarcely to be believed that a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church could really have fallen so low. But the fact is beyond question, and the culprit freely admits it. In sincere regard for Wesley, as one of the noblest men this world has seen, I yield to no one. But if it is required that he be set upon a pinnacle of infallibility and worshiped I beg to be excused. He was unquestionably a very great man, but that he was outside the pale of criticism in all the multitudinous things he wrote is certainly a very large claim, and one which I, at least, find it impossible to concede. My opponents, some of them, strangely enough insist over and over that in differing with Wesley on some points of nomenclature I set myself up to be a greater man than he, and than all the Wesleyan writers who, in unbroken succession, have scrupulously avoided any intimation that their chief might possibly have blundered. Against this uncalled-for inference I must strenuously protest. I hasten to declare—yet how can it be necessary?—that I am far inferior to Wesley in every particular save only in this, that God has placed my life more than a century after his death. But this particular seems to me a very momentous one. It implies an entirely different standpoint as to many things. So great have been the changes in philosophic and theologic thought in the century and a half since Wesley's statements were largely formulated that it is simply inconceivable that any man of his caliber would, if he were writing now, write just as he wrote then. Humboldt was a very great man, but the student of to-day who chooses to state scientific truth in quite a different manner from his does not thereby assume to be greater than Humboldt. Luther and Calvin and Augustine were great men. Did Wesley in differing from them challenge a comparison between their intellectual stature and his own? Such assumptions would make the progress of doctrine or of science very difficult indeed. The question at issue is not at all one of comparative bigness of brains between Wesley and somebody else. Nor is reverence for the "fathers of Methodism," for "ancestral ideas," for "standard authors," the thing most carefully to be considered. The question simply is, What is true? They who can trace a process of argument, comparing Scripture with Scripture and following the guidance of reason, are the ones to decide. My appeal is to those Methodists who are sufficiently set free from the terror of great names to use their own minds, and who are accustomed by scholarly training to measure the force of words. I have entire confidence as to what their verdict will be.

The next most serious charge against me is that I have made an effort to "unsettle the faith of the Church in its long-cherished doctrine of Christian perfection," and to "stay the growing tide of holiness;" that I "antagonize the Wesleyan doctrine of entire sanctification." This is at the utmost possible distance from the facts in the case. My effort has been to settle this doctrine, dearer to me than life, on better foundations. I have striven to make it much more effective by altering somewhat its outward garb while in no way disturbing its inward essence. This point

my critics seem to have great difficulty in comprehending. If the *names* are in any way varied, they take it that the *things* themselves are changed. A little closer examination would show them that this is not so. For example, I am accused of "repudiating the doctrine of original sin," which is about the same as to say that I am a Pelagian or a Unitarian. There is no foundation whatever for this charge; I have simply suggested that, as a working term to express the state into which all the descendants of that original sinner, Adam, are born, "depravity"—the commonly accepted modern name—is very far better than "inbred sin" because much less likely to carry with it Calvinistic implications. Everything which a thorough-going Arminian can consistently believe about our fallen condition I firmly hold. It seems to me of the utmost importance that the ideas of demerit and blameworthiness be not dissociated from sin. And since no Arminian can admit that any blame attaches to us merely for what we inherit from Adam or our other ancestors it is very awkward for him to call that inherited condition sin. I change the name for very good reasons, without at all changing the thing.

It is the same with other matters. I am accused of Zinzendorffianism. One writer quotes against me a long array of deliverances from our bishops, wherein they declare, in answer to a specific question, that "regeneration and entire sanctification are separate and distinct." It is to me quite inconceivable that one who had read my book with any sort of attention could suppose that I did not make regeneration and entire sanctification, properly explained, "separate and distinct." My contention is that the sanctification which every child of God at the new birth obtains is the only sanctification necessary *at that time* to his seeing the Lord, and is *entire up to the light* at that time vouchsafed to him. But that it is absolutely entire, or entire in the sense in which it will come to be in his subsequent progressive experience, I strenuously deny. I am in full accord with Wesley and universal Methodism at this point.

I am accused of writing a book to "dissipate the idea of the second blessing," of being "thrown into convulsions" by it as by a horrible "specter." This is so far from being the case that I took special pains to defend the important truth there is in the term (pages 165-167); and in a volume called *Forty Witnesses*, published by our Book Concern a few years ago, it appeared that I was the only one of the forty who had approvingly used that term in describing his own experience. I believed in it then; I believe in it now. Only I insist that it shall be rationally and scripturally explained, so that the important *things* which are undoubtedly comprised in it shall not be given improper and misleading names.

Again, it is alleged that I have no business, in describing the operations of grace, to use other figures of speech than those which are employed in the Bible—to say, for instance, "empowered against all temptation," rather than "cleansed from all sin." But, as I look at it, the Bible is not a stereotyped theological text-book wherein we are to find written down for all times and all lands the only possible, or allowable, formulas of doctrine. Such a theory would be a worshipping of the letter that killeth



rather than of the spirit that giveth life. The men of each generation and of each country desire to hear the good news in the particular tongue in which they were born; and they must, so far as possible, be gratified. If we can give that news greater effectiveness by translating it, not with literal exactitude, but with free adaptation to the habits of mind and forms of speech of the people among whom we live, surely it is our duty so to do. It is for this purpose only, and to this extent only, that I have substituted some more modern words for those which did such good service in ancient Judea and Asia Minor and Greece.

Very gladly would I take up other allegations and accusations, were it proper for me to use more of the valuable space of this *Review*. But it is scarcely necessary. They deal with utterly unimportant matters. And the answers to them are obvious to those who read the book with any fair degree of intelligence. One thing stands out very distinctly, after all the criticisms of my little volume. No important position taken in it has been even assailed, much less overthrown. No serious attack has been made upon its main argument. It has been called by one aged "holiness" writer "damnable stuff;" but, surely, that proves nothing, except that the assailant lost his temper. I have been publicly invited to retire from the Methodist Church as one no longer wanted, who has violated his ordination vows and is a proper subject of discipline. But until the New England Conference, a humble member of which I have the honor still to be, intimates that it feels disgraced by my continuance therein, I shall not withdraw. When the overthrow of my arguments is attempted I shall be quite ready to defend them. Meantime let it be noted that mere assertion that Wesley could not blunder or contradict himself, because he was such a very great man, are worth but little in face of the fact that I have *proved* he did. I will add just here, what every one familiar with his writings knows, that he was so great a man that again and again he freely admits that he had blundered, corrects himself, and improves upon his own statements. Let it also be noted that charges of inconsistency cannot fairly be made out against me when my words are taken in senses which throughout the book I expressly repudiate, and for the correction of which very largely the volume is written. If my critics do not apprehend the distinctions I have made, see neither sense in them nor call for them, no one can be less surprised at it than the author. I expressly pointed out in the preliminary chapter for what class of people the book was written. If some of those for whom it was not intended have chosen to read it and been stumbled by it or made angry with it, I disclaim all responsibility. They who are more anxious to have what will seem to them a well-reasoned, self-consistent, wholly scriptural theory of Christian perfection than they are to have one which in every smallest particular accords with the phraseology of John Wesley; they whose desire is first, last, and all the time for the truth of Methodism, will welcome this brief treatise. Let those who would really know what I have taught read the book itself rather than garbled quotations from it. The Nashville *Christian Advocate* says: "While it pays strict attention to

the accurate and scientific use of words it is still in the best sense a popular work, and can easily be understood by any intelligent man." From the intelligent men of Methodism I shall suffer no injustice.

Lowell, Mass.

JAMES MUDGE.

"OF WHAT USE IS IT?"

A WRITER in the last issue of the *Review* asks this question about the Song of Songs. But why does he limit his inquiry to that exquisite little drama? We would like to ask the same question about a very much larger portion of the Bible. What is the Bible, anyhow? "What it is intended to be seems one of the things no one can find out." One of the best of our learned men tells us that the first chapter of Genesis is a poem; another says that the first twelve chapters are not historical; another, that they are all literal fact. And what is the use of the dry tables of names and numbers in the fifth, tenth, eleventh, and forty-sixth chapters of Genesis, and in the first nine chapters of First Chronicles? These and other tedious lists occupy more space than the Canticles. How much "supernatural revelation" or "divine inspiration" is there in any of them? Almost half the contents of the last four books of the Pentateuch consists of minute details of Levitical rites and ceremonies, of no practical value for us. As a conundrum, not only the Song of Songs, but Ecclesiastes, and Job, and Jonah, and the prophecies of Daniel, the last nine chapters of Ezekiel, half the Book of Zechariah, and the entire Apocalypse of John have been a great success; but as a supernatural and infallible revelation they are all "a failure." Wherein are these Scriptures more to be desired than Plato's *Dialogues*, or Milton's *Paradise Lost*, or Butler's *Analogy*? If it is "nonsense" to include the Song of Songs among the Scriptures, must we not multiply the same nonsense twentyfold and apply the same reasoning to all these other parts of the Bible which are equally open to question?

Perhaps these questions ought not to pass without a few additional sentences, by way of suggestion. An analysis of fundamental positions, apparently taken for granted by the writer of the inquiry in the last *Review*, discloses the following assumptions:

1. Every book of the Bible must needs be a disclosure of saving truth.
2. Every book of the Bible must needs be a supernatural revelation.
3. A book that has for ages failed to secure uniformity of interpretation cannot be an inspired Scripture.
4. When such men as Dr. Strong, Dr. Terry, and the Rev. W. W. Martin disagree in an exposition they are all alike to be discarded.

Here are several far-reaching propositions, most of them of the nature of *a priori* assumptions. But on what authority are such assumptions made? It may be that a large proportion of the difficulties some people find in the Scriptures arises from unwarranted assumptions of what they imagine the Bible ought to be. Would it not be wiser to ascertain first what the Bible is, and afterward adopt a theory, both of revelation and of inspiration, which is in harmony with the facts? INQUIRER.

**THE ITINERANTS' CLUB.****HOW SHALL THE CHURCH UTILIZE THE REVISED VERSION?**

ALTHOUGH the Revised Version of the English Bible has now been in the hands of the people for several years the question of its probable substitution for the King James Bible is still an open one. Little progress in this direction has been made, either in England or America. So far as we are aware, no considerable body of Christians has thus far adopted it for formal use in the public congregation, nor does there seem to be any tendency to do this. It was to be expected that readers would need a long time to become so accustomed to its changes as to feel at home with it in their public religious services, although they might find instruction and edification from its use in their private studies and meditations. This natural expectation has been realized, and the New Version has been employed as a commentary on the former translation by multitudes who would not be willing to have it read in the public worship of the congregation. The very language of the King James Bible has interpenetrated our thinking; it has become familiar to our ears; it has so often expressed our sense of need before the throne of God, and our hopes for the life to come, that any deviation from its exact phraseology jars upon our hearts as well as upon our ears.

Then, too, it is complained that the revisers, while critically accurate in their renderings, have not availed themselves as fully as they should of the wonderful resources of the English tongue. We propose no discussion, however, of the work itself, which the Church has acknowledged to have been well done. The important question is, What shall we do with the New Version? How shall we utilize these last results of the best biblical scholarship of England and America? It is not necessary to assume that the Revised Version will never come into general use. We are told that the King James Bible, which we now hold so dear, was under suspicion for a long time, and was not introduced generally for half a century. The Latin Vulgate of Jerome was a century in reaching general recognition. Until the time of its adoption shall come, however, something should be done to utilize the more accurate renderings which are found in the New Version. The Rev. Dr. Huntington, of New York, in a recent sermon on the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church for 1895, gives the following statement of its work in this direction:

Of the things actually done by far the most important was the appointment of a commission of competent scholars to consider which and how many of the new readings, recommended in what is known as the Revised Version of the Holy Scriptures, it may be well to introduce into the margin of our standard Bible. It has now become tolerably evident that in the Anglican portion of Christendom, at least, there is a rooted unwillingness, a strong disinclination, to accept the Revised Version as a substitute for the long-established translation known as King James's Bible. Time enough would seem to have elapsed since the New Version made its appearance to allow of our reaching definite conclusions upon this point, and

the popular verdict is (again I say, I am speaking for the Anglican portion of Christendom) that for the general purposes of edification the old is better. The revisers were, no doubt, famous Grecians, but there seems to have been lacking among them that quick ear for melodious English which was so evidently the endowment of those masters of our tongue who, three hundred years ago, gave us the Bible as we have it. At the same time it is not to be denied that among the many emendations put forth by the revisers there are not a few that wonderfully elucidate the true meaning of the sacred text, which for purposes of public reading would be an immense gain. How to make these choice renderings available for us, without disturbing the integrity of the printed text of the Bible as it lies upon the lecterns of our churches, is the question. A happy solution of this difficulty offers itself in the shape of a scheme of marginal or alternative readings. This is no new device, as all students of the Bible are aware. King James's Version, and the versions antecedent to it, have all had their marginal readings, and it has always been open to the minister in reading the daily lessons to avail himself of these alternative phrases, where to do so would more clearly bring out the writer's purpose and intent. What is now proposed is simply to substitute for the marginal readings new ones gathered from the Revised Version. It is a most creditable effort, for the success of it would mean the clearing up of many obscurities which perplex those who listen to Holy Scriptures, as they hear it read to them in public worship, and would go far toward determining the final status of the Revised Version to be rather that of a commentary upon, than that of a substitute for, the English Bible of the last three centuries.

The preacher distinctly states that he is speaking only for "the Anglican portion of Christendom." It is a subject, however, that should interest all English-speaking Christendom. One of the dangers of our time is the multiplication of versions which are each known as the Bible, and the consequent confusion in the minds of those who, from knowing little of the intricacies of translation, cannot understand the necessity for so many variants in the renderings of the word of God. The unconscious influence of environment and early training in molding even our conceptions of the meaning of language is well known; and hence it is necessary that the work of revision should be done by scholars who come from varied environments, who are accustomed to different methods of procedure, and who stand for different schools of Christian thought. This is an element of great value in the late revision. Christian scholars, representing many sides of scholarship and various modes of thinking, joined in the work. The late critical scholar, Professor Ezra Abbot, with the natural liberalistic tendencies of the school of thought in which he had been reared, was in close communion with such a champion of orthodoxy as Dr. Timothy Dwight, and had ample time to compare notes with him on the punctuation of Rom. ix, 5, and other controverted passages of Scripture.

The suggestion we offer, in connection with this recent action of the Protestant Episcopal Convention, is that the subject shall be taken up afresh by the different Churches, and, if the various denominations regard the action as desirable, that a commission of Christian scholars shall be appointed to cooperate with those selected by the Protestant Episcopal Church in deciding what marginal changes are necessary or desirable. Time enough has elapsed since the publication of the recent revision to scrutinize the passages on which criticisms have been made, and the united action of such a committee would be regarded by the English-speaking Church as final for many years to come. A Bible in any sense denominational in its bearings would, in this age of harmonization, become an injury rather than a blessing to the kingdom of God. On the other hand,

our King James Bible, with marginal readings approved by the whole Church, would receive general approval, and would prove of great value in the edification of the body of Christ. If such a universal consensus in securing the desired result is not possible we would suggest as an alternative that a complete edition of the present Bible be prepared with marginal notes containing such changes only as have been accepted by both the English and American committees of the late revision. This would include every change on which absolute unanimity has been reached, and would constitute a basis for universal acceptance. It would seem impossible for any scholar, however eminent, to dispute with any hope of a successful following the unanimous expression of so many representatives of the choicest biblical scholarship both of England and America.

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#### HOW TO WIN CONGREGATIONS.

(Continued.)

In a preceding number of the *Review* we considered the wrong methods of securing congregations. We now inquire, What are some of the elements of success in securing congregations to be employed by one who proposes to adhere closely to the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ?

He may win them by extraordinary preaching power. This, however, is so rare an endowment that it is not to be taken into account as one of the necessary factors. A study of the history of the Church will show that there have been comparatively few great preachers. It is sometimes said by people in other professions, "Where are your great preachers?" We might ask, "Where are your great lawyers? Where are your great physicians? Where are your great scholars?" Eminently successful men in any department of life are comparatively few; and in the great capitals of the world, where the talents of the world are supposed to be concentrated, they may be counted by tens, not by hundreds. As a matter of fact, the great work of the world is done by ordinary men; but it does not necessarily follow that it is ordinary work which they do. Great genius and great oratorical power are special gifts and belong to few. When, however, there are men, such as are found here and there, who possess this extraordinary power of proclaiming the Gospel, it cannot fail to win great congregations and, under the divine blessing, to lead them to Christ.

Personal friendship with people is another element in winning congregations to the house of God. This is especially the case in small communities—in villages and rural districts. In such places it is possible for preachers to be acquainted, not only with their own people, but also with those of other denominations and with those who attend no church at all. Oratory and the services of the church do not seem to draw them; but one whom they respect and one whom they have learned to esteem as a personal friend may always win them to the house of God when all other means have failed. There is special power in a man who inspires such friendships. In large cities and great congregations this

contact with people is, perhaps, impossible; but whenever it is possible it is a most effective instrument in spreading the Gospel.

Executive capacity in a minister is of great service in this regard. A large church is like a great institution or a great railroad enterprise, with many departments, many workers, and many leaders. It has its various organizations, such as the Epworth League, the Sunday school, and the multiplied agencies which have been brought into existence by the Christian Church. In the management of these executive capacity of a high order is very important. One who can have his eye and hand upon every movement of his church, who knows when to speak and when to be silent, when to control and when to leave control to others, has a power for efficiency such as cannot fail to make him eminently useful. A prominent layman told the writer that he believed the lack of executive capacity was a great deficiency in city pastors. He said that many could preach eloquent and even powerful sermons, but had no capacity to direct the various departments of the church; and so the practical administration was feeble in the extreme. It is not uncommon to find a man who, with moderate abilities as a preacher, is successful, through his administrative ability and tact, in holding and influencing large congregations.

A minister may win congregations also by hard work in all departments of church life. Personal effort, to which allusion has already been made, is the greatest factor in securing success. The capacity for hard work is itself a genius of a high order, and it may safely be said that one who has this capacity rarely fails to accomplish great results. A few hours every day, after the studies of the day are over, given to personal effort in inviting people to the church of God will accomplish results such as can be secured in no other way. Blessed is the man who has this gift of hard work, and blessed is the congregation who has a pastor thus endowed.

After all that has been said, there are always invisible influences that secure large audiences of which no analysis can be made. There are men who draw large congregations who are not great preachers, in the strict sense of the word, nor great pastors; but they have a unique personality which serves to attract people around them, who listen to their words and who come again and again. There is a preacher now in the mind of the writer who holds one of the largest congregations in a great city, and hundreds of ministers have attempted to analyze the source of his power. His sermons are simple, unaffected, plain. He is not a great orator, and in no sense a genius; and yet the people come Sunday after Sunday, always feeling that in doing so they have been greatly blessed. It is the power of a grand personality. It is the man back of the services. It is the truth which fills his heart and dominates his life. It is that invisible something which cannot be measured, but which, after all, constitutes an element of highest usefulness.

After all, the greatest power to win congregations, so far as the personality of the minister is concerned, is that which comes from close union with Christ by faith; from the indwelling power of the Holy Spirit; and from thorough consecration to God, through his Son, Jesus Christ.



## PROGRESS IN CONFERENCE COURSE OF STUDY DURING 1895.

THE readers of the "Itinerants' Club" during the past year have noticed the frequent mention made of the examinations in our Conference Course of Study. We have invited correspondence on this subject, regarding it as a matter of great importance at the present time. The enlargement of the course by the Board of Bishops, resulting in greater comprehensiveness and more difficulty in mastering the books selected without thorough preliminary training, has seemed to require special attention. The examining committees of the Conferences have been considering these matters, and some of them have reported the results of the work to this department of the *Review*. The word that comes to us from every quarter indicates progress. The summer schools have been utilized for this purpose. In one of these schools almost every member of the four classes of one of the Annual Conferences was present, with such members of their committees as had been appointed to conduct the examination on the books which had been previously assigned. In these assemblies are secured two advantages, the completion of a part of the Conference Course at an early period of the year, and also the holding of examinations in connection with special opportunities for improvement in studies bearing on ministerial work.

While the work of the committees is carried forward with much zeal and wisdom, we might inquire whether anything can be done, by changes in the order of study, to render their service more effective. The completeness of the Conference Course needs no eulogy. The books assigned to be studied during the four years are more than sufficient to tax the brain and the opportunities of a young man who is charged with the responsibilities of the Christian pastorate. The course should not be lightened, but it is worthy of consideration whether a larger part of it should not be placed among the studies required for admission on trial. If our bishops were to arrange it somewhat differently, transferring the first year's course to the requirements for admission on probation and then dividing the studies of the remaining three years into four parts, they would secure a more thorough preparation by our young ministers, and would also enable them to perform their preaching and pastoral labors with more efficiency. An examination of the course as now constituted will reveal the fact that a knowledge of the studies required to enter the Conference on trial is scarcely a sufficient foundation for a full comprehension of some of the books required in the later period of the course. It would also be helpful if the books should be arranged for study in the order of their difficulty, so as to make the earlier studies a preparation for those requiring more knowledge and greater mental application. A readjustment in the manner suggested would, we think, give added value to the excellent course which has been provided.

These and other means of promoting interest and accuracy in the Conference studies are being developed, alike in the East and in the West, and we congratulate our readers upon the progress in this direction.

**ARCHÆOLOGY AND BIBLICAL RESEARCH.**

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**ARCHÆOLOGY AND OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM.**

TWENTY-FIVE years have produced a remarkable change in the attitude and tactics of the destructive school of biblical critics. During the past decade a complete revolution has taken place, and the old positions have been altogether abandoned. Formerly great stress was placed upon the linguistic argument, upon style, diction, and vocabulary. But "phraseological statistics" no longer play an important rôle in determining the age of a book. The development theory has almost displaced the literary or linguistic, and consequently the critics put less stress upon the words used than upon the subject-matter. The books of the Bible, as we have them, it is said, are not from the pens of Moses, David, Isaiah, or other authors whose names they chance to bear, but are rather compilations, masses of ill-arranged data, often put together by an unskilled editor centuries after the events recorded took place. Our critics rewrite, or rather rearrange, these ancient writings and reproduce them in their original form. To do this in a scientific manner they have to picture the real state of civilization among the Hebrews in all the centuries down to our era. The critic throws the history of the chosen people upon a huge canvas; and, in panoramic style, the varied scenes from Moses to the close of the canon are made to pass before our eyes, and thus we obtain a clear view of the development of ideas and the progress of thought from age to age, as well as of the ruling ideas in any period. It goes without saying that some old-fashioned people cannot help believing that these fine pictures are mere reflections, based upon theories evolved from the brains of those hostile to evangelical truth and of unbelievers in supernatural revelation. This is not strange, since their conclusions are for the most part purely subjective, and not based upon historical data, sound reasoning, or even probabilities.

The method of this school is nowhere better illustrated than in the writings of Canon Cheyne. His recent article in the *Contemporary Review*, entitled "The Archæological Stage of Old Testament Criticism," is therefore interesting. This learned Oxford professor, the high priest of higher criticism in Great Britain, is a man who has thrown away all ecclesiastical fetters, and who prides himself on a profound knowledge of the science of biblical criticism from the standpoint of those not in bondage to the traditions of orthodoxy. This article, like almost everything from this author's pen, is profusely apologetic. He protests against being regarded as one who has changed his views on the subject of Assyriology; indeed, he assures us that he "has been preserved from that generally exaggerated distrust into which, quite excusably, men like Wellhausen and Robertson Smith fell." It is refreshing to see with what tenacity he tries to cling to his utterances of former days, while at the same time he is

gracefully getting ready to abandon theories already exploded and all at once to become the champion of "criticism and exegesis in an archæological direction." His language is very temperate, almost pathetic, but patronizing withal; it is that of a tender-hearted father to a wayward child. Both parties are cautioned against too hasty conclusions, and the hostile schools are exhorted to take their stand upon a common platform. Though Assyriology and archæology have made egregious blunders in the past, and thereby have rightly aroused our suspicions, we must not turn the cold shoulder upon these two inexperienced sisters—errors are expected of the young—but we must rather attempt to use them for the furtherance of biblical criticism. We, however, want not only a more archæological criticism, but also a more critical archæology.

The learned canon defines his position by a reference to the opening chapters of the Book of Genesis, where we may compare "the mythic and semimythic narratives of the Israelites and the Babylonians." Dillmann, whom Professor Cheyne very justly calls the most learned of modern critics, as is well known, wisely maintained that the story of creation, the deluge, and some others recorded in Genesis had their origin in an old tradition common to the Semitic peoples. Such a view, however, according to our learned reviewer, cannot hold its ground even provisionally. It is surprising with what facility Canon Cheyne, by a single stroke of his pen, can sweep away the objections of all those who happen to differ with him. Thus, when Riehm, Kittel, Sayce, Dillmann, McCurdy, or Gunkel does not agree with him he concludes that they are in the wrong.

But, to return to the origin of these myths. We are assured that "the glaringness of those mythic features in their original form has no doubt been toned down in Gen. i, and they have been harmonized fairly well with the higher Israelitish religion; but they are still, for all that, Babylonian, and not Israelitish." The object of this remark is clear. It is a determination to depress the date of Genesis, to bring it down to post-Mosaic times, so as to preclude the possibility of Mosaic authorship. Though the professor is willing to concede that myths concerning the creation of the world had made their way from Babylonia to Canaan previous to the fifteenth century before Christ, or as early as the time of the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, and that the Israelites on their first settlement in Palestine might have received some of these legendary accounts from the Canaanites, yet he insists that the story as told in the first chapter of Genesis bears unmistakable evidence of Babylonian origin. This is the more evident, we are informed, since the Babylonian myths show greater originality. Though the story of creation might have been known to Moses, we must, after all, not lose sight of the fact that there were "three other periods when either an introduction of new or a revival of old myths is historically conceivable." It will be difficult for most readers to see why three periods are named any more than ten; for, were there not constant communications all through the ages, and not simply at intervals of several hundred years, between Babylonia, Canaan, southern Arabia, and Egypt? Babylonian myths would be more

likely to influence Hebrew literature centuries before than during, much less than after, the captivity. Professor Gunkel, the latest writer on this subject, says in *Schöpfung und Chaos* (p. 144, f.) that the dates usually given to these myths are mere "compromises and must be abandoned, since 'most of the legends are very old.'"

The principal value of Canon Cheyne's article is the fact that it has called forth a rejoinder from Professor Sayce, whom the canon had charged with desertion from the ranks of the critics. The professor disclaims any change in his article toward real criticism, but admits that he no longer sympathizes with self-styled critics whose criticism starts with preconceived ideas and groundless assumptions, who treat imperfect evidence as if perfect, or who base opinion upon unproved theories; or, in other words, Professor Sayce, having been led to the edge of a dangerous precipice, and having realized the tendencies and results of the criticism advocated by his Oxford colleague and his friends, deemed it wise and necessary to change front.

The following are in brief some of the reasons which influenced Professor Sayce in rejecting the teachings of the more advanced higher critics:

1. He can no longer regard the Pentateuch as a kind of a literary hodgepodge, mostly compiled during the monarchy, though much of it is postexilic. He cannot believe that the story of Israel in the wilderness is legendary or mythical and that Israel had no history previous to the exodus. He has no sympathy with the analysis of the nineteenth century which slices up the Pentateuch into minute fragments and tickets them with a kind of algebraic symbols, finding no less than three or four distinct writers in even one short verse. He challenges the critics to analyze modern stories known to have a dual authorship, that are written in good English in our own times, as one of the novels of Besant and Rice. He justly characterizes such guesswork—done by students now living, at so distant a date and possessing comparatively little Hebrew literature, and "compiled from the imperfect literature of an imperfectly known language"—as a rope of sand ingeniously woven. Any method condemned by common sense must be unsound and unsafe.

2. Archæology has clearly demonstrated that Moses could have written the books bearing his name. The art of writing was practiced extensively in Egypt, Babylonia, and other countries centuries before the birth of Moses. The universality of writing in the fifteenth century B. C. is established beyond controversy by the Tel-el-Amarna tablets. The center of the literary activity, as revealed on these tablets, was Canaan. No wonder, therefore, that Professor Sayce asserts that "Canaan in the Mosaic age, like the countries which surrounded it, was fully as literary as was Europe in the time of the *Renaissance*." This being true, it requires less faith to believe in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch than to believe, as some critics did a few years ago, that the art of writing was unknown to the great legislator, or that there was no writing or Israelitish history previous to the age of Samuel.

3. The Semitic literature found in Babylon and Assyria is not a patch-work of compilations such as Cheyne would have us believe the Pentateuch to be. The slicing and patching process is practically unknown in the works discovered in the buried clay libraries of Babylonia and Assyria. No wonder, therefore, that so distinguished an authority as Professor Hommel, though admitting the possibility of older documents in the composition of Genesis, says that "it passes the wit of man to separate and distinguish them."

4. Many of the narratives, once characterized by the higher critics as "unhistorical fignments of popular tradition," are now by the help of archæology proved to be genuine history. We need no longer relegate Melchizedek, Chedorlaomer, and Tidal to the realm of myth.

Let us ask, in conclusion, would it not be well for some American critics to follow the example of Professor Sayce and, in the words of Dr. Green, "revise their own ill-judged alliance with the enemies of evangelical truth, and inquire whether Christ's view of the Old Testament may not, after all, be the true view?"

#### WRITING IN HOMER.

THE question of writing in the Homeric times has once more been reopened. This time, by a mere accident, Professor William Ridgeway, of Cambridge, England, in a most interesting article in the *Academy*, entitled "What People Produced the Works called Mycenaean?" incidentally referred to two words in that well-known passage in the *Iliad*—the only one, we believe, in the entire work where there is reference to writing of any kind—which relates the story of Bellerophon, the Joseph of the *Iliad*, who, being falsely accused by Anteia, the wife of Proetus, was sent by the monarch to the court of his father-in-law, Iobates, King of Lycia, with a sealed message containing a request to have Bellerophon put to death. The passage in question has been variously translated, and all translators are agreed that it contains a reference to a document of some kind. The two words are *σήματα λυγρά* (book vi, line 168), which Professor Ridgeway renders "baleful pictographs." The learned professor assumes that this message, written in Argos, but sent to distant Lycia, was pictographic rather than alphabetic.

Mr. Samuel Butler calls the Cambridge professor to account, and demands some further proof in confirmation of his rendering. Professor Ridgeway has a difficult task before him, and probably he will never be able to satisfy intelligent readers that his assumption is well founded. His rendering of the two words was suggested by that of Mr. A. J. Evans, who, by the way, has made valuable discoveries within a year or two, especially in Crete, and who has written a very learned paper, called "Primitive Pictographs." Mr. Butler maintains that *σήματα*, though plural in form, simply means a document, just as the word "letters" is used for alphabetic symbols, or a document; and, while he is not able to present conclusive evidence that the double, or folding, tablet sent by

Prætus to his wife's father was written in alphabetic symbols, he has the argument on his side. His translation of the passage, though not quite literal, may convey the correct idea. It is thus: "He gave him treacherous letters of introduction, to which end he wrote much damaging matter upon a folding tablet."

Professor Monro, of Oriel College, Oxford, in his article on Homer, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, translated the same passage: "Prætus . . . gave him 'baneful tokens, scratching on a folded tablet many spirit-destroying things.' " And he adds: "There is no difficulty, therefore, in understanding the message of Prætus without alphabetical writing. But, on the other hand, there is no reason for so understanding it."

Professor Ridgeway argues that *σῆμα*, the singular of *σῆματα*, always means a mark or a picture, and that *γράφμα* would have been used were the writing in alphabetic characters. This is disproved by Mr. Butler, who cites several passages in which *σῆμα* has not this meaning. It makes but little difference whether Mr. Butler or Professor Ridgeway is correct. The great fact is the same, namely, that communication by letter or tablets, in legible characters of some form, was known in Iliadic times, and that one king thus corresponded with another. An art thus mentioned by the poet might have been practiced by himself or by some one for him. Whether the writing was pictographic, hieroglyphic, or alphabetic is of no importance any more than whether Chinese books are written in script peculiar to these people or in that commonly known as Roman.

But we should not neglect to mention that the most interesting part of Professor Ridgeway's article is that in which he refers to the ancient Pelasgians, who at one time occupied large portions of Greece, the surrounding islands, and much of Asia Minor. He thinks that the works commonly known as Mycenaean, including gems, ornaments, shields, different kinds of implements, and pottery, were produced by the Pelasgians. These objects have been discovered in widely separated places, not only in Greece, but in Thessaly, Crete, many localities in Asia Minor, and even in Italy and Egypt; this, if not a proof of the vastness of the Pelasgian empire, is certainly evidence of the extensiveness of their commerce. Ever since Dr. Schliemann made such wonderful discoveries in Mycenæ the efforts of the excavator have been rewarded by Mycenaean articles almost every year, at great distances from that ancient Pelasgian stronghold. Some of the most important finds of Mr. Evans in Crete were of this same class. On engraved gems and other objects are "what appear to be a series of pictographic symbols not allied to Egyptian hieroglyphs, but showing many points of resemblance to the symbols found on seals and other objects commonly known as Hittite." Is it possible that those people, so powerful in pre-Hellenic times, called by Homer and other classic writers Pelasgians, but of which so little is positively known, were the same as the Hittites of Egyptian, Assyrian, and biblical records? Strange indeed that Greek history knows nothing of the powerful Hittites, at least under that name. It would be wonderful if the archæologist should prove that the Pelasgians and the Hittites were one people.



**MISSIONARY REVIEW.****METHODIST POLITY IN FOREIGN FIELDS.**

THE missionary extension of the period has put to a test the economy of the several Churches. A close study of their adaptations to the needs of the work discloses many points of interest and profit. The Methodist Episcopal economy has required considerable modification in the initial stage of some of its foreign fields.

1. A special modification of the itinerancy has often been found necessary. In Liberia, the feeble churches being unable to support their pastors except in part, the preachers have been obliged to enter into secular engagements as farmers, merchants, or civil officers, thus precluding their transfer from point to point on the recurrence of the Annual Conference sessions. Hence practically the pastors of the Liberia Conference were local preachers holding Annual Conference relationship. In other countries other causes have interfered with the operation of the itinerant plan. Local dialects were to be acquired, as in China, where one meets a new form of speech with every hundred miles, and it requires much time to become acquainted with foreign communities, win confidence, and establish educational and other interests. Hence there has been, as a rule, little application of the itinerant principle on foreign missions by reason of the time limit.

2. In India another modification or expansion of the usual economy appears in the uses made of the District Conference. This antedated the provision of the General Conference recognizing the District Conference as a part of the Church's economy. It was in practical operation in India before it was formulated at all in America. This District Conference takes the forms of procedure of an Annual Conference. From a thousand to fifteen hundred workers in North India Conference alone are "appointed" annually at the last session of the District Conferences to their fields of labor. There are in India some twenty-five presiding elders' districts, in which all the workers not connected with Annual Conferences hold membership in the District Conference, graduating from a course of study extending over eight years, and being elected by the District Conference. It is virtually the Annual Conference of all the workers not appointed by the bishop at the regular Annual Conference.

3. Another modification is the erection of an incipient General Conference, fully operative in India, and sought to be brought into existence in Europe and China. The General Conference ultimately sanctioned—what had already come into existence—a Central Conference in India, to preside over the publishing, educational, and other connectional interests of the Church at large throughout the country. This gives a quasi-autonomy, subject to a few "restrictive rules," to the work; and a similar plan might prove of advantage in other foreign fields.

4. There has been a modification, also, of the exercise of episcopal functions. The "missionary rule" provided for the ordination of men to both deacons' and elders' orders when going beyond the easy reach of episcopal offices. This has become less necessary than formerly because of the frequent personal presence of the bishops on the foreign mission fields, and is perhaps applied in more cases than actually demand it. But there are still fields where it is needful. A missionary to West China goes to a field which has never been visited by a bishop. It would require as much time to reach Chungking from Shanghai as to reach Shanghai from New York. Some bishops have doubted whether any mission ought to be established where distance precluded personal episcopal supervision. The Liberia Conference was for many years unable to graduate its younger ministers to full exercise of their ministerial functions, owing to the prolonged absence of the bishops from the field. The Church suffered by contrast with other Churches which more readily gave full powers to the accredited applicant for orders. For many years there were not ordained men enough to meet the demands of the Churches in Liberia. The same must become true of any field beyond the reach of the episcopacy. The West China Mission has not a solitary ordained native minister, nor can there be a fully developed native Church in West China under present usage. When by riot or sickness the foreign missionaries are driven from the field there is not a Methodist preacher in West China Mission to administer any ordinance of the Church. Foreign missionaries may be fully empowered by ordination under the "missionary rule," but the native preacher cannot be brought to the bishop any more than the bishop can be carried to him.

In order to obviate the dangers of the climate, which made episcopal visits to Liberia more or less perilous to health, the General Conference ordained that there should be a bishop for Africa, with local jurisdiction. To secure this constitutionally the requisite favorable vote of the General and the Annual Conferences was obtained. Later it was assumed that this vote justified the application of the principle to other fields, and a bishop was chosen for India and Malaysia, with local jurisdiction. There were a few persons who held that this last election should also have had the indorsement of a vote necessary to set aside the restrictive rule, but this formality was not observed.

That the election of a missionary bishop for India might not meet all the exigencies of the case was anticipated at the time. The India Conferences had asked for a general superintendent to reside in India, and only accepted a missionary bishop as the best possible compromise. It was felt by them to be desirable that the local bishop should visit America at intervals to secure men adapted to the field, to represent the work before the churches, and to consult with the other bishops on questions of law and general administration. It was necessary that the incumbent should be familiar with the field, the people and their customs, and with at least one of the vernacular languages of the land. Failing to secure a general superintendent to reside in India, the next best that could be

done was to let the India bishop return to America at intervals for the purposes just named. But the rapid growth of the work developed the necessity for the constant presence of the bishop on the field. The three Annual Conferences have expanded into five, besides the Malaysia Mission; the communicants have increased from seven thousand to over fifty-four thousand, and the two hundred native preachers have multiplied almost fourfold. New problems hourly present themselves, and the constant authoritative leadership of the bishop is required in the direction of a great Church scattered over a continent. It would seem, in the nature of the case, that his absence in America for the objects for which it is held to be desirable he shall visit it must seriously handicap the work. It is not easy to combine the advantages of the necessary local supervision with those of the general superintendency, nor is it easy to say how the missionary bishop shall be spared from a field like India for repeated and prolonged visits to America. There are those who see partial relief in the election of another missionary bishop for India, but even they feel that they would still lack some advantages to be derived from the visits of general superintendents not to be had by an increase in the number of missionary bishops. The probabilities are that the fuller evolution of this problem must come gradually and after experiment, but it is so imminent as to demand the most earnest and instant consideration of those best qualified to determine what is the wisest course to be pursued.

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#### THE SITUATION IN MADAGASCAR.

THE story of the relations subsisting between France and Madagascar is a very old one, dating back to the seventeenth century. In 1668 a treaty of friendship, recognizing on the part of the French the sovereignty of the Queen of Madagascar, seemed to end French ambition there. In 1883 the French made new demands resulting in a war. In 1886 a treaty of peace was signed placing the French in a privileged position as regarded the foreign affairs of Madagascar. The treaty contained ambiguous phrases, and the Hova government never agreed to the French interpretation. An annex, or explanatory document, was signed by the French plenipotentiaries, which was suppressed when the treaty was presented to the French chambers. The French have enforced their own interpretation and advanced their claims to a "protectorate," and have secured their end. Thus France takes Madagascar into her "sphere of influence" in Africa. She did not colonize that island; she did not carry civilization to it; she has not developed great trade relations there which have become strained; she has not so much as a French population on the island in conflict with the native social order. She wishes to control the political balance of power; and so she assumes to dominate, not a heathen country, where the basest passions run riot, whose suppression would afford some excuse for the proceeding, but the Christian queen of a Christian government. Politically speaking, we have slight interest in the event. Religiously speaking, we have the profoundest concern for the

native Church of the Malagasy, the martyr Church of an island which, laid on our coast, would reach in length from Maine to South Carolina. The London Missionary Society has expended some thirty millions of dollars, of which two millions have been spent on Madagascar in the last third of a century, while the native churches have contributed half a million dollars more. The London Society at this moment sustains thirty-nine missionaries in Madagascar. All this has been wrought out by British Christians, not by the French. Two things console the friends of Protestant missions at this juncture: first, the London Missionary Society is protected in its operations in Madagascar by a treaty with Madagascar and a convention with France; secondly, the Christian Church in Madagascar is built on an open Bible, and the civilization is of a strong Protestant type. These people know the foundations on which they have builded, and have a history behind them which will inspire them to heroic defense of their principles.

The whole island of Madagascar is, however, not Christianized or even nearly evangelized. The population may be placed at four millions, of whom four hundred thousand only, or one tenth, are Christians. The London Missionary Society had there, in 1894, 1,328 congregations and 280,000 adherents, of whom 63,000 were church members, and 1,061 native pastors and 5,879 preachers, the churches contributing \$35,000 per annum. Besides this there are the missions of the Church of England Missionary Society, the Society for Propagation of the Gospel, the Norwegian Missionary Society, and the Society of Friends. Altogether they sustain 107 foreign Protestant missionaries in the island. The Roman Catholic and Protestant adherents number each about the same. While the government has exerted a strong influence for education it has not established schools, the only ones opened being mission schools.

What will be the influence of the French protectorate on Protestant missions? In Tahiti and other South Sea islands French influence was adverse to morality and to evangelical Christianity. French influence on the west coast of Africa has been seriously obstructive of Protestant missions in the Gaboon and in every other territory acquired from previously Protestant occupancy.

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#### AMERICAN MISSIONS IN TURKEY.

A BODY of the most cultivated, wise, and otherwise able Americans has for years been engaged in Turkey as missionaries of the American Board. It would be difficult to name a corps of men at home or abroad of whom America might more justly be proud. The luster of their scholarship has been equalled by that of their statesmanship and by the rich fragrance of their humble devotion to the greatly benevolent work of elevating ancient Churches which had departed from the faith, had become sunken in idolatry and superstition, and were suffering oppression and cruelty at the hands of Mohammedans. The missions were accurately planned. That to the Armenians was assigned to Drs. Dwight and Goodell, in June,

1832. The Armenians in Constantinople were estimated at a hundred thousand. Other missions were established. These now number five, with perhaps fifty thousand adherents to the churches. Their influence has reached to the whole Armenian Church. When the late Rev. George Knapp, missionary at Biblis, died a few months since, three Armenian priests asked to participate at his obsequies, and the Armenians closed their shops to do him honor. These Armenian missions have been eminently successful. They have six colleges, forty seminaries, and in these and their common schools some twenty thousand scholars. For every mission school the people have established a dozen others themselves, and have become far more intelligent than the Turks. The sultan has become alarmed at their progress and at the changed aspect of Turkey superinduced by these missions. This, in brief, is the cause of the increased repression of literature, and of liberty in general, which the Turkish government brought to bear on Christians of the empire, and which has culminated in the massacre of possibly ten thousand Armenians at the hands of the Kurds and others, instigated by the central government at Constantinople. This all found its check in massed European fleets in the Dardanelles, but with what result will scarcely be known for a long time to come. Meanwhile all Americans must be interested that justice be meted out for all damage that shall come to this most splendid corps of Americans, whose lives are consecrated to the succor and purification of the ancient churches of Bible lands.

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SOME people assume to criticise our missionaries in India for receiving into the Church, by baptism, converted natives who cannot give an account of their theology. An instance is afforded just now, in a mission of another Church in Bengal of a poor shy Bengalese who was very nervous at the thought of being questioned by the missionary, and said, "Sahib, do not examine me; I cannot answer any questions." "What must I do, then?" asked the missionary. "Let me pray, sahib," said the man; "I believe I can do that." All knelt, and he who was embarrassed before man poured out his heart freely to God, in a way that convinced all that he knew God and his Christ. He was so earnest and pious that none could doubt where he ought to be counted and recorded.

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It is an interesting fact that far more applications have been received from Li Hung Chang for students for the Anglo-Chinese missionary colleges than can be possibly met. They are in demand for the telegraph system, for the army and navy, and for General Li's medical school. His agents had instructions to procure them from the missionary colleges, because of the value of the moral training received there. This fact acquires additional significance from the constantly reiterated statements from all parts of China concerning the dishonest and peculating officials of the government. Ironclads and revolving rifles cannot make an empire strong.

## FOREIGN OUTLOOK.

## SOME LEADERS OF THOUGHT.

**Max Krenkel.** He has recently attracted attention by the attempt to show that Luke employed Josephus as an important source of information for his writings. Among other arguments in support of this position he mentions the similarity of the introductions to the works of the two authors. That there is such a similarity no attentive reader will deny. But instances might be named of even greater similarity between the introduction of Luke and others, in which, however, the supposition of literary dependence would be excluded. Krenkel thinks he sees in the sameness of the topics treated by Luke and Josephus, and in the general similarity of style, the indubitable proofs of Luke's dependence upon Josephus. As to the similarity of style, it is sufficient to say that similar subjects must be treated in a somewhat similar manner. Besides, both lived in the same general period and were alike influenced by the style of writing then prevalent. As to the topics treated, Luke's dependence could only be demonstrated if it were proved that he had no other source of information than Josephus. Luke was an intelligent, not to say an educated, man, who had good opportunities to know the facts, by hearsay and observation, concerning which he wrote. Krenkel admits that Luke employed a number of sources for certain parts of his writings. If such be the case, how can there be any good proof that he was dependent upon Josephus for any part of his work? The attempt from this standpoint to show the lateness, and thus the untrustworthiness, of the history contained in the Acts and gospel is, like all other attempts in the same direction, a failure. Krenkel, however, undertakes to show that Luke's vocabulary is so closely related to that of Josephus as to indicate the dependence of the former upon the latter. It is not necessary to deny that there is a similarity in the vocabulary of the two. It is most natural that there should be. Both wrote in Greek, and nearly at the same time, on related subjects; but there is a much greater similarity between the vocabulary of Luke and the Septuagint; so that from this argument also no evidence of the lateness of the books attributed to Luke can be drawn.

**Theodore Elsenhans.** In relation to the conscience, its nature and origin, he has become an authority. He does not think that the conscience is an independent faculty of the mind, coordinate with the intellect, sensibility, and will, but that in all phenomena of the conscience these three work together. Nevertheless, the fundamental original element of the conscience is feeling—feeling aroused by the perception of conduct in connection with motive. Thought and will appropriate to themselves these feelings, so that a judgment is passed as



to the commendability or condemnability of each act, and a purpose to assist or hinder, to participate in or avoid, the act in the future. So far as the purpose is concerned it is the result of the claim on the part of these feelings to unconditional obedience. Elsenhans thinks that the ordinary theories of the conscience are insufficient to explain its phenomena. He believes that it is necessary to assume the germ of conscience to be a natural endowment. Otherwise, he cannot explain the peculiarity of the phenomena in individuals and the uniformity of these phenomena in history. This natural endowment is like the instinct in animals in the immediateness with which it makes itself felt as a motive in particular instances. But it is limited to such actions as have to do with the weal or woe of the individual or of society. He is of the opinion that this endowment becomes more and more powerful and fine with each advance in culture of one generation after another, and that it is transmitted, like other endowments, from parent to child. It is questionable, however, whether there is anything more transmitted than an increased development of ethical knowledge and judgment, and this cannot be transmitted from parent to child, but only from one generation to another. Elsenhans thinks that without this transmitted, cultivated endowment we could not explain how the individual could rise in a few decades to the highest point of moral development. But this can be explained better on the supposition that each generation begins with a more correct estimate of right and wrong than that which preceded it. Yet it must be confessed that in many instances the usual laws of heredity seem to apply to the conscience as to other traits.

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**Arnold E. Berger.** The study of Luther and the German Reformation has occupied many minds in recent years, especially Köstlin and Kolde. And now Berger has won a place alongside of these greatest names by his works on Luther. He boldly asserts that the biographers of Luther have failed hitherto to avoid the influence of the confessional standpoint of the writer, and to present the reformer in his relation to the culture of the period. Berger regards Luther as a religious genius, and at the same time a special product of the culture of the Middle Ages, at the close of which he appeared. These aspects of Luther's life are not new, but Berger has given them a new emphasis. Perhaps he has not altogether succeeded in giving a purely unbiased and objective representation of Luther's life. Even if he has escaped the influence of religious prejudice he has certainly not been free from the bias of his purpose to present Luther in relation to the culture of the Middle Ages. For he has by this attempt given us a one-sided view of the reformer and the Reformation. There are some men who cannot be fitted into their times, but who alter the times in which they live to conform to their personality. Luther was one of these men. To deny this is to deny him the vocation of the reformer, and by implication, therefore, to deny altogether the existence of personal reformers, and to make all reforms the unavoidable result of general historical movement. In the case of Luther, at least, it is not difficult to see

how his personal endowment contradicted the conditions of the times which existed previous to and contemporary with him. He was rather a genius who produced than himself a product. There were thousands of men who were the product of their age and the preceding ages. It was Luther's distinctive recoil from the entire culture of the period which adapted him to the work which he did. He was too original and independent for a product. In these things he stood alone. He had many followers and imitators, but no peers. The elements of character which he drew from the past and from his environments were those which he had in common with his contemporaries. We suspect that the explanation which may be given of Luther's personality and work must be, either that he was, as to his mentality, almost a freak of nature, or else that he was the appointed and sent of God. We choose the latter view.

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#### RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

**"La philosophie d' Ernest Renan."** By Raoul Allier. (Paris, Germer Baillière et Cie., 1895.) Although Renan has been thought of only as an historian and a critic, yet he is here considered as having held and taught certain distinct philosophical opinions. A profound philosopher he certainly never was, as he was not a profound historian. Allier shows that Renan's philosophical opinions were controlled entirely by his views of history. To him history was merely an endless change in the development of mankind. As an historian he approached the works of the great philosophers, but failed to consider their fundamental-critical and speculative views. He found nothing in their writings except what he had already believed, namely, that there is nothing fixed or certain, and that therefore everyone is at liberty to take whatever view of the world he may please. Allier sets forth Renan's view as an evolutionary pantheism, the materials for which he gathered from all sources, without any attempt to test their worth. As to his ethical opinions, Allier says that they were at first not without a certain elevation, but that he gradually fell into the consequences of his own view, that the only thing permanent and universal is change, and hence everyone is free to find his highest good where he can: in art, if he is capable of it; in drunkenness, if he can do nothing else. Politically he held that the average man is not an end in himself, because his personality is of too little account. He is only a means to another end, namely, the State. Hence his preference for the aristocratic form of government. Religiously he never was able to see the connection between religion and morals, and hence it was possible for him to caricature the life of Jesus, and yet to bow in reverence before him. To him religion meant nothing else than a refined sort of mystical revelry. When one considers that Renan was brought up to reverence authority as understood by the Roman Catholic Church it is scarcely a wonder that his opinions reacted to the other extreme when he broke away from his original destination for the Church. Had the revolt from

Roman Catholic authority been prompted by his religious needs instead of by his taste for historical studies, however, he would not have adopted such false and pessimistic views. With all his brilliancy of intellect one can scarcely refrain from the question whether there was not in him a tinge of insanity.

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**"Das Verhältniß der menschlichen Willensfreiheit zur Gotteslehre bei Martin Luther und Huldreich Zwingli"** (The Relation of the Freedom of the Human Will to the Doctrine of God according to Martin Luther and Ulric Zwingli). By Max Staub. (Zurich, Leemann, 1894.) Luther and Zwingli occupy the thought of the civilized world but little less to-day than they did in the sixteenth century. Gradually, however, Zwingli is rising in the estimation of the majority of theologians. Staub finds Luther's doctrine of the bondage of the will and predestination to be the result of his desire to maintain the absolute want of merit of all human activity, and partly of his nominalistic scholasticism, from which he never became wholly free. Not only, according to Luther, was man not free, but God chose or predestinated some to salvation and left others to perish. Luther did not hold that God chose men to pious lives and so to salvation, or to impious lives and thus to damnation, but that in his eternal councils God chose some to heavenly bliss and left others to future misery. This, Staub thinks, is destructive of the foundations of evangelical faith, and is not Christianity, but materialism, a severe judgment, certainly, though perhaps justifiable. Zwingli sought to reconcile two irreconcilable views of God—the antique-panthestic and the biblical-personal. This he reached by the illogical and unethical mixture of the two gods by means of the doctrine of a particular providence, which, however, in the case of Zwingli was not unethical, since it did not make salvation dependent upon the eternal council of God, but upon an appropriate ethical condition of life, which was conditioned by predestination. Staub regards this view as unscriptural, but because it is ethically acceptable it saved Zwingli from falling into the materialism of Luther. Perhaps our author should have taken somewhat into account the fact that Zwingli approached the subject with a view to its systematic treatment, while Luther's purpose, especially as exhibited in his "*de seruo arbitrio*," was to counteract the lax Roman doctrines as represented by Erasmus's attack upon Luther. Zwingli's views could hardly be accepted by any thoughtful philosopher or theologian of to-day, although they are apparently much more mild than Luther's.

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**"La Vue future d'après Saint Paul"** (Eschatology of Saint Paul). By C. Bruston. (Paris, Fischbacher, 1895.) As a study of the possible modification of Saint Paul's eschatological views this little book is of high interest. It was elicited by an article of Sabatier in the *Revue Chrétienne* and its answer by Godet in the same magazine. Sabatier saw in 2 Cor. v, 1-10, a change from the views of Saint Paul as expressed in First Corinthians. In the first letter he connected the resurrection with the im-

pending second advent of Christ. In the second letter he holds that the believer enters immediately upon the pneumatic life at death. The thought of the sleep of the soul had been held in check by the expectation of the early *parusia*. Now, when Paul was looking death in the face, that danger confronted him in all its terror. He could not believe that his Lord would allow him to be more perfectly separated from him, even for a brief space of time after death, than he had been in this life. Nor could Paul believe that the forces which were at work preparing the believer for the heavenly body would cease after death, as they must, on the supposition of the sleep of the soul. But this doctrine of the immediate entrance of the believer upon his heavenly communion with Christ destroyed the doctrine of a common judgment day and resurrection. In reply Godet asserts that there was no such change in the belief of Paul, since in his later letters he was still expecting the coming of the Lord. When Paul, in 2 Cor. v, 1, says, "We have a building of God," he is thinking of something not realized, but to be realized. Bruston holds that Paul did not change his views, although there were certain variations of expression. But he sees in 2 Cor. v the doctrine that the soul is clothed immediately after death with its spiritual body, and reconciles the apparent divergence of Paul's expressions by the supposition that the resurrection of the dead which Paul taught in connection with the *parusia* was only the public revelation of the fact that the souls of the believers had from the moment of death been clothed upon with the house which is from heaven. To one who holds that Paul's eschatological views were the product of his own reflection Sabatier's idea would not be offensive. Bruston's explanation is artificial; nevertheless Godet's attempt at harmonization does not seem satisfactory.

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#### RELIGIOUS AND EDUCATIONAL.

##### **A New Method of Treating the Old and New Testament Writings.**

It has long been felt that the ordinary method of treating biblical literature was unscientific and unsatisfactory. Each "introduction" has contented itself with laying before its readers the books of the Bible one by one and giving a history of their criticism, and each author has felt it necessary to do a little criticising on his own account, in order to show that he was an independent and original investigator. For the purpose of exercising the student in criticism such a method is excellent in the class room. It cultivates a critical and analytical habit of mind, without which there can be no clear thinking on any subject. But when the work is ended there is nothing to show for it except a mass of material which lacks all the elements of history. It is the rough stone just from the quarry; it is not even dressed and fitted to be placed in the edifice to be erected. In fact, it is this erection of the edifice instead of the never-ending accumulation of material which constitutes the latest novelty in the treatment of the books of the Bible. It is now proposed to write histories of

biblical literature just as we have histories of any other literature. It is by no means the intention to do away with criticism, but it is the plan to make criticism subsidiary to the writing of literary history. Perhaps the name which this new "discipline" will take may be "Critical-Biblical Literary History." It certainly must prove a relief from the monotonous thud of the "introduction" as it falls from the press. Something is gained when the advance is made from analysis to construction. Greater interest will be felt by the reader, and he will be able to gain a clearer idea of the sum total of critical results and to judge better of the effects of criticism upon faith. It is natural that the history of the Old Testament literature should begin to be written in the light of the newer investigation, for the same has been several times done for the secular and ethical-religious history of the Jews. On the supposition, too, that many will accept the results of the higher criticism in their public teaching and private thinking, the change from the appearance of criticism, which is always more or less destructive and negative, to history, which is of necessity constructive, and at least in some degree positive, will be beneficial. Instead of a constant controversy with past ideas there will be the presentation of the supposed truth as it is now discovered to be. Edward Reuss, as early as 1881, undertook to write the Old Testament literary history in connection with Jewish political history; and from 1892 to 1894 repeated the attempt, together with a translation into German of the books of the Old Testament. It was done in elegant style, but it reflected rather Reuss's own impressions of the literature than the facts concerning the literature itself. In 1893 a Dutch theologian, Dr. G. Wildebaer, published a work entitled *The Books of the Old Testament in the Order of their Origin*. The title promises nothing more than a list of the Old Testament books in chronological order; but for this a book of 539 pages is not necessary, and so we find much more than the title causes us to anticipate. He begins with the Old Testament fragments of the wandering and settlement in Canaan. Then follow the literary remains of the time of Judges, David and Solomon; the historical traditions, and oldest written notices of historical events and earliest books of the law. From this he passes on to the supposed earliest of the biblical books, namely, Amos and Hosea. Then come Micah and Isaiah, Deuteronomy, Zephaniah, Nahum, Jeremiah, and Habakkuk; then Ezekiel, Deutero-Isaiah, Haggai, and Zechariah i-viii, Lamentations and Obadiah, the Priests' Codex and the Hexateuch, Malachi, Jonah, Ruth, Joel, Isaiah xxiv-xxvii, Zechariah ix-xiv, Proverbs, Job, the Psalter, Chronicles, Solomon's Song, Ecclesiastes, Daniel, and Esther. Even so brief a mention of the new order of the chronological arrangement of the books of the Old Testament as that just given shows what an immense gain in clearness follows from the employment of the historical as distinguished from the critical-introduction method. That a history of the Old Testament literature can be written is also a clear evidence that criticism has reached what it regards as practically final and generally (that is, among critics) accepted conclusions. We may assure ourselves that for a time at least

"advances" will not be forthcoming. The method will have a restraining effect upon critics of individual books, whose works must fit henceforth into the scheme of history, and not stand alone, as heretofore.

**The Newly Discovered Syriac Codex and the Virgin Birth.** Just what effect the famous discovery by Mrs. Lewis and Mrs. Gibson will have on the reading of many New Testament passages cannot now be known. At the present time an interesting, not to say important, discussion is in progress which we shall give in brief. This Sinaitic Syriac gives the three times fourteen generations of the first chapter of Matthew, including the statement that "Jacob begat Joseph." In this the new Syriac differs from the Diatessaron of Tatian, who omits the register both of Matthew and Luke, probably as unworthy of the divine origin of our Lord. But instead of the words, "Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ," in Matt. i, 16, the Syriac says, "Joseph, to whom Mary the virgin was betrothed, begat Jesus, who is called Christ." This reading, which appears to exclude the virgin birth of our Lord, corresponds to variations in chap. i, 21, where the reading is, "She shall bear thee a son," and in i, 25, where the words, "And knew her not till," are entirely omitted, and instead we read, "And he married his betrothed wife, and she bear him a son, and he called his name Jesus." These modifications seem to be the offspring of an effort to construct the history of Christ's birth according to Ebionitic anti-Catholic notions, and to represent our Lord as the physical son of Joseph. The negative critics hail these variations with delight, and would gladly regard them as the original and only authentic text of that portion of Matthew. Even Conybeare adopts this view, together with other English and continental critics. It is a question which cannot be settled by an appeal to preferences or preconceptions. That the copies of the gospels were sometimes violently tampered with in those early days in the interest of dogma no one acquainted with the facts will deny. The question, "In the interest of what dogma was the alteration made?" must be settled by purely objective critical means and methods. More study of the new codex than the time since its discovery has admitted will be required before any important changes in our faith can be safely based upon its peculiar readings. For this reason, if for no other, it would be extremely unwise to depend too much upon its utterances concerning the origin of Jesus. It would need to be proved a very early and most trustworthy codex to overturn in this particular, or in any other, the harmonious testimony of other codices. But in the codex itself, when examined a little more closely, are evidences that the version in question purposely varied from the original from which it was translated or copied. In Luke iii, 23, the new codex coincides essentially with our text, reading, "But Jesus, being about thirty years old, called, as he was, a son of Joseph," showing that the original copy held Jesus to be not the real but the reputed son of Joseph, contrary to its own language in Matt. i, 16. Again, in Matt. i, 16-25, there are utterances which have been allowed to stand which



appear as confirmatory of the canonical and contradictory of the Syriac text. For example, in verse 18 the reading is, "The birth of Jesus took place as follows: As Mary, his mother, to whom Joseph was betrothed, before he married her, discovered that she was with child of the Holy Ghost." Even in verse 16, where these Ebionitic alterations begin, Mary is not called Joseph's wife, but the "virgin who was betrothed to him." It is perfectly evident that the readings of this codex contradict one another in this matter. There is enough variation to show the tendency of the copyist; but there is too little to obliterate the evidence that the copyist did violence to the text before him. If one were to study every expression concerning the birth of Jesus found in the new codex it would be difficult to tell whether it teaches the supernatural or the natural conception. Very certain it is that, whatever anyone may dogmatically hold, the words "conceived by the Holy Ghost" cannot be rejected as primitively Christian and unapostolic on the ground of anything in the Sinaitic Syriac. Furthermore, it is clear that so far as the evidence from the manuscripts, versions, and fathers is concerned the preponderance is in favor of the virgin birth of our Lord Jesus Christ.

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**The Latest Congress of Socialists.** Breslau, Germany, was recently the scene of one of the tamest socialistic congresses ever held in the Fatherland. The leaders of the party of moderation were detained by sickness, but the radical leaders did not take advantage of their absence to carry through their ideas. Perhaps it was on account of the fear that a division in the socialistic ranks would ensue. There was a good deal of extravagant talk, but the police authorities of the city took care that nothing should occur of a treasonable character, and nothing which could unduly excite the populace. The meeting of the congress revealed the fact that the attempt to win the peasantry had proved a failure. Every peasant who owns a little spot of land is thereby held at a distance from the socialists, for if he is to be a pure social democrat he dare not own any real estate whatever. This builds an inseparable barrier between the peasants and the socialists.

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**The Hospital in Jerusalem.** For forty years the deaconesses of Kaiserwerth have been at work in the Holy City. In the orphanage about one hundred and twenty Arabian girls are daily instructed and educated, who later go out as housekeepers, teachers, deaconesses, or servants. The hospital is situated on Mount Zion, where, during the last ten years, 5,840 patients of all confessions of faith have been treated, while treatment in some form has been given to 77,165 persons. The people are so poor that all this service has to be entirely free. The city is very unhealthy, and the hospital has for years proved too small. Hence it is proposed to locate the new hospital in a more healthy portion of the city, and to provide more commodious buildings. About \$10,000 has been collected for this purpose. The old hospital is estimated to be worth about \$12,000, and \$15,000 more will be needed to finish the work.

## SUMMARY OF THE REVIEWS AND MAGAZINES.

THE *Edinburgh Review* for October has as its table of contents: 1. "A History of Spain," by Ulick Burke; 2. "The House of Annandale;" 3. "Crimean Letters;" 4. "Shells and Molluscs;" 5. "Memoirs of Barras;" 6. "Argon and Helium;" 7. "Life of Sir Fitzjames Stephen;" 8. "Mediæval Cyprus;" 9. "Recent Musical Criticism;" 10. "The French in Madagascar;" 11. "Politics, Parties, and Imperial Defense." Of the first book under notice the reviewer says: "We have followed Mr. Burke's interesting volumes mainly as a guide to the political history of the country, with a view to trace the growth of Spain from very small beginnings into a mighty kingdom. But Mr. Burke has set forth much besides this. He has passed in review the history of Spanish literature, music, art, architecture, and much more, which our space permits us only thus briefly to refer to. It is all most interesting; it is all admirably told." In "Crimean Letters" the reader finds a grouping of the thrilling reminiscences of some of the participants in the great struggle before Sebastopol. The criticism of the reviewer on the "Memoirs of Barras" is keen and severe. With reasons for his judgment which there is not space to quote in full, the writer says: "As in the case of Talleyrand's *Memoirs*, the true student of history, if we mistake not, will be much disappointed with these volumes. . . . As a narrative it is meager, shallow, and poor; it is almost wholly devoid of description; it swarms with misstatements and downright falsehoods; it is a tissue of misrepresentation in at least a dozen chapters." Two new gases of "exceptional properties" are introduced to the reader in the sixth article. That the period of decadence in an art "is always the period at which criticism and discussion as to its conditions are most rife" is the claim made in "Recent Musical Criticism." And "at this point we seem now to have arrived in the art of music." Following this is a notice of recent musical discussions by C. Hubert H. Parry, Richard Wallaschek, H. Ellis Wooldridge, W. H. Hadow, J. A. Fuller Maitland, and Arthur Herve; also reminiscences of Wagner by H. T. Finck, Ferdinand Praeger, and J. S. Shedlock.

ANYONE less deserving than the late Edward A. Freeman would stagger under such a eulogy as that pronounced by the *Yale Review* for November in its article on "Freeman, the Scholar and Professor." The subject of its memorial notice is ranked among the encyclopedic scholars of the times, as follows: "He was an historical geographer, a humanist, a philologist, an archæologist, a specialist in architecture, an accomplished journalist, a literary critic, an historian, and a politician in the best Greek sense." H. B. Adams, of Johns Hopkins, is the author of the paper. The other articles are: "An Interoceanic Canal in the Light of Precedent,"

by Theodore S. Woolsey; "The Early Political Organization of Mexico," by Bernard Moses; "The Economic Reforms of the Late English Liberal Administration," by Edward Porritt; "The Referendum, and other Forms of Direct Democracy in Switzerland," by E. V. Reynolds; and "The French Revolution—The Work of the Committees of Legislation and Public Instruction in the Convention," by H. M. Stephens.

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THE table of contents in the December number of the *North American* is most attractive. "The Work of the Next Congress" is discussed by M. W. Hazeltine, and Representatives Catchings, Southwick, and Bell. The Venezuela controversy and the monetary situation are suggested by these experts in national affairs as some of the pressing questions for consideration. Mrs. Lynn Linton follows with a running comment on some of the present "Cranks and Crazes." In "The Last Gift of the Century" N. S. Shaler would have Congress invite the first-class powers of the world to send delegates to a conference at Washington, in January, 1897, in the interest of international arbitration and the suppression of warfare. "How London Deals with Beggars," by Lord Norton, shows a growth in the wise administration of charity in that great metropolis which should be an instructive lesson to every city perplexed with the problem of pauperism. The Hon. J. W. Foster follows with "Results of the Behring Sea Arbitration." At the recent Church Congress in Norwich, England, says Goldwin Smith, "a bold and honorable attempt" was made by Professor Bonney "to cast a millstone off the neck of Christianity by frankly renouncing belief in the historical character of the earlier books of the Bible." Entitling his article "Christianity's Millstone," Professor Smith, from this initial utterance, proceeds to a notice of some of the difficulties of Old Testament historical interpretation which is both able and liberal. In settling the many theological questions which still wait decision, "thought," he declares, "must be entirely free." A. S. White next shows "Our Benefits from the Nicaragua Canal;" A. D. Vandam writes "Personal History of the Second Empire—XII. The End of the Empire;" and Dr. Louis Robinson contributes his fourth paper on "Wild Traits in Tame Animals." The concluding article, by Sir Reginald F. D. Palgrave, on "The House of Representatives and the House of Commons," continues the comparison between these bodies which has been begun by Mr. Herbert and Mr. Taylor in previous numbers of the *North American Review*. Its writer is himself the present clerk of the House of Commons.

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THE November (1895) number of the *Methodist Review* (Nashville, Tenn.) has an excellent table of contents. Professor Morgan Calloway, Jr., has a discriminating article on "The Poetry of Sidney Lanier;" Professor John S. Bassett a "Study of Frederick W. Robertson;" Chaplain W. H. Milburn an interesting sketch and just tribute to the life and character of Bishop Enoch Mather Marvin; Dr. H. M. Du Bose a paper on "Authority in Art

and Religion;" Dr. J. E. Godbey a discussion of the question whether fasting as a religious exercise is enjoined by the Bible. There is also an installment of the editor's historical studies in the making of Methodism. The ability and enterprise of Dr. Tigert's editorship are increasingly manifest in each succeeding number. The editor comments at length upon Bishop Thoburn's article on "Methodist Episcopacy in Transition." Some of its criticisms, coming from an outside source, suggest the propriety of sober reflection inside. We quote: "The disregard of the constitution of the Church, so frequently and strikingly characteristic of the attitude of the Methodist Episcopal Church in measures connected with the episcopacy is rather startlingly illustrated by the bishop's proposal to change the 'plan of our itinerant general superintendency' by General Conference action alone. Should the General Conference see fit to act on his advice it would but afford an illustration of the power of that body to ride roughshod over the Annual Conferences and the bishops, the constitution, and the Church. It is not strange that some in the Methodist Episcopal Church, 'who stand high enough to give their words a wide range of influence,' have said that 'the General Conference will become more and more an unsettling and disturbing element in the Church.' Many thoughtful men in our sister Church breathe easier when the quadrennial sessions are over. . . . The good missionary bishop concludes that the General Conference of 1896 ought to relieve the bishops of the task of making out their annual plan and to make out a quadrennial one for them—that is, to 'district' the general superintendents quadrennially by a majority vote of the General Conference! Shades of Asbury and McKendree! Has it come to this? We say not a word now as to the wisdom of the scheme. But here is no suggestion of referring the proposed modification of the 'plan' to the Annual Conference. The General Conference, in case the question of its power in the premises is raised, has only by a majority vote to decide that the new plan does not infringe the third restrictive rule, and presto! change! In a moment Joshua Soule's 'itinerant general superintendency' is transformed into a 'quadrennial diocesan episcopacy,' and the omnipotent General Conference moves on with no further attention to the matter. Seriously, with all our love and admiration for our brethren of the Methodist Episcopal Church, it is the *sang-froid* with which just such proposals for revolutionary changes emanate from the most respectable sources that makes us draw back from any suggestion of organic union. As matters now stand, such union is simply impossible. . . . We might differ materially with Bishop Thoburn as to the best method of putting up all the working machinery of Methodism, including the episcopacy, on our foreign missionary fields. Evidently this 'missionary bishop' is not wholly satisfied with the plan adopted in his and Bishop Taylor's case. The missionary episcopate is too 'diocesan;' the itinerant general superintendency is not enough 'diocesan;' and so each must be moved toward the other until they meet in a quadrennial diocesan episcopacy, thus leaving (and here seems to be the milk in Bishop Thoburn's cocoanut) the mis-

sionary bishops and the general superintendents on exactly the same level." This is how the matter looks to a disinterested outsider.

THE *New World* for December contains the following table of contents: "Tendencies of Thought in Modern Judaism," by David Philipson; "The Miracles of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels," by Albert Réville; "The Anabaptists," by W. E. Griffis; "The Pseudo-Athanasian Augustinianism," by Levi L. Paine; "Tito Melema," by Julia H. Gulliver; "Popular Protestant Controversy," by C. C. Starbuck; "Local Cults in Homer," by Arthur Fairbanks; "The Nomadic Ideal in the Old Testament," by Karl Budde; and the usual list of book reviews.

THE changed form of *Christian Literature* is in the line of improvement. The December number of the publication has among other quoted articles: "Bishop Butler and his Censors. I," by W. E. Gladstone; "Why Be Religious?" by Marcus Dods; "The Pulpit and Social Reform," by Washington Gladden; "Theology in the University and in the Seminary," by A. M. Fairbairn; and "The Rigidity of Rome," by Wilfrid Ward.—The October number of the *American Catholic Quarterly* opens with "The Evolution of Evolution," by St. George Mivart, F.R.S. "The School Question in Manitoba" is written by J. S. Ewart; and "The Outlook for Ireland," by B. J. Clinche.—The *Methodist Magazine* for December has, among an attractive list of articles, "Petra, the Rock City of Edom," compiled by Dr. Withrow; "Britain's Keys of Empire—Gibraltar," and "Footprints of Luther," by John Stoughton, D.D. All are illustrated. There are also short papers included by Bishop Foster on "Rum's Arraignment," and on "Time," by Bishop Warren.—The *Treasury* for December has as its leading sermon a discourse by J. T. Wightman, D.D., of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and pastor in Baltimore, Md.—In the *Preachers' Magazine* for December are sermons by Dr. C. A. A. Berry and Mark Guy Pearse. The various departments of the issue are well sustained. Dr. W. E. Ketcham is the editor.—The *Catholic World* for December has "Armenia, Past and Present," by Henry Hyvernat, D.D.—The *Chautauquan* for December opens with an attractive illustrated article by Ruth Shaffner on "Iceland and its People." Another illustrated article of unusual interest is by Fred Grundy on "Student Life at Oxford, England." In short, the magazine is crowded with good things.—*Our Day* has among its papers a character sketch of Dr. Albert Shaw, showing how a man of force has early come to leadership.—The *Homiletic Review* for December includes among its "Representative Sermons" a discourse by Dean Farrar on "An Ideal Rule of Life;" one by Dr. James Stalker on "The State of the Unsaved;" and one by Andrew Murray, of South Africa, on "Christ and Abundance of Life."—The *American Kitchen Magazine* is a superior publication of its class. Housewives will find much of importance in its attractive pages for December.

## BOOK NOTICES.

## RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

*Religious Doubt. Its Nature, Treatment, Causes, Difficulties, Consequences, and Dissolution.* By Rev. JOHN W. DIGGLE, M.A., Vicar of Mossley Hill, etc. 12mo, pp. 371. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Price, cloth, \$2.

In his preface the author, who reasons largely from his own experience of religious doubt, states his purpose thus: "On the one hand I have sought to persuade believers to treat religious doubt with large-mindedness and in a Christian temper; and on the other, to persuade doubters not to be content with doubting, but to examine vigorously into the causes of their doubts, to confront steadily the great difficulties besetting doubt—difficulties often greater than those of belief—and to consider fairly the methods suggested for dissolving their doubts, and for attaining that degree of spiritual health and strength which is essential to clear and constant faith." This purpose he closely pursues and ably fulfills. He begins by appealing for charity toward honest doubt, much of it being involuntary and distressing; and supports this appeal by the example set by Christ. He points out that the differences among Christians, even on very important matters, are often greater than those between believers and many doubters. The timid and fretful intolerance of some Christians toward doubt is attributed in part to three causes: the fact that these Christians are not sure of their ground, do not really know whom they have believed, and are not able to give reasons for the hope that is in them; the failure to distinguish what is essential to Christianity from what is nonessential, the greater part of doubt being directed, not against the essential teachings of Christ but against the traditions and opinions of men, the theories and interpretations which dogmatists, with more bravery than truth, declare to be essential; and, thirdly, the bitter, contemptuous, flippant, or belligerent temper of some classes of skeptics. As to the general causes of modern doubt the author names, first, the great growth of full assurance in matters not distinctively religious, the application of scientific methods in various departments having extended the range of positive knowledge and multiplied the certainties possessed by the mind, this progress creating a desire and a demand for proof experimental and positive in all things, including religion. He names, second, the failure of many persons to remember to what extent practical human life in all its ramifications proceeds on faith, is an unending series of actions on trust, and the consequent failure to see that it is quite unreasonable to refuse to proceed in part on trust in matters of religion. He names, third, an apparent personal incapacity to believe. There are doubters by disposition, not toward religion alone, but of things in general—Thomasases who will not believe unless they see and handle; distrust is instinctive with them; they see difficulties, are fertile in objections, want everything explained,



proved, reasoned out. He names, fourth, the natural indifference felt by many persons toward religion. He names, fifth, indulgence in sin as lying unconfessed at the root of a considerable part of religious doubt and real or pretended disbelief; and this may be even when the individual is not definitely conscious that his unbelief is the consequence of his sins. He names, sixth, the bitter perplexity into which many are thrown by the ordinary course of events, and the bewildering problems of human life; by the seeming cruelties of nature, the inequalities of fortune, the calamities of life, the burdens of the heavy-laden, and the tears of the broken-hearted. He names, seventh, the indiscriminating sternness and severity of over-dogmatic and intolerant Christians toward all doubt and doubters; honest questionings are treated as tantamount to sin. This harshness of spirit is illustrated in the minatory sentences of the Athanasian Creed, which denounce all who do not accept certain highly metaphysical propositions concerning the unsearchable nature of the mystery of the Trinity. This same spirit breathes in the decrees of the Council of Trent, the Confession of Faith of the Kirk of Scotland, and the tone and temper of some modern pulpits. He names, eighth, the common confusing of the very essence of Christianity with its mere traditions and accidents, of the kernel with the husk, of Christ's simple Gospel with scholastic accretions, of the revelation of God with the traditions of men; in consequence of which in time of assault many imagine that the citadel of the faith has been destroyed by the enemy when only some humanly constructed out-work has been carried. When the geocentric theory of the solar system was overthrown the planets were not proved unreal nor the science of astronomy invalidated. There is urgent need of a broad and clear demarcation between essentials and nonessentials. This will diminish the number of sects and speed the unification of Christendom. Theories of inspiration should not be put on a level with the substance of the inspired teachings, nor the form of a sacrament with the meaning and effect thereof, nor metaphysical subtleties with the clear, practical teachings of our Saviour's lips or the plain facts of his life, nor the logic of theologians with the direct and unmistakable commands of God, nor the dogmas of the schools with the fundamental and undeniable doctrines of the Scriptures. Nobody has ever made much headway in doubting, or secured many listeners in denying, the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, or the Lord's Prayer, nor other things of similar self-evidencing character in which Christianity is rich and strong. He names, ninth, as a producing cause of doubt, the unworthy lives of many professing Christians; the lack of pure and elevated character; meanness, avariciousness, frivolousness, uncharitableness, enviousness, grossness, untrustworthiness, selfishness, inveracity. These things are stumbling-blocks to many notwithstanding it is clearly unjust as well as stupid to judge Christianity by these exceedingly unchristian professors. He names, tenth, the neglect of doubters to make any effort to prune their doubts or cultivate their faith, or to put themselves in an atmosphere favorable to belief. They read the wrong books and magazines; they hear attacks upon

the Bible but do not study it; they do not frequent the places, nor seek the associations, in which doubt might be dispelled and faith fostered; they patronize schools, seminaries, and universities exclusively secular, where no religious influence is in the atmosphere and attention is never directed to the realities known to faith, the result being a godless education and the spread of apathy and disbelief. Among subsidiary causes of doubt he mentions the growth of the critical spirit which chills fervor, checks emotion, and paralyzes the sentiments of reverence and worship; shallow and bumptious self-conceit and silly ambition to appear smart and independent; the false notion that we can or ought to understand everything; the supposition that, if the doctrines of Christianity are essential to salvation, they ought to be of such a nature that we could not resist or doubt them; worldliness, luxury, and self-indulgence. But the greatest cause of doubt, or lack of belief, according to this author, is what he calls the Law of the Limitation of Force, by which he means that there is in every man a certain fixed amount of force, a limited capacity of absorption; a limited power of taking interest in things. If a man's whole force is spent upon things outside religion, even though many of those things may be innocent or important in themselves, there is no force left to be bestowed on spiritual things, and the result is either total irreligion or a very feeble hold on religious things and a lack of convictions or definite beliefs. The lack of religious interest in individuals and communities is often explicable by the absorption in other affairs which consume the whole time, attention, and force; and this condition of things breeds ignorance, indifference, and unbelief toward spiritual realities. After a chapter on the difficulties attending religious doubt, and another on the consequences of it, the author proceeds to his most congenial task and his most successful effort in the long and useful chapter on "The Victory over Doubt." For conquering doubt the first thing he emphasizes is the importance of not growing morbid over doubts. These cond is the realization that our doubts are neither new nor original. The third is an enlightened perception of the inconceivable vastness of created things. The fourth is the cultivation of simple conceptions of religion. The fifth is the pursuit of goodness. Mrs. Stowe said, "The best way to get rid of doubts in religion is to go and practice what we don't doubt." Alexander Dumas said, "Genius cannot explain God, but goodness proves him." Reverent obedience to conscience is a most effectual means for promoting and strengthening faith. The determination to do right prayerfully will lead to the peace of God and the light of clear convictions. The best way of understanding religion is to practice it. It cannot be wholly proved by argument; the way to grasp its reality is to take it into our hearts and test it and prove it by living it. The author's sixth prescription for removing doubt is the confession by intelligent Christians of the many difficulties left unsolved even by faith. Christianity does not pretend to solve all the riddles of the human mind and heart. Christ left many questions unilluminated and unnoticed. Darkness and mystery are about our lot and path, and to a large degree God hides himself. Attempts

to demonstrate the indemonstrable, or explain the inexplicable, fail and only intensify the doubts of the thoughtful. It is better frankly to confess our ignorance of many things than to pretend to a knowledge we have not. The seventh aid for overcoming doubt in the world is the manifestation of spirituality, zeal, power, and all evidences of strong conviction on the part of the Christian Church. [If the Church is too much identified with, and controlled by, the State it is likely to be secularized and unspiritualized. If religion appears as nothing more than a selfish desire for personal salvation, a prudential insurance against hell, it will not command respect.] The eighth method by which the Church may diminish doubt is by that liberality of spirit and largeness of heart which naturally goes with true spirituality. Ninth, the learning of the truth in religion, as in everything else, requires effort on the part of the learner. Tenth, the exercise of the will is necessary to put ourselves among the associations and under the influences and in reach of the teachings best adapted to develop and encourage faith. Eleventh, the refusal to be so completely absorbed and consumed by other things as to have no time or attention to give to the affairs of the soul. Twelfth, the most important of all requisites for winning the victory over doubt is the assiduous cultivation of the spiritual faculties. For this cultivation three things are primarily necessary: first, the distinct acknowledgment of God as the primal source of man's spiritual nature; second, remembrance of the fact that spiritual air, spiritual nourishment, and spiritual exercise are necessary for the life and growth of the spiritual nature of man; and, third, patient and painstaking attention to spiritual truths and facts. "Hardly any faculty is more important," said Bishop Butler, "for the intellectual progress of man, than attention." It is equally necessary for spiritual progress and a clear knowledge of the truth as it is in Christ. A good index finishes the book, which will be seen, from our meager analysis of parts of it, to be an intelligent and effective treatment of its subject.

*Literature of Theology.* A Classified Bibliography of Theological and General Religious Literature. By JOHN FLETCHER HURST. 8vo. pp. 757. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. Price, cloth, \$4.

It is only the broadest and most experienced scholarship that can survey the whole field of existing literature in any department of knowledge, perceive the one thing which is lacking to complete that literature, or to make the huge mass thereof quickly accessible and available, and confer a new and original benefit upon mankind by supplying the thing which has been lacking. This is what Bishop Hurst has done in the volume before us. It is a classified and exhaustive list of the best and most desirable books in theology and general religious literature, published up to date in Great Britain, the United States, and the Dominion of Canada, giving the size of each book, when, where, and by whom published, and the price. Bishop Hurst's *Bibliotheca Theologica*, issued in 1882, is out of print. The present work, similar in character, is altogether superior in scope and magnitude, in accuracy, fullness, and practical convenience.

Some of the considerations which have impelled the author to undertake the great labor involved in the preparation of this book are indicated by him in the Preface: "That the average library of the Christian layman and of the minister of the Gospel is poor beyond words is a lamentable fact. Many of the books are of such inferior authorship as to unfit them for even storage in any home of people either intelligent or hoping to be intelligent. Such books have drifted in because they are radiant with glaring and realistic pictures, or are bound in captivating sheep or calf, or are presented by well-meaning friends, or have been bought in lots at auction under the hallucination of cheapness, or because of some other apology for the existence of the trash. If two thirds of the shelves of the typical domestic library were emptied of their burden, and choice books put in their stead, there would be a reformation in intelligence and thought throughout the civilized world. A poor book is dear, and a good one cheap, at any cost. One's best book is that which treats best the subject on which one most needs light, and which one can get only by planning, by seeking, and often by sacrificing. One such book is worth more than all the diamonds of Golconda or the pearls of Tuticorin, and sweeter than all the perfumes of Araby the Blest. It is a friend for all seasons, and remains true to the eighties and beyond, if they come. Better one shelf of such treasures than a shipload of literary driftings from the dead pyramids of publishers who sell slowly and of authors who fail quickly. The author of the *Literature of Theology* dares not flatter himself that he can persuade many possessors of poor collections of books to reform them; but if he can lead some of those who are forming their libraries, who are looking into the future for the possession of treasures in books, to select well, to buy only the best, and to make a wise search for special information in general libraries, the disappointments and agonies of at least one friend of books, and friend of all who find friends in books, will not have been in vain." Bishop Hurst has rendered, not now by any means for the first time, a great service to the cause of learning and to all students of theological or religious literature. If his book shall be properly brought to the attention of the large and ever-multiplying class who need and would eagerly welcome it, it will be assured a long, large, and general sale, north and south, east and west, in this and in other countries, and among Christians of all denominations. Especially, no young minister of any Church can afford to set out upon the work of gathering a library without the wise guidance of this practical cyclopedia of religious literature. If he goes on without it he will almost certainly waste, in a very short time, double, treble, quadruple, the cost of this book. A word to the wise is sufficient, and we make no special charge for it.

*Half-Hours with St. Paul, and Other Bible Readings.* By DANIEL STEELE, S.T.D. 12mo, pp. xii, 328. Boston: The Christian Witness Co. Price, cloth, \$1.

Dr. Daniel Steele, who has been called our American Fletcher, is one of the most widely known and highly valued writers of modern times on the theme of scriptural holiness, which forms the topic of the present volume,

as of several others from his pen. So it scarcely needs to be said that this book is thoroughly orthodox, highly spiritual, and written out of much fullness of knowledge both of the Bible and of Christian experience. It contains many pages from which it would be pleasant and profitable to quote at length. We must content ourselves with a few sentences: "There are two ways of professing holiness—the wise and the proper way, and the ostentatious and distasteful way. Christ did not say in a bold and offensive style, 'I am perfectly holy.' He might with truth have used these words, but he would have been needlessly beclouding his own humility and laying stumbling-blocks in the way of his hearers. At this point some modern advocates of Christian perfection are at fault. In set phrase they profess more holiness in half an hour than Jesus Christ did in all his life." "Professors of heart purity, especially those who associate themselves together almost exclusively, are in danger of taking on some of these unamiable qualities [tartness, sourness, envy, censoriousness, self-conceit, headstrongness], and of cherishing uncharitable feelings toward those Christians whose weaker wings of faith have not borne them up to the Pisgah tops of grace. As a safeguard against this peril we recommend a frequent and searching self-examination, with this chapter [1 Cor. xiii] as a touchstone." "This sorting of Christians into two kinds, the self-crucified and those in whom self lives, the wholly and the partially sanctified, is a delicate business, for which only an inspired apostle is competent." "Ever-increasing love is ever-increasing spiritual discernment of the true nature, good or bad, of each circumstance, case, or object which experience may present. A sensitively correct moral perception cannot be too highly prized. It is the gift of the Holy Spirit improved and intensified by use. . . . If there is a moral element at the bottom of all these apparently trivial choices it is evident that it is the design of God that we should acquire a spiritual perspicuity sharp enough to discern it." "It is perilous to read more into the divine promises than the spirit of inspiration intended." These cautions are good and greatly needed.

This book is by no means one for the unthinking, who wish only warm exhortation. It is in many respects a very learned volume; Greek words, and quotations from Greek grammars, abound, and a great deal is made of Greek tenses and compounds, of aorists and perfects and prepositions. Dr. Steele's scholarship flourishes luxuriantly in the paths of Greek. As to what that perfection is which can be realized in this life, he says: "I do not think it is an ideal perfection." He calls it "perfect love," and defines that phrase by saying it is to love God with all the heart, mind, and strength. He tells us that love "may be perfect in kind, that is, free from all impurities, but it can never be perfect in degree." "By perfect love we mean pure love. It is perfect in kind, but is capable of infinite increase." The difference in the love, or faith, or holiness of the babe in Christ and the mature Christian is in quantity, not in quality—in degree, not in kind. Wesley states this matter very clearly in his sermon on "Patience," which, being published in 1784, near the close of his life, may be taken to represent his ripest views. He says: "Many persons . . . have

not spoken warily upon this head, not according to the oracles of God. They have spoken of the work of sanctification, taking the word in its full sense, as if it were quite of another kind—as if it differed entirely from that which is wrought in justification. But this is a great and dangerous mistake, and has a natural tendency to make us undervalue that glorious work of God which was wrought in us when we were justified. . . . There is, in that hour, a general change from inward sinfulness to inward holiness. The love of the creature is changed to the love of the Creator; the love of the world into the love of God. Earthly desires . . . are in that instant changed, by the mighty power of God, into heavenly desires. . . . It [entire sanctification] does not imply any new *kind* of holiness—let no man imagine this. Love is the sum of Christian sanctification; it is the one *kind* of holiness which is found, only in various *degrees*, in the believers who are distinguished by St. John into ‘little children, young men, and fathers.’ . . . In the same proportion as he [the babe in Christ] grows in faith, he grows in holiness; he increases in love, loveliness, meekness, in every part of the image of God.” This statement, we think, must commend itself to the sober common sense of most. Divine love is always perfect in kind. The degrees of holiness possessed by a believer, depending on a number of conditions, will vary greatly according to the stage of his progress. But the capacity, as Dr. Steele clearly intimates, is to go on increasing forever. The reputation of the author as a writer upon such topics has secured for this book already a large sale. The fifth thousand is now out.

*Why I am Not an Agnostic.* By E. D. SMITH, Ph.D. 12mo, pp. 55. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. Price, paper, 20 cents.

Dr. Smith is a member of the North Ohio Conference, having come to us from the ministry of the Lutheran Church, in which he was known as a man of mind and scholarship. His little book is a trenchant and forcible reply to a certain peripatetic platform blasphemer's lecture on “Why I am an Agnostic.” These five chapters prove the author to be thoroughly familiar with the ground he traverses. His five reasons for not being an agnostic are: First, because the agnostic theory of the origin of life is, according to his experimental method, utterly without any observed facts or experimental results to warrant it; second, because the agnostic's theory of the origin of man is as baseless as his theory of the origin of life; third, because the agnostic will not admit all the conclusions to which he is led on the supposition that his hypothesis is demonstrated or demonstrable; fourth, because the history of the world for sixty centuries has been unfolding under the controlling influence of three great Christian ideas—Freedom, Immortality, and God; fifth, because the orthodox creed is the aggregate of the great truths of the Scriptures, and because the Scriptures themselves set forth their truth on scientific principles. In the five chapters these reasons are amplified and their propositions solidly substantiated with vigor and skill. A more incisive and cogent argument against agnosticism we do not remember to have seen in so small a compass. We heartily commend it.



## PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND GENERAL LITERATURE.

*Unguarded Gates, and Other Poems.* By THOMAS BAILEY ALDRICH. 12mo, pp. 121. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. Price, cloth, \$1.25.

W. D. Howells, in *Harper's Monthly* last November, wrote of "Literary Boston Thirty Years Ago." Aldrich was there then, with a ripe literary reputation in prose and verse, as editor of *Every Saturday*. How far it is back to "Baby Bell" and "Marjorie Daw" we do not know; but the years are so many that in the prelude to this latest bundle of verse the poet writes as if he were in sight of the time when the voices, visions, and dreams which came to him in youth and middle life from the sea and the woods, the flowers and the winds, and amid the city's din, may fly and die in the dull and heavy days of age, empty of such music and light and gladness. The little volume before us gives lovely proof that "the flight of the Muse" is yet some way off in the future. Aldrich is a dainty and exquisite artist; not one of those who paint with a broom and think success measured by the amount of acreage one can besmear with violent and vociferous colors, but an artist so deft and delicate that he could "paint, fold for fold, on the limbs of Titania, the woven air of Cashmere." "Unguarded Gates" is a warning against the dangers arising from unrestricted immigration:

O Liberty, white Goddess! is it well  
To leave the gates unguarded? On thy breast  
Fold Sorrow's children, soothe the hurts of fate,  
Lift the downtrodden, but with hand of steel  
Stay those who to thy sacred portals come  
To waste the gifts of freedom. Have a care  
Lest from thy brow the clustered stars be torn  
And trampled in the dust. For so of old  
The thronging Goth and Vandal trampled Rome,  
And where the temples of the Cæsars stood  
The lean wolf unmolested made her lair.

Here and there in this volume are signs that our poet has not forgotten the Orient, that region of dreams where all things are possible, natural, and permissible, whose charms, mostly imaginary, have fascinated the poets from time immemorial. Aldrich has painted many a rich and dainty picture of the East, among which one always comes back to us when we think of Aldrich or the Orient—that "Prelude" in which he told how Hassan Ben Abdul sat and discoursed at the Ivory Gate of Bagdad, while all manner of persons stopped and drew near to listen—four Arab boys, a water-seller, a jet-black eunuch, a merchandising Jew, a glittering jeweler, and two blind mendicants:

And if the Khaleef had been riding near,  
He would have stopped to listen like the rest,  
For Hassan's fame was ripe in all the East.  
From white-walled Cairo to far Ispahan,  
From Mecca to Damascus he was known,

Hassan, the Arab with the singing heart.  
 His songs were sung by boatmen on the Nile,  
 By Beddowee maidens and in Tartar camps,  
 While all men loved him as they loved their eyes;  
 And when he spake, the wisest, next to him,  
 Was he who listened.

It were easy to show by a hundred quotations from this latest volume of his verse that Aldrich is still Aldrich. Take this about the fire on the hearth:

Along the still damp apple wood  
 A little flame ran that chirped like a bird—  
 Some wren's ghost haunting the familiar bough.

Take this picture:

The bleak New England road; the level boughs  
 Like bars of iron across the setting sun;  
 The gray, ribbed clouds piled up against the west;  
 The windows splashed with frost; the firelit room,  
 And in the antique chair that slight girl-shape,  
 The auburn braid about the saintly brows  
 Making a nimbus, and she white as snow.

Take from "White Edith" this about the fate of a young queen who long ago, "in the savage childhood of this world," reigned but for one single day, and then

Ere yet the dawn its gleaming edge lay bare  
 Like to the burnished ax's subtle edge,  
 She, from her sleep's caresses roughly torn,  
 The meek eyes blinking in the torches' glare,  
 Upon a scaffold for her glory paid  
 Her cheeks' two roses. For it so befell  
 That from the Northland there was come a prince,  
 With a great clash of shields and trailing spears  
 Through the black portals of the breathless night,  
 To claim the scepter. He no less would take  
 Than those same roses for his usury.  
 What less, in faith! The throne was rightly his  
 Of that sea-girdled isle; so to the block  
 Needs go the ringlets and the white swan throat.  
 A touch of steel, a sudden darkness, then  
 Blue heaven and all the hymning angel choir.

Saying that Grecian myths and other classic fictions do not beguile him as they did in youth, he writes:

Andromeda, in fetters by the sea,  
 Star-pale with anguish till young Perseus came,  
 Less moves me with her suffering than she,  
 The slim girl figure fettered to dark shame,  
 That nightly haunts the park, there, like a shade,

Trailing her wretchedness from street to street.  
 See where she passes—neither wife nor maid.  
 How all mere fiction crumbles at her feet!  
 Here is woe's self, and not the mask of woe.

Having been born by the sea in the quaint old town of Portsmouth, N. H., where the scene of his "Story of a Bad Boy" is laid, Aldrich says:

The first world, sound that fell upon my ear  
 Was that of the great winds along the coast  
 Crushing the deep-sea beryl on the rocks—  
 The distant breakers' sullen cannonade.

And he thinks it would be fit if the last earthly sound to reach his ears should be "some message blown over the dim salt lands that fringe the coast," just when "the dawn, illumining the purple waves, turns the gray pools and willow stems to gold." What the sea always does to a man whose boyhood was familiar with it is manifest in the sonnet, "Outward Bound:"

I leave behind me the elm-shadowed square  
 And carven portals of the silent street,  
 And wander on with listless, vagrant feet  
 Through seaward-leading alleys, till the air  
 Smells of the sea, and straightway then the care  
 Slips from my heart, and life is once more sweet.  
 At the lane's ending lie the white-winged fleet.  
 O restless Fancy, whither wouldst thou fare?  
 Here are brave pinions that shall take thee far—  
 Gaunt hulks of Norway; ships of red Ceylon;  
 Slim-masted lovers of the blue Azores!  
 'Tis but an instant hence to Zanzibar,  
 Or to the regions of the midnight sun:  
 Ionian isles are thine, and all the fairy shores.

Aldrich has the purely artistic temperament; he is a poet and no preacher. Truth requires us to say that in his always delectable verse we have the free play of an exquisitely cultivated æsthetic sense, trained to facile and elegant expression, but unpledged to moral industries. He has given much pure and refined pleasure to his fellow-men, and in his poetry there is nothing harmful or depressing. He has no liking for those pessimistic poets who have

Trained their Pegasus to draw a hearse  
 Through endless avenues of drooping verse.

*Our Industrial Utopia, and its Unhappy Citizens.* By DAVID HILTON WHEELER. 12mo, pp. 341. Chicago: A. C. MCCLURG & Co. Price, cloth, \$1.25.

This book will serve several good purposes; it will operate as a corrective of many erroneous notions widely prevalent; it will help to restore a healthy tone to a depressed and demoralized public feeling respecting the social situation; and it will put its readers in possession of much really valuable information. Yet it will fail to do all the good

it ought to do. The class to whom it would be the most beneficial will not largely read it, as they are apt to scrupulously avoid the light on certain subjects. Some of this class who do read it will use portions of it, we fear, to "point a moral," if not to "adorn a tale," by quoting its "atrocious sentiments" to disapproving audiences. Some of our pessimistic teachers would have us believe that present social conditions are as bad as they can be and are daily growing worse! Dr. Wheeler does not go to the other extreme of showing that all things are perfect and steadily getting better, but he does give us good reason for believing that there is a general upward tendency with still ample opportunity for both further advance and accelerated rate of progress. The author is hardly as clear as he might be as to the precise limits and character of "Our Utopia," but if we rightly apprehend him it is the stage of civilization we have now reached and which is characterized by an abundance of superfluities for all classes of society. If not the exact realization of Sir Thomas More's ideal it is such an approach toward it as to suggest its possibility, if not its practicability—in neither of which did More himself have any positive faith, as his term Utopia, meaning *nouhere*, indicates. In successive chapters the author discourses with great effectiveness on such subjects as superfluity and unhappiness in Utopia, competition, capital, labor, and wages, government, ethics of industry, etc. His position is decidedly conservative, yet he is frankly open to fresh lines of thought developed in recent discussions, and his views are so forcibly set forth as to challenge consideration. The term "superfluities" appears with a meaning somewhat out of range of its ordinary acceptation. With him it is whatever pertains to the common welfare and yet is above the actual necessities of life. Most people regard it as covering those things not only that we could do without, but that we could spare about as well as not. We have, however, no one word to substitute as standing for such utilities as lie between necessities and luxuries. "Comforts" and "conveniences" are frequently used to fill their space; but there is a vagueness about them which makes them unsatisfactory. Necessity is itself a rather elastic term, and there are very few people who realize how little is absolutely essential to the keeping of life and health in good condition. The author holds that it is not so much the necessities of life for which the great majority of men are struggling, but the superfluities, and that, too, properly enough. Nevertheless, many readers will feel that he has fixed too low the line where necessities end and superfluities begin. The strictures on the clamor against competition are very strong and not altogether untimely. There is no doubt about the waste and harshness and the frequent cruelty attendant upon rivalry in business. There is scarcely any field in which human selfishness has so large room and such great inducements for its operation as here. So obvious is this that even among men of only moderately advanced views it has seemed that it must wholly cease to be an operative principle in any wholesome industrial system. Yet so deeply is it implanted in the whole nature of things that reason seems to demand its

retention in some form. Nor in all the assaults made upon it has there yet appeared any efficient substitute for it. It is not inconceivable that it may be retained and yet so modified in its operation as to be freed from all its vicious effects. Still, we suspect that our author may have failed to recognize all the evils that belong to competition as it now presents itself in the industrial world. There is, however, food for thought in the suggestion of the moral superiority of the communities in which competition largely prevails over those in which it is feeble. There is very much valuable truth in what is said concerning the relation of the government to industrial affairs. Paternalism symbolizes not a very reasonable principle in the state of any people. This is sometimes carried or sought to be carried to a preposterous extent. But legislative interference may be legitimate and yet stop far short of that. It may and unquestionably often does restrict and suppress certain crying evils in the relations of employers and workmen. The long series of factory acts in Great Britain and similar action by our own State legislators testify to this end, though there is yet much to be desired in this line. We do not understand Dr. Wheeler to deny this, and yet it is possible that here, as in the question of competition, he is inclined to leave too much to the operation of natural law. A considerable class of readers will dissent from some of the author's views on the subject of trusts. He describes with clearness and force the great gain to the community that is possible to flow from the formation of these large combinations. These cannot be gainsaid, though they are very liable to be overlooked by superficial thinkers. So, too, he speaks wisely on the natural barriers against many of the evil liabilities involved. Yet the peril to society of putting such vast power in the hands of irresponsible men is not so fully indicated as seems desirable. The opportunity for oppressing the weak and working the ruin of honorable competitors, and that, too, otherwise than within legitimate economic limits, is exceedingly great, and it is not conceivable that some will not take this sinister advantage. It is, moreover, evident, after discounting to a reasonable extent such testimony as may be inspired by partisan and prejudiced motives, that there have been some appalling rascalities perpetrated in the operation of the great trusts. The author deals trenchantly with the false social and economic views so widely prevalent, and deftly punctures many a bubble popularly presumed to contain solid instead of gaseous matter. The functions of capital are ably set forth. We are made to see that it is not, as it is fabled to be, the employer of labor, and therefore the cause of all the woes experienced by the latter, but rather that both it and labor are employed by the manager or *entrepreneur*. Notable, too, is his approval of the theory concerning land that it has no value except what has been put into it by labor, which of itself is a refutation of Henry George's doctrine of government ownership and the single tax. The great advantages to industrial society of accumulated wealth by individuals, so abhorrent in the socialistic mind, are made very obvious. The distinction between moral and economic disorders, a source of perpetual confusion to

many minds, is well drawn. Another subject about which much obfuscation exists, and that, too, in minds otherwise well informed, is that of self-interest and selfishness. It does not follow, as Dr. Wheeler aptly reminds us, that because self-interest is one of the chief springs of action in industrial enterprise, therefore this is the same as selfishness, or that any form of pure selfishness is to be approved. The book as a whole is suggestive and stimulating. Dr. Wheeler's style is not only clear, it is also attractive. There is pleasure as well as profit in reading him. He has poise and range, and the faculty of looking at his subject from many sides. He is no mere pedant or book-student, but also sufficiently a man of affairs to perceive the practical bearing of theories and things.

*The Principles of Rhetoric.* By ADAMS SHERMAN HILL, Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory in Harvard College. New edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo, pp. 431. New York: Harper & Brothers. Price, cloth, \$1.20.

This work, intended for "advanced students of English composition," may well be brought to the attention of the clerical readers of our *Review*. First published in 1878, it was even then accepted as a compacted, comprehensive, and wholly modern statement of the principles underlying the proper use of our English tongue. In this new edition it has probably no superior as a convenient and practical manual for rhetorical study. Some elementary matter has been omitted; one or two new chapters have been added; the book has been in part rewritten and rearranged; the illustrative quotations have been made more numerous; and altogether there are one hundred and twenty-eight more pages in this edition than in that of 1878; while the index at the end is a model of completeness, filling thirty-one pages. But the distinctive feature of the work, and that which renders it more interesting and readable, as well as more instructive, than any treatise of the kind which we remember to have read, is the free and skillful use of practical illustrations. Most of them are taken from the writings of acknowledged masters of English; and a footnote gives the name of the particular work from which each quotation is drawn. These illustrations occupy at least one half of the book and emphasize the various principles which the author advances. Several of them fill more than a page of small type; most of them are of interest in themselves, independent of their utility as examples of correct or careless writing; and many will revive pleasant memories and rekindle old literary friendships. That the book has been revised up to date is attested by the fact that it contains no less than six such quotations from Mrs. Ward's *Marcella*. We have called the attention of our clerical readers to this work with a purpose. The author defines rhetoric as "the art of efficient communication by language," and adds, "It is not one of several arts out of which a choice may be made; it is the art to the principles of which, consciously or unconsciously, a good writer or speaker must conform." Now here lies the point. The truth is that few writers or speakers do "unconsciously" make the most of their opportunities; and preachers are no exception to this statement. Language is their one means of communication with their congregations, their



one vehicle for the expression of the truth committed to them, their one instrument for the persuasion of men and the uplifting of humanity; and it is their solemn duty to use it with all the force and effectiveness which they can bring to bear. One may be a successful merchant, a skillful surgeon, an eminent artist, a famous general, or even a great statesman, without a facile and forceful use of his mother tongue; but it becomes the minister of Jesus Christ to deliver his message in simple, direct, vigorous language, and with all the convincing power of orderly arrangement and of proper emphasis upon vital points. We especially recommend the chapters in this book on "Exposition" and "Argument." Incidentally, and without any intention of revealing editorial secrets, we suggest that the study of this or some similar work might often add considerably to the interest and value of the contributed portion of the *Review*.

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#### HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, AND TOPOGRAPHY.

*The Huguenots and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.* By HENRY M. BAIRD, Professor in the University of the City of New York; Author of *The History of the Rise of the Huguenots of France*, and of *The Huguenots and Henry of Navarre*. With Maps. Two volumes. 8vo, pp. xxviii, 566, xlix, 604. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Price, cloth, \$7.50.

These volumes, as is shown by the above transcription from the title-page, form a sequel to two previous works by the same author, the one published in 1879, the other in 1886. Together, they constitute a connected history of the Protestants of France "down to the full recognition of Protestantism by Napoleon Bonaparte, as First Consul, in the second year of the nineteenth century," and represent "the conclusion of historical studies that were begun more than thirty years ago." Many of our readers will recognize Dr. Baird at once as an old-time friend. Though a Presbyterian, he has frequently contributed to the *Review*, induced, initially, thereto by the close friendship existing between him and Dr. Whedon. In the number for October, 1857, soon after Dr. Whedon's accession to the editorship, we find his first article; in that for September, 1894, we find his last; and, in all, nineteen articles from his pen have appeared in its pages. About half of these are on classical themes, upon which the author, a veteran Greek professor, is easily at home. But just thirty years ago, in the *Review* for January, 1866, almost at the beginning of the researches which have culminated in his historical trilogy, appeared an article on "Bossuet as a Persecutor;" and, at intervals since, he has contributed other articles suggested by materials that had accumulated in his study of ancient documents and records bearing upon the Huguenots. Nor did he hit upon the subject for his great work by accident. His calling and election to it, indeed, seem clearly an instance of predestination, reinforced by all the laws of heredity and early association; for Dr. Baird, as is indicated by his name, is of Huguenot ancestry himself, and his father, the Rev. Robert Baird, D.D., was the author, among other works, of a *History of the Waldenses, Albigenses, and Vau-*

*dois*, while his brother, the late Rev. Dr. Charles Washington Baird, published in 1885 a valuable *History of the Huguenot Emigration to America*. The present volumes, while essentially a continuation of the author's preceding works, may still be read as an independent history. They begin with the accession of the boy Louis XIII in 1610, twelve years after the signing of the Edict of Nantes by Henry IV. When that edict had been obtained the Huguenots, says Dr. Baird, "felt themselves warranted in looking forward with some degree of confidence to a long period of quiet and prosperity, under the protection of a law expressly declared to be perpetual and irrevocable. . . . The edict was not, however, a proclamation of equal rights to the professors of all Christian creeds: this was its weak point. The Reformed religion was not recognized as entitled to the same consideration as the Roman Catholic. The latter was tacitly accepted as the religion of the State as a whole, the traditional and better religion, into conformity with which it was desired and it was hoped that all the king's subjects would ultimately be brought. By the side of this State religion and in its shadow the Protestant religion might stand, and for its security many equitable provisions were enacted. Yet it stood an inferior and with inferior rights. . . . But the exercises of the Protestant worship were 'lawful' within certain limits, and for the peaceful maintenance of these exercises all the authority of the crown was solemnly pledged." This assumed superiority of the Catholic faith and the tacit understanding of the Catholic leaders that Protestantism was to be "tolerated" only until its adherents could be brought, by fair means or foul, within the fold of the Church constitute the keynote of the religious history of France during the succeeding two centuries. So long as Henry of Navarre still lived little, indeed, could be accomplished. But with the accession of Louis XIII began a period of ever-increasing intrigue, treachery, cruelty, and persecution, culminating in the revocation of the edict by Louis XIV in 1685. That this consummation was so long delayed is due largely to the fact that the Huguenots, while constituting "but a small minority of the entire population of France," were "so massed in certain parts of the country as to exert an influence which could not be overlooked or misunderstood." Under Louis XIII occurred the suppression of the Protestants of the province of Béarn and the three Huguenot wars ending with the fall of La Rochelle, the Huguenot stronghold. The two great aims of Richelieu's policy were the extinction of the Protestants in France and the overthrow of the power of Austria. Of the two, however, the latter was far the stronger and more imperative, and necessitated at times the subordination and postponement of the other, as well as half-hearted alliances with Gustavus Adolphus and the Protestants of Germany; so that, under his rule, as well as under that of Louis XIV and Cardinal Mazarin, the Huguenots enjoyed, on the whole, in spite of much persecution and oppression, a comparative repose and prosperity. But with the death of Mazarin in 1661 commences a period of accelerated misfortune and disaster. Little by little the privileges of the Huguenots are invaded, their rights disregarded, and their liberties

infringed. Protestant communities are robbed of their civic prerogatives, Protestant churches are closed and destroyed, Protestant pastors maltreated and murdered. Isaac Homel, an "old man of seventy-two years, of which he had spent forty-two in the exemplary discharge of his duties as a minister of the Gospel," was sentenced to be broken on the wheel. Let the reader who does not know exactly what that means consult any large dictionary. "The agony produced by the most excruciating of all modes of execution known to a bloodthirsty legislation was enhanced by the malice which purposely delayed the last and most merciful blow that should end his misery." Forced "conversions" are made at the point of the sword. "Harassed by importunity, wearied in body and mind, vexed by the loss of property ruthlessly destroyed before their very eyes, distracted by the outrages done to themselves, still more by the dastardly outrages done to their wives and children whom they were powerless to defend save by the utterance of the fatal words of submission, and seeing all these things done in the name of the king, in obedience, as it would seem, to his commands," Protestants pretended to abjure their religion. "That their submission was involuntary and insincere they did not conceal, and could not have concealed had they desired to do so." And all this before the formal revocation of the edict, while the Protestant worship was still nominally under the protection of the crown! Want of space prevents us dwelling, even briefly, upon the recall of the edict by Louis XIV; the cruelties and heartbreaks and wretchedness of the period of the exile; the desperate struggle of the Camisards of the Cevennes; the churches of the "Desert"—conventicles secretly held in secluded places in forest and mountain and valley; the partial relief afforded by the edict of Louis XVI; and the full restoration of civil and religious liberty granted by the first Napoleon. "Exercising an influence out of all proportion to their numbers," says Professor Baird, "the descendants of the Huguenots shape, to no inconsiderable extent, the policy of a nation that scarcely appreciates as yet the service which those men of firm and loyal principle rendered to France in the past or the service which their successors are capable of rendering to France in the future. . . . After the fall of President MacMahon, in 1879, a majority of the ministers—five out of ten—were Protestants, and from that time to this the Protestant representation in the chief councils of the nation has never been small. It has, indeed, been urged as a grievance that in those branches of the administration that specially call for high intellectual culture Protestants have appropriated a share to which they are not entitled—that a Protestant is the director of the normal school, that Protestants are at the head of primary and secondary instruction, that a Protestant woman presides over the school of Sèvres, that Protestant generals direct the polytechnic school and the school of Versailles, and that there are a host of Protestants in the courts of law, as judges, counselors, and officers." These volumes adequately relate the story of a great national tragedy—a tragedy second to none in modern times, unless it be to that now being enacted in Armenia. Professor

Baird has rather undertold the story than overstated it. There is a sobriety in his judgments, a moderation in his style, a reserve and repression in the whole narrative that reveal a dispassionate seeking for the truth and a conscientious endeavor not to overcolor the picture. If religious motives are occasionally emphasized at some expense to underlying political motive, it is due largely to the nature and limitations of the subject. We advise our friends to read the work.

*Papers of the American Society of Church History.* Vol. VII. Edited by REV. SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, M.A., Secretary. 8vo, pp. 313. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

This paper-covered volume contains the secretary's report of the seventh annual meeting of the society, held in Washington, D. C., December 27 and 28, 1894; a bibliography of works interesting to students of Church history published in 1893 and 1894; a paper by Professor George P. Fisher, of Yale University, on "Dr. Schaff as a Historian;" another by Rev. Charles H. Small, of Hudson, O., on "Some Elements in the Making of the United States;" and a third by Professor John Lewis Ewell, of Howard University, on "Judge Samuel Sewall (1652-1730), a Typical Massachusetts Puritan." A list of members of the society and of deceased members follows. The list of works bearing in some degree on Church history, issued within two years, fills 225 pages. The officers of the society are: President, Bishop J. F. Hurst; vice presidents, Professors H. M. Baird, G. P. Fisher, H. E. Jacobs, and Dr. C. C. Tiffany; secretary, Dr. S. M. Jackson; treasurer, Mr. Barr Ferree; councillors, Drs. T. W. Chalmers, J. M. Buckley, H. C. Vedder, and H. M. McCracken. The third paper gives interesting glimpses of New England two hundred years ago. "The august position of the minister in the Puritan settlement may be illustrated by a sentence from Ezekiel Rogers, the first pastor of the neighboring town of Rowley. . . . When a stranger ventured to inquire of him, 'Are you, sir, the person who serves here?' he replied, 'I am, sir, the person who rules here;' but that early Puritan ministry of New England deserved the profound and affectionate respect of their own and of all subsequent generations." Touching the witchcraft mania is the following: "Witchcraft was for centuries the nightmare of Christendom. The nineteen persons executed in Salem in 1692 seem hardly worthy of mention when we think of the tens of thousands put to death on the same charge in Europe." Judge Sewall recognized negroes and Indians as his own brothers. When his grandson and the daughter of a negro wood-chopper were baptized together in church he wrote in his diary, "So all are one in Christ." In 1700 he published a public protest against slavery in Massachusetts, the closing sentence of which was: "These *Ethiopians*, as black as they are, seeing they are the Sons and Daughters of the First *Adam*, the Brethren and Sisters of the last *ADAM*, and the Offspring of *GOD*; they ought to be treated with a Respect agreeable." That was in the days when Massachusetts was exporting fish to the West Indies to exchange for molasses, distilling the molasses into rum, and sending the rum to Africa to buy

negroes. Negroes are no longer bought and sold by Americans, but Massachusetts is still sending rum to Africa in enormous quantities. This typical Puritan was more hospitable to new thought two centuries ago than some men are now. After expostulating with some over what he regarded as errors Judge Sewall said: "If God should please by them to hold forth any light that had not been seen or entertained before, I should be so far from envying it that I should rejoice in it." On Tuesday, February 10, 1708, this Puritan chief justice, then fifty-six years old, spent the day in fasting and private prayer, in the upper chamber at the northeast end of his house, closing the shutters next the street, and the burden of his praying was in part as follows: "Perfect what is lacking in my faith and the faith of my dear yokefellow. Convert my children, especially Samuel and Hannah. Provide rest and settlement for Hannah. Recover Mary, save Judith, Elizabeth, and Joseph. Requite the labor of love of my kinswoman Jane Tappin; give her health, find out rest for her. Make David a man after thine own heart. Let Susan live and be baptized with the Holy Ghost and with fire. Steer the government in this difficult time, when the governor and many others are so much at variance. Direct, incline, overrule on the council day, February 12th, as to the special work of filling the Superior Court with justices, or any other things of like nature. Bless the company for the propagation of the Gospel. Revive the business of religion at Natick, and accept and bless John Neesnumin, who went thither last week for that end. Bless the South Church. Save the town, college, province. Defend the purity of worship. Save this New World, that Christ, who is stronger, would bind the strong man and spoil his house; and order the word to be given that Babylon is fallen." This godly judge, a high model for the judges of to-day, died comforting himself with the words, "If any man sin we have an Advocate with the Father, even Jesus Christ the righteous." His body for one hundred and sixty years has lain under the trees in the shadow of Park Street Church, in Boston. Of his portrait Whittier wrote:

The face that a child would climb to kiss,  
True and tender, and brave and just,  
That man might honor and woman trust.

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#### MISCELLANEOUS.

*Thoughts on Religion.* By the late GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. Second edition. 12mo, pp. 195. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. Price, cloth, \$1.25.

The first edition of this book was exhausted almost immediately. The ability of the author, the peculiarities of his religious history, the oscillations of his mind upon fundamental problems of thought, his undoubted sincerity and frankness, gave the public an interest in knowing what might be the character of his final utterances on the great matters treated in this posthumous volume. Most of the papers contained therein were written during the last winter of his life, and when he died, in the early

summer of 1894, were put, by his desire, into the hands of Dr. Charles Gore, Canon of Westminster, to be used as he might see fit. Canon Gore, believing that their publication would serve the cause of truth, arranged them as they now appear, accompanied with thirty pages of introductory explanation and comment in the "Editor's Preface." These essays and notes, as the editor says, represent the tendency of a mind from a position of unbelief in the Christian revelation toward one of belief in it; a tendency of seeking after God if haply he might feel after him and find him, and not a position of settled orthodoxy. Galileo in the old cathedral at Pisa watched with absorbed interest the swinging of the lamp amid the incense and before the altar of worship; in this book we watch the swinging to and fro of an intellectual pendulum across the greatest subjects of human thought, sometimes before the altar and sometimes away into regions where are no altars and no worship.

*Illustrative Notes*, 1896. A Guide to the Study of the Sunday School Lessons, with Original and Selected Comments, Methods of Teaching, Illustrative Stories, Practical Applications, Notes on Eastern Life, Library References, Maps, Tables, Pictures, and Diagrams. By JESSE LYMAN HURLBUT and ROBERT REMMINGTON DOHERTY. 8vo, pp. 384. New York: Hunt & Eaton. Cincinnati: Cranston & Curtis. Price, cloth, \$1.25.

The first half of the coming year the Sunday school lessons are in the gospel according to Luke, and the second half in Old Testament history. It is a joy to read this book, proving, as it does, that in no department of study and instruction, not even in scientific laboratories, or in surgeries, or in machineries, are facilities, implements, and methods more advanced, improved, and complete than in the study of Holy Scripture by the aids furnished in this volume of *Illustrative Notes*. It is an orderly storehouse of richest materials gathered from the fields of exegesis, history, topography, choice literature, and actual life. It makes the Bible luminous and its study fascinating. The book is full of pictures, which make places and customs, and costumes and dwellings, and tombs and temples, as vivid and familiar to the reader as if he traveled the sacred lands and saw these things with his own eyes. The maps are clear, accurate, and ample. And, especially, nothing could be finer than the nearly three hundred literary illustrations, gathered from choicest sources, in a wide and varied range of literature. We do not remember ever to have seen a better volume of Sunday School Lesson Helps. Every teacher in Methodism should have it, and the older scholars as well. And for Bible study in the home, without reference to the Sunday school, nothing could be better.

*Under the Old Elms*. By MARY B. CLAFLIN, Author of "Brampton Sketches," "Personal Recollections of John G. Whittier," "Real Happenings." 16mo, pp. 150. New York and Boston: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. Price, cloth, gilt top, \$1.

Mrs. Claflin, the wife of Hon. William Claflin, ex-Governor of Massachusetts, is well known by her earnest and active interest in the promotion of education, literature, and religion. Her books are like the hospitalities of her home, gracious, graceful, sweet, and engaging, full of memories and echoes of many distinguished and delightful guests.



